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Abstract
In this thesis we present a new secret sharing scheme based on binary error-correcting
codes, which can realize arbitrary (monotone or non-monotone) access structures.
In this secret sharing scheme the secret is a codeword in a binary error-correcting
code and the shares are binary words of the same length. When a group of participants
wants to reconstruct the secret, the participants calculate the sum of their shares and
apply Hamming decoding to that sum. The shares have the property that, when
the group is authorized, the secret is the codeword which is closest to the sum of the
shares. Otherwise, the sum diers strongly enough from the secret such that Hamming
decoding yields another codeword.
The shares can be described by the solutions of a system of linear equations which
is closely related to rst order Reed-Muller codes. We consider the case that there are
only two dierent Hamming distances from the sums of the shares to the secret: one
small distance k for the authorized sets and one large distance g for unauthorized sets.
For this case a method of how to nd suitable shares for arbitrary access structures is
presented.
In the resulting secret sharing scheme large code lengths are needed and the security
distance g is rather small. In order to nd classes of access structures which have more
ecient and secure realizations, we classify the access structures such that all access
structures of one class allow the same parameters g and k. Furthermore we study
several changes in the access structure and their impact on the possible realizations.
This gives rise to special classes of access structures dened by veto sets and
necessary sets, which are particularly suitable for our approach.
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Zusammenfassung
In dieser Arbeit stellen wir ein neues Secret Sharing Scheme basierend auf fehlerkorri-
gierenden Codes vor, mit dem beliebige (also auch nicht monotone) Zugrisstrukturen
realisiert werden konnen.
Das Geheimnis ist ein Codewort in einem binaren fehlerkorrigierenden Code und
die Teilgeheimnisse sind binare Worter derselben Lange. Wenn Teilnehmer das Geheim-
nis rekonstruieren wollen, bilden sie die Summe ihrer Teilgeheimnisse und wenden
Hamming-Decodierung auf das Ergebnis an. Die Teilgeheimnisse sind derart beschaf-
fen, dass fur alle zulassigen Konstellationen das Geheimnis das nachstgelegene Code-
wort ist. Andernfalls ist der Abstand der Summe zum Geheimnis so gro, dass
Hamming-Decodierung ein anderes Codewort liefert.
Die Teilgeheimnisse konnen durch Losungen eines linearen Gleichungssystems be-
schrieben werden, welches in engem Zusammenhang zu Reed-Muller Codes erster Ord-
nung steht. Wir betrachten den Fall, dass es nur zwei verschiedene Hamming-Abstande
von den Summen der Teilgeheimnisse zum Geheimnis gibt: ein kleiner Abstand k fur
die zulassigen Konstellationen und ein groer Abstand g fur die unzulassigen. Fur
diesen Fall stellen wir eine Methode zur Erstellung passender Teilgeheimnisse vor.
Die Codelangen im resultierenden Secret Sharing Scheme sind jedoch sehr gro
und die Sicherheitsabstande g sind eher klein. Um Klassen von Zugrisstrukturen
zu nden, die ezientere und sicherere Realisierungen zulassen, klassizieren wir alle
Zugrisstrukturen, so dass alle Zugrisstrukturen in einer Klasse dieselben Parameter
g und k erlauben. Auerdem untersuchen wir die Auswirkung einiger Anderungen an
der Zugrisstruktur auf die moglichen Parameter.
Spezielle Klassen von Zugrisstrukturen, die uber Vetomengen und notwendige
Mengen deniert sind, erweisen sich als besonders geeignet fur unseren Ansatz.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Sharing Secrets
The security of many protocols for digital transactions is based on the secrecy of some
sensitive data. These \secrets" can be, for example, passwords or private keys in a
public-key cryptosystem, which are used for digital signatures.
There are situations, where a secret has to be provided to a group of users, which
are, viewed individually, not entirely trustworthy. Only certain groups of participants,
which are considered as trustworthy, should have access to the secret. Furthermore,
when storing highly sensitive data it might be advisable to split it up into pieces and
store these pieces in dierent locations. The single pieces should provide as little
as possible information about the data and only if a minimum number of pieces is
combined, the original data should be recovered. This increases the required eort for
an attacker signicantly.
In both cases the use of a secret sharing scheme can be helpful. As the name
suggests, a secret sharing scheme is a method of sharing a secret among a set of
participants. For a given secret the so-called dealer calculates suitable shares and
distributes them to the participants. The shares shall have the property that only
certain predened subsets of participants are able to reconstruct the secret from their
shares. These subsets are called authorized and the set of all authorized subsets is
called access structure. The remaining subsets are called unauthorized. They should
learn as little as possible about the secret from their shares.
Secret Sharing Schemes were introduced independently by Shamir [35] and Blakely
[7] in 1979. Both schemes are designed to realize so-called threshold access structures,
where all sets of participants are authorized if and only if their cardinalities reach a
predened threshold. In 1991 Simmons et al. proposed a secret sharing scheme which
can be used to realize all monotone access structures ([27]). In these access structures
all supersets of authorized sets are also authorized. For further reading on monotone
secret sharing we recommend the surveys [36] and [3].
It depends strongly on the access structure if there exists a suitable secret sharing
scheme to realize it. Almost all secret sharing schemes are limited to special types of
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access structures, especially to monotone access structures.
However, there are many scenarios that require more general access structures and
it is worth developing secret sharing schemes to realize them. Suppose, for example,
that the participant set consists of two disjoint sets A and B and that the recon-
struction of the secret should be possible if and only if at least as many participants
from A as from B are involved. This access structure is non-monotone: Consider an
authorized set A[B, A 2 A, B 2 B. That means jAj  jBj. When we add more than
jAj  jBj participants from group B, the resulting set is unauthorized since it contains
more participants from B than from A.
Another example of non-monotone access structures are those, where certain par-
ticipants have veto power. That means there is a set V of participants, such that
all sets B with B \ V 6= ? are unauthorized. This access structure is non-monotone
since for all authorized sets A and all participants v 2 V the superset A [ fvg is
unauthorized.
By now very little is yet known about secret sharing schemes realizing arbitrary
access structures. The only exception is a secret sharing scheme presented by Schulze
[34]. He proposed a linear geometric construction to realize arbitrary access structures.
However, depending on the access structure, linear spaces of very large dimensions are
needed.
In this work we present a new secret sharing scheme based on error-correcting
codes that realizes all kinds of access structures.
1.2 Our Approach towards Secret Sharing
Consider the following secret sharing scheme on the participant set T = fT1; : : : ; Ttg.
The secret as well as the shares are binary words of the same length n and the recovery
of the secret is done by adding the shares in the vector space Zn2 . Then, for example,
the access structure   = fA  T : Tj 2 Ag for a xed j can be realized easily by
assigning the secret s as share to the participant Tj and the zero word of length n
to each of the other participants. When a group of participants tries to reconstruct
the secret they add their words and receive s if Tj takes part in the reconstruction.
Otherwise they receive the zero word and learn nothing about the secret. The security
and eciency of this secret sharing scheme can hardly be topped, but the example is
unrealistic as actually no secret sharing scheme is needed. Furthermore, most access
structures have no realizations like that. For example   = fA  T : jAj = 1g cannot
be realized with this method if there are three or more participants: Each participant
needs to receive the secret as a share and therefore each set with an odd number of
participants gains the secret.
We improve this concept by sharing codewords of an error-correcting code C  Zn2 .
Thus we can allow the sums of shares of the authorized sets to dier a little bit from
the secret. Using a decoding algorithm this error can be corrected if it does not exceed
the error-correction capability of the code C and the authorized sets receive the secret
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codeword s. That means, when a group of participants is authorized, we want the
secret to be the codeword which is closest to the sum such that Hamming decoding
yields the secret. Otherwise, when the participants are unauthorized, we want the sum
of their shares to dier strongly enough from the secret such that Hamming decoding
outputs another codeword.
1.3 Outline of this Thesis
This work is organized as follows.
In Chapter 2 we give an overview of the fundamentals of secret sharing schemes.
We start with the formal denition of secret sharing schemes and introduce the terms
perfectness and rate. Then we present two well known secret sharing schemes which
realize threshold structures and general monotone access structures. Furthermore,
we describe Schulze's secret sharing scheme which realizes arbitrary access structures.
Finally, we have a look at management models of secret sharing schemes which include
another trusted entity, the combiner.
Chapter 3 summarizes the fundamentals of error-correcting codes. This includes
terms like the error-correction and detection capability, the minimum distance and the
covering radius of a code. Furthermore we deal with the weight distribution of a code
and its dual code and their connection given by the MacWilliams identity. Finally, we
present four important families of codes where we focus on Reed-Muller codes, which
play an important role in this work.
In Chapter 4 we present our new approach towards secret sharing based on error-
correcting codes. We start with an overview of the current state of research. Then
we turn to our approach and develop a method of how to nd suitable shares for all
kinds of access structures. For this purpose the structure of the shares is extensively
studied. We restrict ourselves to the case that the share sums of all authorized sets
have the same distance k to the secret and that all sums of the unauthorized sets have
the distance g. It turns out that large code lengths are required and that the distance
g is rather small.
The rest of this work deals with the search for access structures which allow more
favorable parameters.
Chapter 5 is about the classication of access structures such that all access struc-
tures in the same class allow the same parameters b1; g; k, where b1 is the weight of
the secret. Provided that there is one access structure with favorable parameters, this
gives us the possibility to identify a whole class of access structures with these param-
eters. We also present a renement of this classication such that all access structures
in the same rened class also have the same suitable codes.
In Chapter 6 we present several techniques of how to construct new access struc-
tures from already given access structure and study their impact on the possible pa-
rameters b1; g; k and the suitable codes. These techniques are the transition from
an access structure to its dual access structure (which consists of the unauthorized
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sets), the embedding of access structures into larger participant sets, the symmetric
dierence of an access structure with an unauthorized set, the intersection of access
structures and the removal of one authorized set.
In Chapter 7 we use the results of Chapter 5 and 6 to identify special classes of
access structures which allow very good parameters. On the one hand these are access
structures related to Reed-Muller codes. On the other hand certain access structures
dened by veto sets and necessary sets have favorable parameters.
Chapter 8 summarizes the results of the previous chapters and gives a brief outlook
on possible further work.
Chapter 2
Basic Concepts of Secret Sharing
In this chapter we give an overview of the basic concepts of secret sharing. We intro-
duce the basic denitions and methods and describe the most commonly known secret
sharing schemes. Furthermore, we describe Schulze's scheme which realizes arbitrary
access structures. We start with the formal denition of secret sharing schemes in
terms of distribution functions as Stinson proposed in [37].
2.1 Basic Denitions
Denition 2.1. Let T = fT1; : : : ; Ttg be a set of participants. The subsets of T which
should be able to recreate the secret from their shares are called authorized. The other
subsets are called unauthorized. The set   of all authorized subsets is called access
structure.
According to our denition any subset of P(T ) is an access structure. However,
there are types of access structures which appear to be more natural than others and
have been widely studied. The most prominent types are the following.
Denition 2.2. (a) An access structure of the form   = fA  T : jAj  g is called
(jT j; )-threshold structure with threshold .
(b) An access structure with the property that for all A 2   any superset B  A
is also authorized is called monotone. Otherwise we call the access structure
non-monotone.
It is easy to see that threshold structures are monotone. For a monotone access
structure   let
 min = fU  T : U 2   and V =2   for all V  Ug
be the set of all minimal authorized sets and
 max = fU  T : U =2   and U 6 V for all V  T ; V =2  g
5
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be the set of all maximal unauthorized sets with respect to  .  min and  max uniquely
characterize the monotone access structure  .
Denition 2.3. A secret sharing scheme on a participant set T which realizes the
access structure   is a 6-tupel (T ; ;S;K;F ; r) with the following components:
(a) T = fT1; : : : ; Ttg is a non-empty participant set.
(b)   is an access structure on the participant set T .
(c) S is the set of all possible secrets that can be shared with the scheme.
(d) K denotes the set of all possible shares.
(e) F = S
s2S
Fs is the set of the distribution functions. For each secret s 2 S each
distribution function fs 2 Fs assigns appropriate shares kj to the participants
Tj.
fs : T ! K
Tj 7! kj for all j = 1; : : : ; t
(f) r is the recovery function. For each set of shares r outputs the secret s if
the shares come from a distribution function for s and if the related group of
participants is authorized. Otherwise r outputs a denitely dierent value s0 2 S,
s0 6= s, or a random element of S. This depends on the concrete realization of
the secret sharing scheme.
r : P(K) ! S
fkj1 ; : : : ; kj`g 7!
8>>>><>>>>:
s if fkj1 ; : : : ; kj`g = fs (fTj1 ; : : : ; Tj`g)
with fTj1 ; : : : ; Tj`g 2  ;
s0 otherwise:
We use the term \function" in a general sense as random choices are involved.
The computation of the shares and their distribution to the participants are per-
formed by a trusted entity, the so-called dealer.
All components of a secret sharing scheme are public. The security of the scheme
depends on the structure of the shares. They have to be constructed in a way that the
shares of each unauthorized subset provide little to no information about the secret.
So-called perfect secret sharing schemes provide maximum security.
Denition 2.4. A secret sharing scheme (T ; ;S;K;F ; r) is called perfect if for all
secrets s 2 S and all distribution functions fs 2 Fs the following equation holds:
p (sj fkj1 ; : : : ; kj`g) = p(s)
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for all fkj1 ; : : : ; kj`g = fs (fTj1 ; : : : ; Tj`g) with fTj1 ; : : : ; Tj`g =2  ,
where p(s) is the probability of guessing the secret s and p (sj fkj1 ; : : : ; kj`g) is the
conditional probability of guessing the secret s when the shares kj1 ; : : : ; kj` are known.
That means, in a perfect secret sharing scheme the shares of each unauthorized
set of participants yield no further information about the secret. For this reason only
monotone access structures can be realized by perfect secret sharing schemes: If there
is an unauthorized set B containing an authorized set A, the participants from B get
to know the secret from the shares of A.
Next we consider the information rate, which is a measure for the eciency of a
secret sharing scheme.
Denition 2.5. For each participant Tj, j = 1; : : : ; t, let Kj = ff(Tj) : f 2 Fg =S
s2S
ffs(Tj) : fs 2 Fsg be the set of all possible shares for all possible secrets that he
might receive from a distribution function. Dene
qj =
log2(jSj)
log2(jKjj)
:
Then
q = min fqj : 1  q  tg
is called information rate of the scheme.
Since there are jSj secrets, each secret can be represented by a binary word with
length log2(jSj) and one can say that each secret contains log2(jSj) bits of information.
In the same way each share of the participant Tj contains log2(jKjj) bits of information.
That means qj is the ratio of the information contents of an arbitrary secret and an
arbitrary share of participant Tj.
A high information rate is desirable as it means an ecient distribution of the
information of each secret on the corresponding shares. In [37] Stinson shows that each
perfect secret sharing scheme realizing a monotone access structure has an information
rate q  1. This motivates the following denition.
Denition 2.6. A perfect secret sharing scheme with information rate q = 1 is called
ideal.
If, for example, a secret sharing scheme is perfect and each element of Zp can be
chosen as a secret and as a share, we have
q = qj =
log2(p)
log2(p)
= 1
and the secret sharing scheme is ideal. In the non-perfect case larger information rates
are possible. For example, consider the following t-threshold scheme on the partici-
pant set fT1; : : : ; Ttg. Let S = Ztp be the secret set. Suppose that each participant
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Tj receives the jth component of the secret. Then K = Zp. The scheme is not per-
fect, since the knowledge of each component restricts the search for the secret. The
information rate is q = log2(p
t)
log2(p)
= t  1.
2.2 Secret Sharing Schemes Realizing Special Ac-
cess Structures
In this section we present two very well-known secret sharing schemes realizing thresh-
old structures and (general) monotone access structures. An overview of secret sharing
schemes using error-correcting codes is given in Chapter 4.
2.2.1 Shamir's Threshold Scheme
In [35] Shamir presents a perfect secret sharing scheme which can realize all threshold
structures. It is based on the fact that one needs at least  data points to interpolate
a polynomial of degree   1. Shamir's scheme has the following components.
(a) T = fT1; : : : ; Ttg
(b)   =   is a (jT j; )-threshold structure with an arbitrary threshold 1    t.
(c) S = Zp, p prime, is the set of all possible secrets. p is a security parameter.
When p increases it becomes more and more unlikely to guess the right secret.
(d) The share set is K = Zp n f0g  Zp.
(e) In order to distribute a secret s 2 Zp according to the access structure   the
dealer chooses randomly a polynomial f 2 Zp[x] of degree    1 with f(0) = s
and pairwise disjoint values x1; : : : ; xt 2 Zp n f0g. Then he assigns the shares
kj = (xj; f(xj)) via the distribution function
fs : T ! K
Tj 7! (xj; f(xj))
to the participants.
(f) When some participants Tj1 ; : : : ; Tj` want to recover the secret they apply an
interpolation algorithm on their data points, for example Lagrange interpolation.
They determine a polynomial g of degree at most ` 1. If `   the participants
receive g = f and are able to determine s = f(0). Otherwise g 6= f and no
information about f(0) is provided. The recovery function is given by
r : P(K) ! S
fkj1 ; : : : ; kj`g 7! g(0);
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where g 2 Zp[x] is the result of an polynomial interpolation algorithm with input
(xj1 ; f(xj1)); : : : ; (xj` ; f(xj`)).
Since the shares of any unauthorized set provide no information about s, Shamir's
scheme is perfect. Additionally, when we always use the same x-values x1; : : : ; xt, for
example xj = j for all j = 1; : : : ; t, we have K = Zp = S and the scheme is ideal.
2.2.2 Simmons' Linear Secret Sharing Scheme
In [27] Simmons et al. propose a linear algebraic secret sharing scheme which can
realize all monotone access structures. The shares as well as the secret s are points in
a projective space. s is the intersection point of a publicly known line L and a secret
subspace U . The participants receive elements of U such that only the authorized sets
are able to generate U and to determine s.
(a) T = fT1; : : : ; Ttg
(b)   is an arbitrary monotone access structure on T with  max = n.
(c) The secret set S is a 1-dimensional subspace L of a projective space P of dimen-
sion n.
(d) The set K of all possible shares is given by P(P). Each share consists of a set of
points in the projective space P. The empty set can also be a share.
(e) Let  max = fU1; : : : ; Ung. In order to distribute a secret s 2 L according to   the
dealer chooses randomly a (n  1)-dimensional projective subspace U of P such
that the secret is the intersection point of U and the secret set L. He determines
a basis B = fb1; : : : ; bng of U such that b1; : : : ; bn and s are in general position.
Now the dealer distributes the shares using the distribution function
fs : T ! K
Tj 7! fbi 2 B : Tj =2 Uig :
(f) When a set T of participants wants to recover the secret they join their points
bi1 ; : : : ; bi` and determine the projective subspace A := hbi1 ; : : : ; bi`i. Since   is
monotone we know that T is unauthorized i T  Ui for an 1  i  n. In
this case the basis element bi is missing in the shares of all participants of T .
dim(A)  n  1 and A \ L = ? since b1; : : : ; bn and s are in general position.
When T is authorized, then T * Ui for all i = 1; : : : ; n and each bi must be
distributed to one or more participants of T . Hence A = U and A \ L gives the
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secret. The recovery \function" is given by
r : P(K) ! S
fkj1 ; : : : ; kj`g 7!
8><>:the unique element of h
S`
m=1
kjmi \ L if h
S`
m=1
kjmi \ L 6= ?
a random element of L else.
Simmon's scheme is perfect, since the shares of the unauthorized sets provide no
further information about the secret. But it is not ideal because the shares may consist
of more than one element of P.
2.3 Schulze's Scheme Realizing Arbitrary Access
Structures
Schulze's scheme described in [34] is inspired by Simmon's scheme. It is based on
the following idea. Let   be an access structure with the authorized sets A1; : : : ; An.
For each authorized set Ai =
n
Tk1;i ; : : : ; Tk`i;i
o
the set fAig can be considered as
a monotone access structure on the participant set
n
Tk1;i ; : : : ; Tk`i;i
o
with the only
authorized set Ai and with fAigmax = fA  Ai : jAj = `i   1g and jfAigmaxj = `i.
Hence it can be realized with Simmon's scheme using a `i-dimensional projective
space Pi. These realizations of the single fAig are merged into one realization of
  by choosing the Pi to be independent subspaces of a larger projective space P. For
this purpose, each secret needs to have a representative in each of the Pi.
Schulze's scheme is perfect. But unfortunately, the dimension of P increases with
the number of the authorized sets and the number of participants within these sets.
Schulze's scheme has the following components.
(a) T = fT1; : : : ; Ttg is the participant set.
(b)   = fA1; : : : ; Ang is an arbitrary access structure on T containing the authorized
sets A1; : : : ; An 2 P(T ). For i = 1; : : : ; n let `i = jAij.
(c) In a projective space P of dimension d = n   1 +
nP
i=1
`i the dealer chooses n
linearly independent subspaces P1; : : : ;Pn and in each subspace Pi he chooses a
one-dimensional subspace Li. Each secret is represented by a certain element of
each Li, where all Li represent the same set of secrets. That means each secret
s has n representatives s1; : : : ; sn with si 2 Li for all i = 1; : : : ; n. W.l.o.g one
can say that the secret set is S = L1 since all Li have the same cardinalities.
(d) The set K of all possible shares is given by P(P) n f?g. Each share consists of
a non-empty set of points in the projective space P.
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(e) Let s be the secret to be shared. Then s has a representative si in each Li. In
each Pi the dealer chooses randomly a (`i   1)-dimensional projective subspace
Ui such that the representative si is the intersection point of Ui and Li. For each
authorized set Ai =
n
Tk1;i ; : : : ; Tk`i;i
o
he chooses `i elements uk1;i ; : : : ; uk`i;i of Ui
which generate Ui, such that these elements and si are in general position within
Ui. Finally, he determines a basis Bi of Pi for all i = 1; : : : ; n. Now the dealer
distributes the shares using the distribution function
fs : T ! K
Tj 7!
[
i:Tj2Ai
fuj;ig [
[
i:Tj =2Ai
Bi:
(f) When a set T of participants wants to recover the secret they determine the
subspace B which is generated by all their elements. Then all sections B \ Li
are considered Since the Pi are linearly independent, these sections can be studied
separately. We have
B \ Li =
8>><>>:
Ui \ Li = fsig if T = Ai
? if T ( Ai
Pi \ Li = Li if T 6= Ai; T 6 Ai
:
When T is authorized, there is exactly one section B \  i which consists of
one element si. This element represents the secret s. Otherwise, when T is
unauthorized, the participants do not learn anything about the secret from their
shares and can only guess a representative for the secret. Hence Schulze's scheme
is perfect.
The recovery \function" is given by
r : P(K) ! S
fkj1 ; : : : ; kj`g 7!
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
the element of S represented by the unique element of
h S`
m=1
kjmi \ Li if h
S`
m=1
kjmi \ Li 62 f?; Lig
the element of S represented by a random element of Li
if h S`
m=1
kjmi \ Li 2 f?; Lig for all i = 1; : : : ; n
:
2.4 Management Models
In this section we have a closer look at the parties involved in a secret sharing scheme
and their connections to each other. In the classical management model the lifetime
of a secret sharing scheme consists of two phases:
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1. Initially, the dealer chooses a secret s 2 S that he wants to share according to  .
Then he distributes suitable shares k1; : : : ; kt among the participants T1; : : : ; Tt
using a distribution function fs 2 Fs. This phase is called sharing phase.
2. In the so called recovery phase a group fTj1 ; : : : ; Tj`g of participants pool their
shares kj1 ; : : : ; kj` together and calculate r (fkj1 ; : : : ; kj`g).
In this model the recovery is public in the sense that all involved shares and, if the
participants are authorized, also the secret become public to all attending participants.
Therefore the scheme can be used only for one time. But there is an even more serious
problem.
Consider a non-monotone access structure   and an authorized set A 2   such
that there is an unauthorized superset B  A. When the participants of B try to
recover the secret using all their shares, they fail. But since all members of B want
to know the secret and the risk of being caught is very low, it is very likely that they
will agree on the following. Only the participants from A reconstruct the secret and
the remaining members of B watch that process and learn the secret, too. This can
be avoided by introducing another trusted party: the combiner. A combiner driven
management model works as follows.
1. In the sharing phase the dealer chooses a secret s 2 S. Then he calculates
suitable shares k1; : : : ; kt as in the classical model, but keeps them secret. For
each j = 1; : : : ; t the participant Tj receives a concealed share k
0
j instead of kj,
such that the original share kj can be recovered from k
0
j when some additional
information c is known (for example c is a set of keys of a symmetric encryption
system and k0j is the encryption of kj using one of these keys). The dealer sends
the additional information c to the combiner. All transmissions are performed
via secure channels.
Dealer Combiner
T1 : : : Tt
c
k01 k0t: : :
Figure 2.1: Sharing phase in a combiner driven model
2. In the recovery phase a group fTj1 ; : : : ; Tj`g of participants send their concealed
shares k0j1 ; : : : ; k
0
j`
via a secure channel to the combiner. Using his additional
information c he recovers the original shares kj1 ; : : : ; kj` . Then he calculates
r (fkj1 ; : : : ; kj`g) and sends the result via a secure channel to the device which
carries out the desired action if it receives the secret.
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Dealer Combiner
Tj1 : : : Tj`
k0j1 : : : k
0
j`
Figure 2.2: Recreation phase part 1 in a combiner driven model
Device
Dealer Combiner
Tj1 : : : Tj`
r(fkj1 ; : : : ; kj`g)
Figure 2.3: Recreation phase part 2 in a combiner driven model
In a combiner driven model the participants do not know the original shares.
Furthermore they do not learn the secret, even if they are authorized. Hence the
secret sharing scheme can be used for several times with the same secret and the same
shares. In addition to that the participants have no longer the possibility to make
their own arrangements during the recovery phase.

Chapter 3
Error-Correcting Codes (ECC)
This chapter provides basic knowledge about coding theory which is fundamental for
this thesis. We present the basic denitions and concepts and describe some families
of codes which play a role in the following chapters. A more detailed introduction into
coding theory can be found for example in [5],[43] and [21].
3.1 Basic Denitions and Concepts
The aim of coding is to modify data in a way, such that random errors, that occur
during the transmission, can be detected or even corrected. For this purpose redun-
dancy is added to the original data which makes the data more \distinguishable" from
each other. This makes it is easier to nd out if errors have occurred or even which
errors these were and to restore the original data.
In our context data are words over a given alphabet. The modied data words
are called codewords and are words over the same alphabet. The set of all these
codewords is called code and the transition from the original word to the codeword
is called encoding. In this work we consider only so called block codes, where all
codewords have the same length.
Denition 3.1. Let A be a nite set (an alphabet) and n 2 N. Then each subset
C of An = A : : : A| {z }
n
is a (block) code with length n. The elements of C are called
codewords. In the case A = Z2 the code C is a binary (block) code.
Example 3.2. Consider the alphabet A = Z2 and the binary block code
C = f(0; 0; 0; 0); (0; 0; 1; 1); (0; 1; 0; 1); (0; 1; 1; 0);
(1; 0; 0; 1); (1; 0; 1; 0); (1; 1; 0; 0); (1; 1; 1; 1)g  A4:
The codewords come from the eight data words (0; 0; 0), (0; 0; 1), (0; 1; 0), (0; 1; 1),
(1; 0; 0), (1; 0; 1), (1; 1; 0), (1; 1; 1) 2 A3 which are encoded by adding the following
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redundancy bits
(0; 0; 0)! (0; 0; 0; 0) (1; 0; 0)! (1; 0; 0; 1)
(0; 0; 1)! (0; 0; 1; 1) (1; 0; 1)! (1; 0; 1; 0)
(0; 1; 0)! (0; 1; 0; 1) (1; 1; 0)! (1; 1; 0; 0)
(0; 1; 1)! (0; 1; 1; 0) (1; 1; 1)! (1; 1; 1; 1):
C is a so-called parity check code where the original words are encoded by adding a
parity check bit, such that each codeword has an even number of ones.
In the following we use the term \code" instead of \block code". Now we specify
how words can be distinguish from each other.
Denition 3.3. Let A be a nite alphabet and n 2 N.
(a) Consider two words a = (a1; : : : ; an), b = (b1; : : : ; bn) 2 An. The number
d(a; b) := # fi : 1  i  n; ai 6= big
is called Hamming distance of a and b.
(b) Let C  An be an arbitrary code. Then
d(C) = min fd(a; b) : a; b 2 C; a 6= bg
is the minimum distance of C.
Example 3.4. The codewords of the binary code
C = f(0; 0; 0; 0)| {z }
a
; (0; 0; 1; 1)| {z }
b
; (0; 1; 0; 1)| {z }
c
; (0; 1; 1; 0)| {z }
d
;
(1; 0; 0; 1)| {z }
e
; (1; 0; 1; 0)| {z }
f
; (1; 1; 0; 0)| {z }
g
; (1; 1; 1; 1)| {z }
h
g:
from Example 3.2. have the Hamming distances
d a b c d e f g h
a 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 4
b 2 0 2 2 2 2 4 2
c 2 2 0 2 2 4 2 2
d 2 2 2 0 4 2 2 2
e 2 2 2 4 0 2 2 2
f 2 2 4 2 2 0 2 2
g 2 4 2 2 2 2 0 2
h 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 0
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and the minimum distance is d(C) = 2. In contrast to that there are original words
(for example (0; 0; 1) and (0; 1; 1)) that dier only in one position. Hence the encoding
enlarged the distance between the words.
Now suppose that a codeword c is sent over a channel and the word x is received.
The receiver knows that a codeword was sent and when x is a codeword, he assumes
that x is the correct codeword. Otherwise he knows that errors have occurred. De-
pending on the application he than has the possibility to request the codeword c again
or has to deduce the sent codeword c from x. The process of assigning a codeword to
a received word is called decoding.
Denition 3.5. The following decoding algorithm is called Hamming decoding. Let
C  An be an arbitrary code. Suppose that a codeword has been sent and the word
x 2 An is received. Then Hamming decoding outputs an arbitrary codeword c 2 C
with the property
d(c; x) = min
c02C
d(c0; x):
That means Hamming decoding yields one of the codewords which are closest to
the received word with respect to the Hamming distance.
Example 3.6. Consider the code C from Example 3.2. When the word x = (1; 0; 0; 0) 2
Z42 is received, Hamming decoding outputs one of the data words (0; 0; 0), (1; 0; 0),
(1; 0; 1) and (1; 1; 0) since the related codewords have a Hamming distance of 1 to x.
Next we study the impact of the minimum distance of a code on its error-detection
and error-correction capability when Hamming decoding is used.
Denition and Remark 3.7. When a codeword c 2 C  An is sent and the word
x 2 An with d(c; x) = t is received, we know that t errors have occurred during
transmission. Whether these errors can be detected or even corrected depends on the
minimum distance of the code C in the following way.
 Let d(C)  t + 1. Then x cannot be a codeword of C and we know that errors
have occurred. C is called a t-error-detecting code.
c c0 2 C
x
d(C)>t
t
 Let d(C)  2t+1. Then c is the codeword lying next to x and Hamming decoding
yields the correct codeword. C is called a t-error-correcting code.
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c c0 2 C
x
d(C)>2t
t t
That means C can correct up to
j
d(C) 1
2
k
errors, regardless of which codeword
was sent and on which positions the errors occurred. That is why
j
d(C) 1
2
k
is
called error-correction capability of C. Nevertheless, there may be codewords
and positions such that Hamming decoding still yields the right codeword when
more than
j
d(C) 1
2
k
errors occur.
Example 3.8. (a) The binary code C from Example 3.2 has minimum distance
d = 2 and is a 1-error-detecting and 0-error-correcting code.
(b) In contrast to that the binary code
C = f(0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0); (0; 1; 0; 1; 0; 1); (1; 0; 1; 0; 1; 0); (1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1)g
has minimum distance d(C) = 3 and is a 2-error-detecting and 1-error-correcting
code. But when the codeword c = (0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0) is sent and x = (1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0)
is received, 2 errors have occurred and Hamming decoding yields nevertheless
the sent codeword c.
We now introduce another important parameter of a code: the covering radius. It
describes the Hamming distance from the code to the furthest word outside the code.
Denition 3.9. Let K be a nite eld, n 2 N and C  Kn a code. The smallest
r 2 N0 with the property that for all words x 2 Kn there is a codeword c 2 C with
d (x; c)  r is called covering radius (C) of C.
That means (C) is the smallest radius r such that the balls with radius r centered
in the codewords cover the whole space An. It follows directly from the denitions
that
(C) 

d(C)  1
2

:
Further details about the covering radius can be found in [15].
Example 3.10. The parity check code from Example 3.2 has covering radius (C) = 1:
Let x = (x1; x2; x3; x4) 2 Z42 be arbitrary. Then x or x0 = (x1; x2; x3; x4 + 1) have an
even number of ones and belong to C. Therefore the Hamming distance of x to the
code is one or zero.
The most frequently used codes are so-called linear codes.
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Denition 3.11. Let K be a nite eld, n 2 N and C  Kn a code. Suppose that C
is a linear subspace of Kn. Then C is called a linear code. Let k be the dimension of
C. Then C is called a [n; k]-code or a [n; k; d(C)]-code. If K has q elements we also say
that C is a [n; k; d(C)]q-code and for q = 2 the code is called a binary [n; k; d(C)]-code.
Example 3.12. Let u = (1; 1; 0; 0; 0); v = (0; 1; 1; 0; 0) 2 Z52. The linear subspace
C = hu; viZ2 = f0; u; v; u+ vg = f(0; 0; 0; 0; 0); (1; 1; 0; 0; 0); (0; 1; 1; 0; 0); (1; 0; 1; 0; 0)g
is a binary [5; 2; 2]-code.
Using a linear code it is very easy to encode the data words or to nd out, whether
a received word is a codeword or not.
Denition and Remark 3.13. Let C be a linear [n; k]-code over K.
(a) Let b1; : : : ; bk be a basis of C and G =
0BBB@
b1
b2
...
bk
1CCCA be the (k  n)-matrix whose rows
are these basis vectors. Then G denes an encoding of the original words in Kk
by
x = (x1; : : : ; xk) 7! x G =
kX
i=1
xibi for all x 2 Kk:
G is called a generator matrix of C.
Let c1; : : : ; cm be a generator set of C. Then G0 =
0BBB@
c1
c2
...
cm
1CCCA is called general
generator matrix of C. It has the property C = x G0 : x 2 Kk	.
(b) Since C is a k-dimensional subspace of Kn, C is the kernel of a linear function
h : Kn ! Kn k. Let H be the (n   k  n)-matrix with h(x) = H  x for all
x 2 Kn (x denotes the transposed vector of x). Then
H  x = 0 2 Kn k , x 2 C:
H is called a check matrix of C.
Example 3.14. The linear code C from Example 3.12 has the following generator
matrix G and check matrix H:
G =

u
v

=

1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0

; H =
0@1 1 1 0 00 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
1A :
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Denition 3.15. Let K be a nite eld and n 2 N.
(a) For all x = (x1; : : : ; xn) 2 Kn the number
wt(x) = # fi : 1  i  n; xi 6= 0g
is called (Hamming) weight of x.
(b) Let C 6= f0g be a code in Kn. Then
min fwt(c) : c 2 C; c 6= 0g
is called minimum weight of C.
Since the Hamming distance is translation invariant, the minimum distance and
the minimum weight of a code are the same when the code is linear. The minimum
distance of a linear code can be read from its check matrix:
Proposition 3.16. Let C be a linear [n; k]-code over K with check matrix H. Then
d(C) = min fr 2 N : H has r linearly dependent columnsg
= max fr 2 N : each r   1 columns of H are linearly independentg :
In particular that means d  rk(H) + 1 = n   k + 1. This inequality is called
Singleton bound.
When the roles of G and H are changed, we obtain a linear [n; n   k]-code with
generator matrix H and check matrix G, the so-called dual code.
Denition and Remark 3.17. Let C be a linear [n; k]-code over K with generator
matrix G and check matrix H. Then
C? = x H : x 2 Kn k	
is called the dual code of C. G is a check matrix of C? since
y 2 C?
, y = x H for a x 2 Kn k
, y  c? = 0 for all c 2 C
, G  y = 0:
Example 3.18. The dual code C? of the code C from Example 3.12 is generated by
the check matrix H from Example 3.14. Therefore
C? = h(1; 1; 1; 0; 0); (0; 0; 0; 1; 0); (0; 0; 0; 0; 1)iZ2
= f(0; 0; 0; 0; 0); (1; 1; 1; 0; 0); (0; 0; 0; 1; 0); (0; 0; 0; 0; 1)
(1; 1; 1; 1; 0); (1; 1; 1; 0; 1); (0; 0; 0; 1; 1); (1; 1; 1; 1; 1)g:
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Denition 3.19. Let C be a linear [n; k]-code over K.
(a) For all i = 0; 1; : : : ; n let wi be the number of codewords in C with weight i.
Then the vector
w(C) = (w0; w1; : : : ; wn)
is called weight distribution w(C).
(b) The polynomial
W (C; x) =
nX
i=0
wix
i 2 R[x]
is called weight counter of C.
Example 3.20. The linear code C from Example 3.12 and its dual code C? have the
weight distributions
w(C) = (1; 0; 3; 0; 0; 0) and w(C?) = (1; 2; 1; 1; 2; 1)
and the weight counters
W (C; x) = 1 + 3x2 and W (C?; x) = 1 + 2x+ x2 + x3 + 2x4 + x5:
The weight counters of a linear code and its dual code have the following important
relation.
Theorem 3.21 (MacWilliams Identity). Let C be a [n; k]q-code. Then
W (C?; x) = (1 + (q   1)x)
n
jCj W

C; 1  x
1 + (q   1)x

:
(For more details see [26].)
Example 3.22. In our example
(1 + (q   1)x)n
jCj W (C;
1  x
1 + (q   1)x) =
(1 + x)5
4

 
1 + 3

1  x
1 + x
2!
=
(1 + x)5
4
+
3
4
(1 + x)3(1  x)2
=
1
4
(1 + 5x+ 10x2 + 10x3 + 5x4 + x5) +
3
4
(1 + x  2x2   2x3 + x4 + x5)
= 1 + 2x+ x2 + x3 + 2x4 + x5
= W (C?; x):
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3.2 Important Families of Linear Codes
In this section we present some of the best-known and frequently used families of linear
codes.
3.2.1 Hamming Codes and Simplex Codes
Hamming codes were invented by Hamming in 1950. They are linear codes with
minimum distance three, which can be dened over arbitrary nite elds. We describe
Hamming codes by constructing their check matrices.
Let K be a nite eld with q elements and ` 2 N. The linear space K` has exactly
q` 1
q 1 one-dimensional subspaces (each non-zero vector generates one of these subspaces,
where the q 1 non-zero multiples of each vector generate the same subspace). Dene
the code length n = q
` 1
q 1 and the dimension k = n  `. In order to construct a check
matrix for a [n; k]-Hamming code we choose one generator of each one-dimensional
subspaces of K` and write these generators as columns in matrix. This yields a
(`  n)-matrix H over K. In the binary case each non-zero vector generates its own
one-dimensional subspace. In this case the check matrix consists of all non-zero vectors
of Z`2.
Example 3.23. For q = 2 and ` = 3 we obtain n = 2
3 1
2 1 = 7 and k = n  ` = 4.
H =
0@1 0 0 1 1 0 10 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 1
1A
is a check matrix for a [7; 4]-Hamming code, since each one-dimensional subspaces of
Z32 is represented by exactly one column.
Proposition 3.16 shows that all Hamming codes have minimum distance three. We
determine m = min fr 2 N : H has r linearly dependent columnsg:
 m 6= 1 since there is no zero column in H.
 m 6= 2 since there are no two columns which are multiples of each other.
 m = 3 since the sum of two columns of H generates another one-dimensional
subspace of K`.
d = 3 means that Hamming codes can detect up to d(C)  1 = 2 errors and correctj
d(C) 1
2
k
= 1 error. In other words, the balls B1(c) of radius one (with respect to the
Hamming distance) centered at the codewords are disjoint. Furthermore Hamming
codes have the property that the union of all balls B1(c) is already the whole space
Kn. Hence the error-correction capacity and the covering radius are equal. This makes
Hamming codes so-called perfect codes.
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The dual code of a [n; k]q = [
q` 1
q 1 ;
q` 1
q 1   `]q-Hamming code is called [ q
` 1
q 1 ; `]q-
Simplex code. Simplex codes have the property that all non-zero codewords have the
weight q` 1. Hence their minimum distance is also q` 1. For q = 2 Simplex codes have
the covering radius 2` 1   1.
3.2.2 Reed-Solomon Codes
Reed Solomon codes were introduced by Reed and Solomon in 1960 ([32]). These
codes are linear and non-binary. They have many applications in everyday life. For
example they are used for data storage on CDs, DVDs and for QR-codes.
Let K be a nite eld with q  3 elements. Choose a code length n and a minimum
distance d with 1  d  n  q and an ordered subset M = (x1; : : : ; xn) of K with
pairwise dierent elements. Then the related Reed-Solomon code C is dened by
C = f(f(x1); : : : ; f(xn)) : f 2 K[x]; deg(f)  n  dg :
Each word a = (a0; a1; : : : ; an d) 2 Kn d+1 is regarded as the polynomial fa(x) =
a0 + a1x+ : : :+ an dxn d 2 K[x] and is encoded via
a 7! (fa(x1); : : : ; fa(xn)) :
Each polynomial fa has at most n   d zeros. Therefore the codewords in C have at
least the weight d. On the other hand, the Singleton bound says d(C)  n k+1 = d.
This yields d(C) = d. Hence C is a [n; n  d+ 1; d]q-code.
Depending on the choice of M a Reed-Solomon code can have another important
property. K = (K n f0g ; ) is a cyclic group and there is an element  2 K with
K = f1 = 0; ; : : : ; q 2g and q 1 = 1. When we choose M = (1; ; : : : ; q 2),
the related Reed-Solomon code is a so-called cyclic code. That means the cyclic shift
of any codeword yields another codeword. This property allows faster encoding and
decoding algorithms. Furthermore, cyclic codes have the ability to detect burst errors
with length l  n  k, where all errors lie in a segment of the message with length l.
Example 3.24. For K = Z5 we have q = 5 and dene n = q 1 = 4.  = 2 generates
K since (0; 1; 2; 3; 4; ) = (x1; x2; x3; x4) = (1; 2; 4; 3). We choose d = 3. This
yields the Reed-Solomon code
C = f(f(1); f(2); f(4); f(3)) : f 2 Z5[x]; deg(f)  1g :
The data word a = (2; 3) 2 Z5 represents the polynomial 2+3x 2 Z5[x] and is encoded
to
c = (2 + 3  1; 2 + 3  2; 2 + 3  4; 2 + 3  3) = (0; 3; 4; 1):
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3.2.3 Reed-Muller Codes
Reed-Muller codes are a family of binary error-correcting linear codes. They were
invented by Reed and Muller in 1954. During the Mariner expeditions 6, 7 and 9 to
Mars in 1969-1972 a Reed-Muller code was used for image transmission to earth.
A Reed-Muller Code RM(r;m) is characterized by two variables r;m 2 N0 which
determine its parameters. Reed-Muller codes can be dened in many ways. Two of
them are the following.
Denition of RM(r;m) via Boolean polynomials:
A Boolean polynomial is a polynomial in Z2[x1; : : : ; xm]. Each Boolean polynomial
function f : Zm2 ! Z2 is uniquely characterized by its value table
xm 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 : : : 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
...
x3 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 : : : 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
x2 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 : : : 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
x1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 : : : 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
f(x1; : : : ; xm)         : : :        .
The last row of the table is the vector in Z2m2 which contains the function values for
all possible assignments of the variables x1; : : : ; xm in the given order. This vector is
called evaluation vector of the Boolean polynomial function f and is denoted with f .
We write f  f and say that f is related to f . It can be shown that any vector in
Z2m2 is the evaluation vector of a Boolean polynomial function.
Now we can dene RM(r;m) as the set of all evaluation vectors of Boolean poly-
nomial functions of degree less or equal r in m variables
RM(r;m) =

f : f : Zm2 ! Z2 Boolean polynomial function with degree  r
	
:
A generator matrix for RM(r;m) can be constructed by writing the evaluation
vectors of all monomial functions m : Zm2 ! Z2 of degree  r as rows in a matrix.
Example 3.25. Let r = 2 and m = 3. Then RM(r;m) is generated by the matrix
G =
0BBBBBBBBB@
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
1CCCCCCCCCA
 1
 x1
 x2
 x3
 x1  x2
 x1  x3
 x2  x3
:
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Denition of RM(r;m) via the Plotkin construction:
Let n 2 N and A;B  Zn2 . The Plotkin construction of A and B is dened by
A / B :=  a; a+ b 2 Z2n2 : a 2 A and b 2 B	 :
Starting with RM(0;m) := f(0; : : : ; 0); (1; : : : ; 1)g  Z2m2 for all m 2 N0 we dene
RM(r;m) by the recursion
RM(r;m) := RM(r;m  1) / RM(r   1;m  1):
Example 3.26.
RM(1; 1) / RM(0; 1) = f(0; 0); (0; 1); (1; 0); (1; 1)g / f(0; 0); (1; 1)g
= f((0; 0); (0; 0) + (0; 0)) ; ((0; 0); (0; 0) + (1; 1)) ;
((0; 1); (0; 1) + (0; 0)) ; ((0; 1); (0; 1) + (1; 1)) ;
((1; 0); (1; 0) + (0; 0)) ; ((1; 0); (1; 0) + (1; 1)) ;
((1; 1); (1; 1) + (0; 0)) ; ((1; 1); (1; 1) + (1; 1))g
= f(0; 0; 0; 0); (0; 0; 1; 1); (0; 1; 0; 1); (0; 1; 1; 0);
(1; 0; 1; 0); (1; 0; 0; 1); (1; 1; 1; 1); (1; 1; 0; 0)g
= RM(1; 2):
Both constructions yield exactly the same codes. According to the construction
the code length is n = 2m. The dimension is k =
rP
i=0

m
i

since this is the number of
all Boolean monomial functions in m variables with degree  r. Furthermore it can
be shown by induction that the minimum distance is d = 2m r.
The Reed-Muller codes with r = 1 are called rst order Reed-Muller codes. They
play an important role in the next chapters and we will need the following properties
of this family of codes.
Denitions and Remark 3.27.
(a) RM(1;m) can be constructed from RM(1;m  1) in a very simple way:
RM(1;m) = RM(1;m  1) / RM(0;m  1)
= RM(1;m  1) / f(0; : : : ; 0| {z }
2m 1
); (1; : : : ; 1| {z }
2m 1
)g
=
 
c; c

: c 2 RM(1;m  1)	 [  c; c : c 2 RM(1;m  1)	 ;
where c is the complementary vector of c. The Plotkin construction assigns two
codewords (c; c) and (c; c) to each codeword c 2 RM(1;m 1). When we consider
c to be the evaluation vector f of a Boolean polynomial f 2 Z2[x1; : : : ; xm 1]
the Plotkin construction yields
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(c; c) =
 
f(x1; : : : ; xm 1)

f(x1; : : : ; xm 1) = c
(c; c) =
 
xm + f(x1; : : : ; xm 1)

.
(b) Dene
RM0(1;m) = ff : f : Zm2 ! Z2 Boolean polynomial function with degree  1
without the summand 1g
= ff : f : Zm2 ! Z2; f(x1; : : : ; xm) = xi1 + : : :+ xi` ;
i1; : : : ; i` 2 f1; : : : ;mg pairwise distinctg [ f(0; : : : ; 0)g
= fc = (c1; : : : ; c2m) 2 RM(1;m) : c1 = 0g
and
RM1(1;m) = ff : f : Zm2 ! Z2 Boolean polynomial function with degree  1
with the summand 1g
= ff : f : Zm2 ! Z2; f(x1; : : : ; xm) = 1 + xi1 + : : :+ xi` ;
i1; : : : ; i` 2 f1; : : : ;mg pairwise distinctg [ f(1; : : : ; 1)g
= fc = (c1; : : : ; c2m) 2 RM(1;m) : c1 = 1g:
Then
RM0(1;m) = RM0(1;m  1) / Z2m 12
and
RM1(1;m) = RM1(1;m  1) / Z2m 12 :
(c) C = RM(1;m) has the weight distribution
w(C) = (1; 0; : : : ; 0; 2m+1   2
"
2m 1
; 0; : : : ; 0; 1):
This follows directly from part (a) by induction over m.
(d) For a binary vector v let supp(v) be the set of all positions where the vector
v has the value one. supp(v) is called support of v. The complement supp(v)
consists of all positions where v has the value zero.
Let c; d 2 RM(1;m) n f(0; : : : ; 0); (1; : : : ; 1)g be two dierent codewords with
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c 6= d. Then
jsupp(c) \ supp(d)j =
supp(c) \ supp(d) =supp(c) \ supp(d) = supp(c) \ supp(d) = 2m 2:
Especially d(c; d) = 2m 1. This follows directly from part (a) by induction over
m.
(e) C = RM(1;m) has the covering radius
(C)
(
= 2m 1   2m 22 if m is even
 2m 1   2m 22 if m is odd
(see [15]).

Chapter 4
A New Approach to Secret Sharing
Using Error-Correcting Codes
There are many ways to construct secret sharing schemes using various mathematical
objects and concepts. Shamir for example uses polynomial interpolation over nite
elds ([35]). Blakeley as well as Simmons present geometric constructions based on
the intersections of hyperplanes in projective spaces and ane spaces ([7],[27]), while
Asmuth and Bloom give an algebraic construction based on the Chinese remainder
theorem ([2]). In the following chapters we study constructions using error-correcting
codes. We begin with an overview of the previous research on secret sharing schemes
based on error-correcting codes. Then we present our new approach which diers
signicantly from the previous constructions.
4.1 Overview of the Current State of Research
McEliece and Sarwate were the rst to observe a connection between secret sharing
and error-correcting codes [30]. They found out that Shamir's secret sharing scheme
is closely related to Reed-Solomon codes. Using the notations of 2.2.1 the shares in
Shamir's scheme dene a vector v =
 
f(1); : : : ; f(t)
 2 Ztp for a polynomial f(x) =P 1
i=0 aix
i 2 Zp[x] of degree  1. In other words v is a codeword in an -dimensional
Reed-Solomon code over Zp with M = (1; : : : ; t) (see 3.2.2). If at least  digits of v
are known the corresponding information word (a0; : : : ; a 1), and therefore the secret
f(0) = a0, can be calculated using an errors-and-erasures algorithm.
This construction can be generalized to arbitrary linear [t; k]q codes (see [33]). Let
G denote a generator matrix of such a code with columns G1; : : : ; Gt and let v1 2 Fq
be the secret to be shared. Choose randomly k 1 values v2; : : : ; vk 2 Fq and calculate
the corresponding codeword (c1; : : : ; ct) = (v1; : : : ; vk) G. Then give each cj as a share
to participant Tj. A set fTj1 ; : : : ; Tjsg can determine the secret by solving the related
system of linear equations (v1; : : : ; vk) 
 
Gj1 ; : : : ; Gjs

= (cj1 ; : : : ; cjs) if the vector
e1 = (1; 0; : : : ; 0)
 is a linear combination of the columns Gj1 ; : : : ; Gjs . Otherwise the
participants gain no information about the secret. Hence the secret sharing scheme
30 Chapter 4. A New Approach to Secret Sharing Using ECC
is perfect and ideal. In [33] Renvall and Ding show that each k shares determine the
secret if the underlying code is a MDS code. In terms of vector spaces these secret
sharing schemes are introduced earlier by Brickell in [9].
A similar construction is proposed in [18] by Ding et al. They use linear [t; k]q codes
to share multisecrets s = (s1; : : : ; sk) 2 Fkq consisting of k single secrets s1; : : : ; sk 2 Fq.
Let G be a generator matrix of such a code and s be a multisecret. Then s  G =
(c1; : : : ; ct) is calculated and the cj are given as shares to the participants Tj for all
j = 1; : : : ; t. If enough participants join the reconstruction the multisecret can be
found using a suitable decoding algorithm. It turns out that special MDS codes yield
perfect [t; k]-threshold schemes for multisecrets.
Another construction of threshold schemes with linear codes is described in [22]
by Karnin et al. In this construction the secret is dened as a part of the codeword
and not as a part of the information word. In order to share a secret c0 2 Fq among
t participants a linear [t + 1; k]q code C is used. The dealer chooses a codeword
c = (c0; : : : ; ct) with the rst component c0 equal to the secret and distributes the
remaining components as shares to the participants. Tj receives the share cj for all
j = 1; : : : ; t. Suppose that a group of participants wants to recover the secret. When
the number of participants which are not in this group is below the error-correction
capacity of the code C, the group can recover the secret using a decoding algorithm.
Otherwise the recovery may be successful or not. This depends on the structure of
the code C. In [33] Renvall and Ding show that this construction also yields a perfect
[k; t]-threshold scheme if C is a MDS code.
In [40] Tang et al. present a criterion of whether a monotone access structure
  can be realized using Karnin's ideal construction. Furthermore they propose an
algorithm which outputs a suitable linear code realizing   such that the information
rate is optimal, if there is no ideal solution.
Bertilsson and Ingemarsson ([6]) extend Karnin's construction for arbitrary mono-
tone access structures. They present an algorithm which generates a suitable generator
matrix using the minimal subsets of  . The resulting secret sharing schemes are per-
fect but in general codes of length > t are necessary because some participants need
to receive more than one component of the codeword as shares.
In [28], [29] Massey shows an important relationship between the access structures
related to a linear code C and the dual code C? in Bertilsson's and Ingemarsson's
construction. Let G0; : : : ; Gt denote the columns of the generator matrix G. Sup-
pose that d = (d0; : : : ; dt) is a word in the dual code with d0 = 1 and further s > 0
nonzero components dj1 ; : : : ; djs . Since d  G = 0 the rst column G0 can be writ-
ten as linear combination G0 =
Ps
j=1 aijGij and the secret can be computed easily
as c0 =
Ps
j=1 aijcij . Based on this consideration Massey characterizes the minimal
authorized sets in terms of minimal codewords of C?. A nonzero codeword d is called
minimal if there exists no other codeword d0 such that supp(d)  supp(d0). Each
(minimal) codeword d = (d0; : : : ; dt) 2 C? can be associated with a set S of partic-
ipants by stating Tj 2 S i dj 6= 0 for all j = 1; : : : ; t. Massey proves that the sets
of participants associated to the minimal codewords in C? starting with one are ex-
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actly the minimal subsets of the monotone access structure related to the code C via
Karnin's construction.
Van Dijk ([42]) pointed out that Massey's approach is a special case of the gener-
alized vector space construction introduced by Bertilsson in [6].
Inspired by Massey's results dierent classes of codes and their duals were studied.
Ding et al. apply Karnin's construction to classes of ternary codes ([17]) Li et al.
study classes of binary codes [25] and Carlet and Ding use codes from perfect nonlinear
mappings ([10]).
Another interesting class of codes are the algebraic-geometric codes. Using these
codes Karnin's approach yields ideal ramp schemes ([11], [12], [13], [14], [24]). Ramp
schemes are a generalization of threshold-schemes with an upper threshold t2 and a
lower threshold t1 such that any subset of at least t2 participants can recover the secret
and all subsets containing t1 or less participants are unauthorized. The dierence t2 t1
is called threshold gap. The authors show how the threshold gap depends on the genus
of the algebraic curve which denes the code. In [13] Chen et al. show that random
error-correcting codes also provide ramp schemes with high information rate.
There is a close relation between the minimal distances d and the dual distance d?
of the underlying codes C and the thresholds t1 and t2. Sodan shows that Massey's
construction yields a ramp scheme with t1 = d
?   2 and t2 = t   d + 2 ([38]). In
[31] Paterson and Stinson nd out that a (not necessarily linear) code with minimal
distance d and dual distance d? provides a [d?   s   1; t   d + 1] ramp scheme with
arbitrary information rate s  d?   2. Kurihara et al. improve the bounds on t1 and
t2 using the concept of relative generalized Hamming weights ([23]).
In general it is hard to determine the minimal codewords of a given code. This
problem is called covering problem. Even the restriction to minimal words starting
with one is no simplication. However the Ashikhmin-Barg lemma gives a criterion
that ensures that all nonzero words of a code are minimal [1]. Roughly speaking that
lemma tells us that all nonzero codewords are minimal if the weights of all codewords
are close to each other. Ding and Yuan show in [20] that the access structure related
to C has some interesting properties when all nonzero words in C? are minimal: With
the above notations C? is a [t + 1; t + 1   k]q code. Let H = (H0; : : : ; Ht) denote a
generator matrix for C? and assume that no column is the zero vector. Then there are
exactly qk 1 minimal authorized subsets. Furthermore if Hj is a multiple of H0 the
participant Tj has to be part of any authorized set (Tj is called dictatorial). Otherwise
Tj is part of exactly (q 1)k 2 minimal authorized sets. In [20] [19], [44] several classes
of linear codes are studied. Using the Ashikhmin-Barg lemma the authors show that
all nonzero codewords in the dual codes are minimal and obtain secret sharing schemes
with the stated properties.
In [39] Tan and Wang improve Massey's scheme such that the participants are able
to detect cheating by the dealer.
Tentu et al. provide an ideal computationally perfect secret sharing scheme based
on MDS codes realizing conjunctive hierarchical access structures ([41]). In such access
structures the set of participants consists of disjoint subsets T = Smi=1 Ti. Each level
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Ti is assigned a threshold ti and set A  T is authorized i
A \Sij=1 Tj  ti for all
i = 1; : : : ;m. The secret s is divided into the sum s = s1+: : :+sm. Then m codewords
c1; : : : ; cm are constructed such that each ci has the rst component si. Some of the
remaining components are made public and the other components are distributed as
shares to the participants such that any set A  Sij=1 Tj of at least ti participants can
recover the codeword ci and therefore the summand si. If a group consists of at least
ti participants for all i = 1; : : : ;m, they can determine all components si and are able
to calculate s.
In [16] Cramer et al. improve Bertilsson's and Ingemarsson's construction by using
linear hash functions. In the proposed secret sharing scheme the secret is the image
s = h(x) of a suitable vector x 2 Fk under a randomly chosen linear hash function
h : Fk ! Fl. The vector x is encoded to a codeword c of a linear error-correcting
code and the entries of c are distributed as shares to the participants. The resulting
schemes are ramp schemes and due to the use of the hash function the threshold gap
depends only on the rate of the underlying code.
All these previous secret sharing schemes using error-correcting codes have the limi-
tation that they can only realize monotone access structures. In contrast to that our
approach yields a secret sharing scheme which can realize arbitrary access structures.
First results concerning the properties of the shares were achieved in cooperation
with Michael Beiter ([4]).
4.2 The Basic Idea of Our Approach
In the previous constructions the secret and the shares are certain parts of an infor-
mation word or a codeword. In our secret sharing scheme the secret is a complete
codeword of a binary error-correcting code and the shares are binary words of the
same length as the secret. When a group of participants is authorized we want the
secret to be the codeword next to the sum of their shares, such that Hamming de-
coding yields the secret. Otherwise, when the participants are unauthorized, we want
the sum of their shares to dier strongly enough from the secret such that Hamming
decoding outputs the wrong codeword. Let C be a binary code and s 2 C the secret
to be shared. In terms of the minimum distance d of C the shares k1; : : : ; kt 2 Zn2
distributed to the participants T1; : : : ; Tt shall have the properties
1. d (kj1 + : : :+ kj` ; s) 

d 1
2

if fTj1 ; : : : ; Tj`g 2   and
2. For all unauthorized sets fTj1 ; : : : ; Tj`g there is a codeword c 2 C, c 6= s such
that d (kj1 + : : :+ kj` ; s) > d (kj1 + : : :+ kj` ; c).
The rst property guarantees that all authorized groups of participant are able to
reconstruct the secret. Since the Hamming distance from kj1 + : : :+ kj` to s does not
exceed the error correcting capability of C the secret can be computed with a suitable
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decoding algorithm. The second requirement ensures that Hamming decoding does
not yield the secret when the set is unauthorized.
In a certain way, our approach is related to Karnin's construction. In this con-
struction each participant Tj receives the jth entry cj of a codeword c. Instead of this,
Tj could receive the word (0; : : : ; 0; cj; 0; : : : ; 0). When enough participants add their
words, Hamming decoding yields c and therefore the secret c0.
The diculty consists in nding suitable codes C and secrets s 2 C and in construct-
ing shares with the desired properties. In the next sections we will deal with these
problems. We will see that suitable codes, secrets and shares which meet condition 1.
and 2. can be found for all access structures. However, in general the resulting secret
sharing scheme is neither perfect nor ideal, even when monotone access structures
are considered: Using Hamming decoding each unauthorized set receives a codeword
which is denitely not the secret. Since these codewords can be excluded, not all
secrets are equiprobable.
By now the only known access structures which have perfect realizations using
our approach are those of the the form   = fA  T : Tj 2 Ag for a xed j when the
secret is a non-zero codeword. We assign the secret as share to Tj and the zero word
to the other participants. Then the unauthorized sets gain no information about the
secret and Hamming decoding always yields the zero word which is not the secret.
Furthermore, the realization is almost ideal since there are jCj possible shares and
jCj   1 possible secrets.
So far our secret sharing scheme has the following formal components.
(a) T = fT1; : : : ; Ttg is the set of participants.
(b)    P(T )nf?g is arbitrary. We have to omit the empty set because at least one
share is necessary during the recovery of the secret. In the following we consider
only access structures which do not contain the empty set.
(c) The possible secrets are certain codewords of a suitable binary error correcting
code C with length n: S  C  Zn2 .
(d) K = Zn2 is the set of all possible shares.
(e) The distribution functions will be constructed in the following sections.
(f) r : P(Zn2 ) ! C assigns each set of shares fkj1 ; : : : ; kj`g a random element of
dec (kj1 + : : :+ kj`). dec : Zn2 ! P(C) is a decoding function for C and yields
the set of all codewords with minimum Hamming distance to the input vector.
In order to nd a suitable selection of shares for a given access structure we need
to learn more about the structure that the shares must have. This will be done in
the next section. We will see that the shares are characterized by a system of linear
equations. In Section 4.4 we use that knowledge to prove the existence of a suitable
selection of shares for any access structure on an arbitrary number of participants
fullling condition 1. and 2.
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It will turn out that a large code length n is necessary to realize arbitrary access
structures. However, large shares must be expected when arbitrary access structures
are realized. When there are t participants there are 2t 1 possible authorized subsets.
Hence it takes already up to 2t 1 bits of information to declare all authorized subsets.
Furthermore it turns out that in the realization provided by Section 4.4 the dis-
tances from the share sums of unauthorized subsets to the secret are rather small.
There are only a few codewords closer to these sums than the secret. That is why our
secret sharing scheme is far from being perfect, even when monotone access structures
are realized. However, since we are going to realize arbitrary access structures which
are generally non-monotone, the participants must not receive their shares in plain
text and the use of a combiner is vital. In a combiner driven management model the
small distances are unproblematic as long as conditions 1. and 2. are satised.
Later we will identify access structures which allow smaller code lengths and larger
distances from the sums of the shares of unauthorized sets to the secret. For this
purpose we will classify all access structures on the same participant set and develop
several techniques of how to derive the realization of one access structure from the
realizations of others.
4.3 The Structure of the Shares
Let T = fT1; : : : ; Ttg be a set of t participants and   an arbitrary access structure
on T . We need to nd a suitable error correcting binary code C of suitable length n
with minimal distance d and to construct vectors k1; : : : ; kt 2 Zn2 such that the secret
is represented by a codeword s 2 C and the following requirements are satised:
1. d (s; kj1 + : : :+ kj`) 

d 1
2
 , fTj1 ; : : : ; Tj`g 2  
2. For all unauthorized sets fTj1 ; : : : ; Tj`g there is a codeword c 2 C, c 6= s such
that d (s; kj1 + : : :+ kj`) > d (c; kj1 + : : :+ kj`).
In the following we assume that a secret s has already been chosen and suitable shares
k1; : : : ; kt 2 Zn2 are already distributed to the participants. We deduce conditions on
the code length n and the structure of the shares, such that the requirements 1. and 2.
are satised. This will lead to a procedure of how to nd a suitable code length n and
how to construct suitable shares in terms of solutions of a system of linear equations.
We develop the description of n and the shares k1; : : : ; kt by these linear equations in
the following four steps.
4.3.1 Dening Total Orders
In the rst step we dene total orders on P(T ), on the set of all sums of the distributed
shares, on the set of the distances of these sums to the secret and on the binary codes
RM0(1; t) and RM1(1; t).
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(a) At rst we dene a total order 4 on the power set P(T ) of the participant set.
We number the participants and order them according to the natural order of
the indices:
T1  T2  : : :  Tt:
Then we use this order to dene a total order on P(T ) inductively.
 Let ? be the smallest set in P(T ).
 Assume that the power set of the rst r participants, 0  r < t is already
ordered. Then we have the ordered series
? 4 : : : 4 Sj 4 : : : 4 S2r 1
of all subsets of fT1; : : : ; Trg. We receive the ordered series for r + 1 par-
ticipants by extending the series to
? 4 : : : 4 Sj 4 : : : 4 S2r 1 4
fTr+1g 4 : : : 4 Sj [ fTr+1g 4 : : : 4 S2r 1 [ fTr+1g:
(b) Now suppose that each participant Tj 2 T has received a share kj 2 Zn2 . We use
the ordered set (P(T );4) as index set to order the set(X`
m=1
kjm : kjm 2 fk1; : : : ktg
)
of all possible sums of the distributed shares. We dene
kj1 + : : :+ kj` 4 ki1 + : : :+ kiu
,
fTj1 ; : : : Tj`g 4 fTi1 ; : : : Tiug :
(c) Next we use the ordered set (P(T );4) as index set to order the set(
d
 
s;
X`
m=1
kjm
!
: kjm 2 fk1; : : : ktg
)
of the distances from all possible sums of distributed shares to the secret in the
same way. We dene
d (s; kj1 + : : :+ kj`) 4 d (s; ki1 + : : :+ kiu)
,
fTj1 ; : : : Tj`g 4 fTi1 ; : : : Tiug :
This order on the set of distances allows us to dene the so called distance vector.
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Denition 4.1. The distance vector corresponding to the secret s and the shares
k1; : : : ; kt is the vector
b = b(s; k1; : : : ; kt) =
 
b1; b2; : : : ; b2t

:=
0BBBBBBBBBBBBB@
d (s; 0)
d (s; k1)
...
d

s;
P`
m=1
kjm

...
d
 
s;
tP
j=1
kj
!
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCA
such that bi 4 bi+1 for all 1  i  2t   1.
Example 4.2. For three participants T1; T2; T3 with shares k1; k2; k3 2 K = Zn2
the total order on P(T ) is given by
? 4 fT1g 4 fT2g 4 fT1; T2g 4 fT3g 4 fT1; T3g 4 fT2; T3g 4 fT1; T2; T3g :
The sums of shares are ordered by
0 4 k1 4 k2 4 k1 + k2 4 k3 4 k1 + k3 4 k2 + k3 4 k1 + k2 + k3
and the distances by
d (s; 0) = wt(s) 4 d (s; k1) 4 d (s; k2) 4 d (s; k1 + k2) 4 d (s; k3)
4 d (s; k1 + k3) 4 d (s; k2 + k3) 4 d (s; k1 + k2 + k3) :
(d) Finally we use (P(T );4) as index set to dene total orders on the subsets of the
polynomial ring Z2[x1; : : : ; xt] consisting of Boolean polynomials of degree one
with or without the constant summand 1. These orders imply total orders on
the binary codes RM0(1; t) and RM1(1; t). We dene
xj1 + : : :+ xj` 4 xi1 + : : :+ xiu
,
fTj1 ; : : : Tj`g 4 fTi1 ; : : : Tiug
and
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1 + xj1 + : : :+ xj` 4 1 + xi1 + : : :+ xiu
,
fTj1 ; : : : Tj`g 4 fTi1 ; : : : Tiug :
Example 4.3. For t = 3 the total orders on RM0(1; t) and RM1(1; t) are given by
the orders on the related Boolean polynomials
0 4 x1 4 x2 4 x1 + x2 4 x3 4 x1 + x3 4 x2 + x3 4 x1 + x2 + x3 and
1 4 1+x1 4 1+x2 4 1+x1 +x2 4 1+x3 4 1+x1 +x3 4 1+x2 +x3 4 1+x1 +x2 +x3:
This yields the following total orders on RM0(1; 3)
(00000000)  0 4 (01010101)  x1 4 (00110011)  x2
4 (01100110)  x1 + x2 4 (00001111)  x3 4 (01011010)  x1 + x3
4 (00111100)  x2 + x3 4 (01101001)  x1 + x2 + x3
and on RM1(1; 3)
(11111111)  1 4 (10101010)  1 + x1 4 (11001100)  1 + x2
4 (10011001)  1 + x1 + x2 4 (11110000)  1 + x3 4 (10100101)  1 + x1 + x3
4 (11000011)  1 + x2 + x3 4 (10010110)  1 + x1 + x2 + x3.
At this point we give a representation of the evaluation of a Boolean polynomial
p 2 Z2[x1; : : : ; xt] of constant degree one on a vector w 2 Zt2 in terms of the order 4
that we need later on.
Remark 4.4. The interpretation of the elements (a0; : : : ; at 1) of Zt2 as binary repre-
sentations of natural numbers
t 1P
i=0
ai2
i yields an order  on Zt2:
(0; : : : ; 0)  (1; 0; : : : ; 0)  (0; 1; 0; : : : ; 0)  (1; 1; 0; : : : ; 0)  : : :  (1; : : : ; 1):
Let v = (v1; : : : ; vt) be the ith element of (Zt2;) and p the Boolean polynomial which
belongs to the ith element of (RM0(1; t);4) for an arbitrary 1  i  2t. Then p is
related to v = (v1; : : : ; vt) in the following way: vj = 1 i the monomial xj is a term
of p. Hence the evaluation of p on an arbitrary vector w 2 Zt2 can be expressed by
calculating the scalar product
p(w) = v  w :
4.3.2 Characterization of the Distance Vector
In the second step we characterize the distance vector b(s; k1; : : : ; kt) in terms of the
supports of the secret and the shares.
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The shares as well as the secret are binary vectors of length n. Let I = f1; : : : ; ng
denote the set of all positions in such a vector. In this step we dene a partition
I = I t1
:[ ; : : : ; :[ I t2t+1 such that the support of each sum of shares is the union of
a uniquely determined selection of the I ti . The term "partition" is used in a general
sense since some I ti could be empty. Dene s := k0. Then each position in I belongs
to a unique set of the form
supp (kj0) \ : : : \ supp (kj`) \ supp
 
kj`+1
 \ : : : \ supp (kjt):
with j0; : : : ; jt 2 f0; : : : ; tg pairwise distinct. We will see that this classication of the
positions yields a partition of I into 2t+1 disjoint sets with the required properties.
Initially consider a scheme with only one participant T1. We fragment I = supp(s)
:[
supp(s) into four disjoint subsets
I =

supp(s) \ supp(k1)

:[

supp(s) \ supp(k1)

:[
supp(s) \ supp(k1)

:[ (supp(s) \ supp(k1))
= I11
:[ I12
:[ I13
:[ I14
with I11 := supp(s)\ supp(k1), I12 := supp(s)\ supp(k1), I13 := supp(s)\ supp(k1) and
I14 := supp(s) \ supp(k1).
When we add a second participant we obtain a renement of the above partition into
eight disjoint subsets
I21 = supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2)
I22 = supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2)
I23 = supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2)
I24 = supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2)
I25 = supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2)
I26 = supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2)
I27 = supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2)
I28 = supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2):
Inductively we can partition I for an arbitrary number of t participants. Given the
partition I = I t 11
:[ : : : :[ I t 12t for t  1 participants dene
I ti := I
t 1
i \ supp(kt) and I ti+2t := I t 1i \ supp(kt):
for all 1  i  2t. This gives a partition I = I t1
:[ : : : :[ I t2t+1 with the following
properties.
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Remark 4.5. Let kj1 + : : : + kj` be an arbitrary sum of shares, jm 6= 0 for all m =
1; : : : ; `. Then the support supp (kj1 + : : :+ kj`) of the sum is the (disjoint) union of
all I ti such that I
t
i \ supp (kjm) 6= ? for an odd number of shares kjm 2 fkj1 ; : : : ; kj`g.
Denition 4.6. for i = 1; :::; 2t+1 we dene
ai = ai(s; k1; : : : ; kt) := jI ti j and
a(s; k1; : : : ; kt) = (a1; : : : ; a2t+1):
Note that a permutation on the positions has no eect on the ai. That means for
each s 2 Zn2 with weight wt(s) = b1  n all choices a1; : : : ; a2t+1 2 Nn0 with
2tP
i=1
a2i = b1
and
2tP
i=1
a2i 1 = n   b1 determine shares k1; : : : ; kt uniquely up to the order of their
entries. Since the support of an arbitrary sum of shares is the disjoint union of a
suitable selection of the I ti we can write the weight of each sum of shares as the sum
of the corresponding ai. Furthermore we have a representation of the distance from
each sum of shares to the secret in terms of the ai.
Remark 4.7. Let kj1 + : : : + kj` be an arbitrary sum of shares, jm 6= 0 for all m =
1; : : : ; `. Assume that supp (kj1 + : : :+ kj`) = Ii1
:[ : : : :[ Iik . Then
(a) wt (kj1 + : : :+ kj`) = ai1 + : : :+ aik
(b) wt(s) =
2tP
i=1
a2i
(c) d (s; kj1 + : : :+ kj`) = wt (s+ kj1 + : : :+ kj`) =
kP
v=1
iv odd
aiv +
kP
i even
i 6= i1; : : : ; ik
ai
The rst sum counts the positions where s has the value 0 and kj1 + : : : + kj`
has the value 1. The second sum counts the positions where s has the value 1
and the sum kj1 + : : :+ kj` has the value 0.
Example 4.8. Let C = RM(1; 3) and t = 2. Consider the following secret s 2 C  Z82
and the shares k1; k2 2 K = Z82:
positions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
s =
 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0

k1 =
 
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1

k2 =
 
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0

The supports are
supp(s) = f1; 2; 3; 4g ; supp(k1) = f1; 2; 4; 6; 7; 8g and supp(k2) = f1; 3; 6; 7g :
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This yields
I21 = supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) = f5g ) a1 = 1
I22 = supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) = ? ) a2 = 0
I23 = supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) = f8g ) a3 = 1
I24 = supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) = f2; 4g ) a4 = 2
I25 = supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) = ? ) a5 = 0
I26 = supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) = f3g ) a6 = 1
I27 = supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) = f6; 7g ) a7 = 2
I28 = supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) = f1g ) a8 = 1:
For example
supp (s+ k1 + k2) = supp(10000001) = f1; 8g = I23
:[ I28
yields
d (s; k1 + k2) = wt (s+ k1 + k2) = a3 + a8 = 1 + 1 = 2:
Furthermore, wt(s) = jsupp(s)j = j f1; 2; 3; 4g j = a2 + a4 + a6 + a8.
4.3.3 The Connection of the ai to the Distance Vector b
In the third step we show that the components ai are related to the distance vector b
by a system of linear equations.
Each participant Tj receives a share kj 2 Zn2 and the partition I = I1
:[ : : : :[ I2t+1
enables us to write the distance d

s;
P`
m=1
kjm

of each sum of shares to the secret as a
sum of suitable ai. Hence there must be a matrix M(t) 2M2t;2t+1(Z) with the entries
0 and 1 depending only on t such that for all possible secrets s and shares k1; : : : ; kt
and the resulting vectors a(s; k1; : : : ; kt) and b = (s; k1; : : : ; kt) the equation
M(t) 
0BBB@
a1
a2
...
a2t+1
1CCCA
| {z }
=a
=
0BBBBBB@
wt(s)
d (s; k1)
...
d
 
s;
tP
j=1
kj
!
1CCCCCCA =
0BBB@
b1
b2
...
b2t
1CCCA
| {z }
=b
(4.1)
holds.
In the following we describe the structure of such a matrix M(t). We start with
a lemma which shows a close relation between M(t) and the rst order Reed Muller
codes RM(1; t) and RM(1; t+1). This relation determines M(t) uniquely. In the next
section we deal with the question for which types of distance vectors b 2 N2t0 there is
a suitable vector a 2 N2t+10 coming from the same s; k1; : : : ; kt as b such that 4.1 holds.
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Lemma 4.9. Let M(t) 2 M2t;2t+1(Z) be a matrix with entries in f0; 1g such that
Equation 4.1 holds for all a = a(s; k1; : : : ; kt) and b = b(s; k1; : : : ; kt) coming from the
same secret s and the same shares k1; : : : ; kt. Then M(t) has the following properties:
(a) The odd numbered columns of M(t) are the codewords of RM0(1; t) and the
even numbered columns of M(t) are the codewords of RM1(1; t). The even and
the odd numbered columns appear in ascending order with respect to 4 (from
left to right).
(b) The rows of M(t) are the codewords of RM0(1; t+ 1) corresponding to Boolean
polynomials with the term x1. They appear in ascending order with respect to
4 (from top to bottom).
Proof. Proof by induction on t.
Let t = 1. For arbitrary s and k1 we have the partition
I =

supp(s) \ supp(k1)

| {z }
I1
:[

supp(s) \ supp(k1)

| {z }
I2
:[

supp(s) \ supp(k1)

| {z }
I3
:[ (supp(s) \ supp(k1))| {z }
I4
with a1(s; k1) = jI1j, a2(s; k1) = jI2j, a3(s; k1) = jI3j and a4(s; k1) = jI4j.
b1 = wt(s) = a2(s; k1) + a4(s; k1). Hence the rst row of M(1) is
 
0 1 0 1

. The
second row is given by
 
0 1 1 0

since d (s; k1) = a2(s; k1) +a3(s; k1) is the number
of positions where k and s1 have dierent values. We obtain
M(1) =

0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0

:
Now, compare the columns and rows of M(1) with the codewords of RM(1; 1) and
RM(1; 2).
RM0(1; 1) = f(0; 0); (0; 1)g with (0; 0)  0 4 x1  (0; 1)
These codewords correspond to the odd numbered columns of M(1). The even num-
bered columns of M(1) correspond to
RM1(1; 1) = f(1; 1); (1; 0)g with (1; 1)  1 4 1 + x1  (1; 0):
Furthermore the codewords of RM0(1; 2) corresponding to Boolean polynomials with
summand x1 are x1  (0; 1; 0; 1) and x1 + x2  (0; 1; 1; 0) with x1 4 x1 + x2. These
are the rows of M(1). Hence the assertion holds for t = 1.
Assume the assertion is true for t   1 2 N. When we add another participant Tt
with an arbitrary share kt of the same length than s; k1; : : : ; kt 1, the weight vector
b(s; k1; : : : ; kt 1) for t  1 participants is extended to the weight vector b(s; k1; : : : ; kt)
for t participants via
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0BBBBBBBBBBBBB@
d (s; 0)
d (s; k1)
...
d

s;
P`
m=1
kjm

...
d
 
s;
t 1P
j=1
kj
!
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCA
| {z }
=b(s;k1;:::;kt 1)
!
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
d (s; 0)
d (s; k1)
...
d

s;
P`
m=1
kjm

...
d
 
s;
t 1P
j=1
kj
!
d (s; kt)
d (s; k1 + kt)
...
d

s;
P`
m=1
kjm + kt

...
d
 
s;
t 1P
j=1
kj + kt
!
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
| {z }
=b(s;k1;:::;kt)
:
The rened partition I = I t1
:[ : : : :[ I t2t+1 is represented by
0B@a1(s; k1; : : : ; kt 1)...
a2t(s; k1; : : : ; kt 1)
1CA
| {z }
=a(s;k1;:::;kt 1)
!
0BBBBBBBB@
a1(s; k1; : : : ; kt)
...
a2t(s; k1; : : : ; kt)
a2t+1(s; k1; : : : ; kt)
...
a2t+1(s; k1; : : : ; kt)
1CCCCCCCCA
| {z }
=a(s;k1;:::;kt)
with ai(s; k1; : : : ; kt) + ai+2t(s; k1; : : : ; kt) = ai(s; k1; : : : ; kt 1) for all i = 1; : : : ; 2t.
At rst we examine the rows of M(t). Let ri(t   1) denote the ith row of M(t   1)
and Si denotes the ith sum of shares with summands in fk1; : : : ; kt 1g, 1  i  2t 1.
Then
ri(t  1)  (a1(s; k1; : : : ; kt 1); : : : ; a2t(s; k1; : : : ; kt 1)) = d (s; Si)
This yields the equations
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ri(t  1)  (a1(s; k1; : : : ; kt); : : : ; a2t(s; k1; : : : ; kt))
= d

sjsupp(kt); Sijsupp(kt)

= d

sjsupp(kt); (Si + kt)jsupp(kt)

;
ri(t  1)  (a2t+1(s; k1; : : : ; kt); : : : ; a2t+1(s; k1; : : : ; kt)) 
= d
 
sjsupp(kt); Sijsupp(kt)

;
ri(t  1)  (a2t+1(s; k1; : : : ; kt); : : : ; a2t+1(s; k1; : : : ; kt))
= jsupp(kt)j   d
 
sjsupp(kt); Sijsupp(kt)

= d
 
sjsupp(kt); Sijsupp(kt)

= d
 
sjsupp(kt); Sijsupp(kt) + kt

= d

sjsupp(kt); (Si + kt)jsupp(kt)

:
Hence on the one hand the distances d (s; Si) and d (s; Si + kt) can be calculated by
(ri(t  1); ri(t  1))  (a1(s; k1; : : : ; kt); : : : ; a2t+1(s; k1; : : : ; kt))
= d

sjsupp(kt); Sijsupp(kt)

+ d
 
sjsupp(kt); Sijsupp(kt)

= d (s; Si) = bi(s; k1; : : : ; kt)
and 
ri(t  1); ri(t  1)

 (a1(s; k1; : : : ; kt); : : : ; a2t+1(s; k1; : : : ; kt))
= d

sjsupp(kt); (Si + kt)jsupp(kt)

+ d

sjsupp(kt); (Si + kt)jsupp(kt)

= d (s; Si + kt) = b2t+i(s; k1; : : : ; kt):
On the other hand these distances are dened by the scalar products ri(t)a(s; k1; : : : ; kt)
and ri+2t 1(t)  a(s; k1; : : : ; kt) , where ri(t) is the ith row and ri+2t(t) is the i+ 2t 1th
row of M(t). Therefore we can assume that the rows of M(t) have the form
ri(t) = (ri(t  1); ri(t  1)) for all 1  i  2t 1 and
ri(t) =

ri(t  1); ri(t  1)

for all 2t 1 + 1  i  2t:
This means that the rows of M(t) are given by the Plotkin construction on the rows of
M(t 1). By induction the rows of M(t 1) correspond to the words of RM0(1; t) with
summand x1. Therefore the rows of M(t) correspond to the words of RM
0(1; t + 1)
with summand x1 in the desired order.
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Let cj(t 1) denote the jth column of M(t 1). The Plotkin construction on the rows
yields a Plotkin construction on the columns. We have
cj(t) =

cj(t  1)
cj(t  1)

and
c2t+j(t) =
 
cj(t  1)
cj(t  1)
!
for all j = 1; : : : ; 2t:
Let j be odd. According to our assertion, the column cj(t   1) belongs to a Boolean
polynomial xj1 + : : : + xj` 2 Z2[x1; : : : ; xt 1]. As cj(t) is the repetition of cj(t   1) it
corresponds to the same Boolean polynomial xj1 + : : : + xj` 2 Z2[x1; : : : ; xt], however
dened on t variables. Since (0; : : : ; 0| {z }
2t 1
; 1; : : : ; 1| {z }
2t 1
)  xt the column cj+2t(t) belongs to
the polynomial xj1 + : : : + xj` + xt 2 Z2[x1; : : : ; xt]. Therefore the assertion holds
for the odd numbered columns. By the same argument the even numbered columns
correspond to the codewords of RM1(1; t) ordered by 2: When j is even the column
cj(t 1) is related to a Boolean polynomial 1+xj1 + : : :+xj` 2 Z2[x1; : : : ; xt 1]. Hence
cj(t) =

cj(t  1)
cj(t  1)

belongs to the Boolean polynomial 1+xj1+: : :+xj` 2 Z2[x1; : : : ; xt]
and c2t+j(t) =
 
cj(t  1)
cj(t  1)
!
is related to 1 + xj1 + : : :+ xj` + xt 2 Z2[x1; : : : ; xt].
For abbreviation we denote the submatrix of M(t) consisting of the odd numbered
columns with M(t)odd and the submatrix of the even numbered columns with M(t)even.
Example 4.10. For t = 3 participants we have the matrix
M(3) =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
:
The rows are the codewords of RM0(1; 4) corresponding to Boolean polynomials with
summand x1:
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0BBBBBBBBBBBB@
x1
x1 + x2
x1 + x3
x1 + x2 + x3
x1 + x4
x1 + x2 + x4
x1 + x3 + x4
x1 + x2 + x3 + x4
1CCCCCCCCCCCCA
:
The columns of
M(3)odd =
0BBBBBBBBBBBB@
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCA
are the codewords of RM0(1; 3) belonging to the Boolean polynomials
(0; x1; x2; x1 + x2; x3; x1 + x3; x2 + x3; x1 + x2 + x3)
and the columns of
M(3)even =
0BBBBBBBBBBBB@
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
1CCCCCCCCCCCCA
are the codewords of RM1(1; 3) dened by the Boolean polynomials
(1; 1+x1; 1+x2; 1+x1+x2; 1+x3; 1+x1+x3; 1+x2+x3; 1+x1+x2+x3) :
4.3.4 Simplication of Equation 4.1
In this step we transform Equation 4.1 to make the relation between a(s; k1; : : : ; kt)
and b(s; k1; : : : ; kt) clearer. We use the relation of M(t) to the Reed-Muller code
RM(1; t) described in Lemma 4.9. At rst we dene two more useful matrices.
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Denition 4.11.
 "(t) 2 M2t;2t(f0; 1g) is the matrix whose rows correspond to the codewords of
RM0(1; t) ordered by 4 in ascending order (from top to bottom).
 E(t) 2 M2t;2t (f1g) is the matrix generated by replacing the zeros in "(t) by
ones and the ones by minus ones. Ei(t) denotes the ith row of E(t) for all
i = 1; : : : ; 2t.
When the number of participants is clear we omit the parameter t. " and E have
the following properties.
Lemma 4.12. (a) " and E are symmetric. The columns of " correspond to the
codewords of RM0(1; t) ordered by 4, too. Hence " = M odd.
(b) E is invertible as matrix over Q.
(c)
2tP
i=1
Ei =
 
2t; 0; : : : ; 0

.
(d)
2tP
i=2
Ei =
 
2t   1; 1; : : : ; 1.
Proof. (a) Let pi denote the ith element of RM
0(1; t) and vj the jth element of Zt2
with respect to the order on Zt2 dened in Remark 4.4. Per denition the element
of " in the ith row and jth column is "i;j = pi(vj) and " has the form
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
0(0; : : : ; 0) 0(1; 0; : : : ; 0) : : : 0(1; : : : ; 1)
x1(0; : : : ; 0) x1(1; 0; : : : ; 0) : : : x1(1; : : : ; 1)
x2(0; : : : ; 0) x2(1; 0; : : : ; 0) : : : x2(1; : : : ; 1)
x1 + x2(0; : : : ; 0) x1 + x2(1; 0; : : : ; 0) : : : x1 + x2(1; : : : ; 1)
...
...
...
x1 + : : :+ xt(0; : : : ; 0) x1 + : : :+ xt(1; 0; : : : ; 0) : : : x1 + : : :+ xt(1; : : : ; 1)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
:
As stated in Remark 4.4, pi(vj) = vi vj = vj vi = pj(vi). Hence " is symmetric.
(b) E is invertible since E  E = 2t  E2t (where E2t denotes the identity matrix).
With part (a) the diagonal entries are clear since 1 and  1 are the only entries
in E. The zeroes come from the fact two dierent codewords in RM0(1; t) dier
in the half of their entries. (see 3.27 (d))
(c),(d) The rst entries are clear since the rst column of " is the zero word. The other
columns come from words in RM0(1; t) n f(0 : : : 0)g which have weight 2t 1 and
start with a zero. (see 3.27 (c))
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Example 4.13. For t = 3 participants we have
"(3) =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
:
The rows are related to the Boolean polynomials
0; x1; x2; x1 + x2; x3; x1 + x3; x2 + x3 x1 + x2 + x3:
E(3) =
0BBBBBBBBBBBB@
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1  1 1  1 1  1 1  1
1 1  1  1 1 1  1  1
1  1  1 1 1  1  1 1
1 1 1 1  1  1  1  1
1  1 1  1  1 1  1 1
1 1  1  1  1  1 1 1
1  1  1 1  1 1 1  1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCA
Based on these preliminary thoughts we nd a simplication of the linear system
4.1.
Lemma 4.14. Let a = a(s; k1; : : : ; kt) = (a1; a2; : : : ; a2t+1) and b = b(s; k1; : : : ; kt).
Then Equation 4.1 is equivalent to the following system of linear equations:
2tX
i=1
a2i = b1
a4   a3 = 1
2t 1
E2  b
...
a2i   a2i 1 = 1
2t 1
Ei  b (4.2)
...
a2t+1   a2t+1 1 = 1
2t 1
E2t  b:
Proof. Let aodd = (a1; a3; : : : ; a2t+1 1) and aeven = (a2; a4; : : : ; a2t+1). Then
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M  a = b
, M odd  (aodd) +M even  (aeven) = b
, E M odd  (aodd) + E M even  (aeven) = E  b (4.3)
Since E is invertible (see Lemma 4.12 (b)) the last two equations are equivalent. Next
we compute the matrices E M odd and E M even separately using the information about
the columns of M given in Lemma 4.9 and the properties of rst order Reed-Muller
codes stated in 3.27.
 For j = 1; : : : ; 2t let M oddj denote the jth column of M odd. Then M oddj corresponds
to the jth element of RM0(1; t). The ith row Ei of E corresponds to the ith
element of RM0(1; t). Now we calculate all scalar products Ei M oddj . We have
to distinguish four cases.
1. j = 1.
Ei M odd1 = Ei  (0; : : : ; 0) = 0
2. i = 1, j 6= 1.
E1 M oddj = (1; : : : ; 1) M oddj = wt
 
M oddj

= 2t 1
since all codewords in RM0(1; t) except for the zero vector have weight 2t 1.
3. Let i; j 6= 1, i 6= j. Ei has the values 1 and M oddj has the values 0 and
1. Therefore each multiplication during the calculation of Ei M oddj has the
form 1  0,  1  0, 1  1 or  1  1. In this case Ei and M oddj correspond to
dierent nonzero codewords in RM0(1; t). These codewords have both 2t 1
times the value 0 and 2t 1 times the value 1 such that they coincide exactly
in 2t 2 positions with value 0 and 1, respectively. This yields
Ei 1  1 1  1
M oddj 0 0 1 1
# 2t 2 2t 2 2t 2 2t 2
.
where # denotes the number of positions with the specied combinations.
Thus
Ei M oddj = 2t 2   2t 2 = 0:
4. Let i = j 6= 1. Then Ei and M oddj belong to the same nonzero codeword of
RM0(1; t) and we have
Ei 1  1 1  1
M oddi 0 0 1 1
# 2t 1 0 0 2t 1
.
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Therefore
Ei M oddi =  2t 1:
This yields
E M odd =
0BBB@
0 2t 1 : : : 2t 1
0  2t 1
...
. . .
0  2t 1
1CCCA :
 For j = 1; : : : ; 2t let M evenj denote the jth column of M even. Then M evenj corre-
sponds to the jth element of RM1(1; t). Again we calculate all scalar products
Ei M evenj . There are ve dierent cases.
1. i = j = 1.
E1 M even1 = (1; : : : ; 1)  (1; : : : ; 1) = 2t
2. i 6= 1, j = 1.
Ei M even1 = Ei  (1; : : : ; 1) = 0
since Ei has exactly 2
t 1 ones and 2t 1 minus ones.
3. i = 1, j 6= 1.
E1 M evenj = (1; : : : ; 1) M evenj = wt
 
M evenj

= 2t 1
since all codewords in RM1(1; t) n f(1; : : : ; 1)g have the weight 2t 1.
4. Let i; j 6= 1, i 6= j. Then the vectors Ei and M evenj belong to dierent
codewords in c; d 2 RM(1; t) n f(0; : : : ; 0); (1; : : : ; 1)g with c 6= d. This
yields
Ei 1  1 1  1
M evenj 0 0 1 1
# 2t 2 2t 2 2t 2 2t 2
and
Ei M evenj = 2t 2   2t 2 = 0:
5. Let i = j 6= 1. Then there is a polynomial p 2 Z2[x1; : : : ; xt] of degree one
without the summand 1 such that Ei is related to p and M
even
i  1 + p. p
and 1 + p have exactly 2t 1 times the value 0 and the value 1 and dier for
all inputs. Therefore
Ei 1  1 1  1
M eveni 0 0 1 1
# 0 2t 1 2t 1 0
and
Ei M eveni = 2t 1:
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We obtain
E M even =
0BBB@
2t 2t 1 : : : 2t 1
0 2t 1
...
. . .
0 2t 1
1CCCA :
Using these results on E M odd and E M even, Equation 4.3 is equivalent to0BBBBB@
2t 1 
2tP
i=2
aoddi
 2t 1aodd2
...
 2t 1aodd2t
1CCCCCA+
0BBBBBB@
2t 1
 
aeven1 +
2tP
i=1
aeveni
!
2t 1aeven2
...
2t 1aeven2t
1CCCCCCA =
0BBB@
E1  b
E2  b
...
E2t  b
1CCCA :
Replace the rst row by the sum of all rows. Then
0BBB@
0
 2t 1aodd2
...
 2t 1aodd2t
1CCCA+
0BBBBB@
2t 
2tP
i=1
aeveni
2t 1aeven2
...
2t 1aeven2t
1CCCCCA =
0BBBBB@
2tP
i=1
Ei  b
E2  b
...
E2t  b
1CCCCCA :
According to Lemma 4.12 (c), this is equivalent to0BBBBB@
2tP
i=1
a2i
2t 1 (a4   a3)
...
2t 1 (a2t+1   a2t+1 1)
1CCCCCA =
0BBB@
b1
E2  b
...
E2t  b
1CCCA :
Example 4.15. Consider a scheme on t = 3 participants.
E M odd  (aodd) + E M even  (aeven)
=
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA

0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
a1
a3
a5
a7
a9
a11
a13
a15
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
+
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
8 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA

0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
a2
a4
a6
a8
a10
a12
a14
a16
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
!
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
8P
j=1
a2j
4 (a4   a3)
4 (a6   a5)
4 (a8   a7)
4 (a10   a9)
4 (a12   a11)
4 (a14   a13)
4 (a16   a15)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
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E  b
=
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
b1 + b2 + b3 + b4 + b5 + b6 + b7 + b8
b1   b2 + b3   b4 + b5   b6 + b7   b8
b1 + b2   b3   b4 + b5 + b6   b7   b8
b1   b2   b3 + b4 + b5   b6   b7 + b8
b1 + b2 + b3 + b4   b5   b6   b7   b8
b1   b2 + b3   b4   b5 + b6   b7 + b8
b1 + b2   b3   b4   b5   b6 + b7 + b8
b1   b2   b3 + b4   b5 + b6 + b7   b8
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
!
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
b1
b1   b2 + b3   b4 + b5   b6 + b7   b8
b1 + b2   b3   b4 + b5 + b6   b7   b8
b1   b2   b3 + b4 + b5   b6   b7 + b8
b1 + b2 + b3 + b4   b5   b6   b7   b8
b1   b2 + b3   b4   b5 + b6   b7 + b8
b1 + b2   b3   b4   b5   b6 + b7 + b8
b1   b2   b3 + b4   b5 + b6 + b7   b8
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
We obtain the equations
a2 + a4 + a6 + a8 + a10 + a12 + a14 + a16 = b1 and
a4   a3 = 1
4
(b1   b2 + b3   b4 + b5   b6 + b7   b8)
a6   a5 = 1
4
(b1 + b2   b3   b4 + b5 + b6   b7   b8)
a8   a7 = 1
4
(b1   b2   b3 + b4 + b5   b6   b7 + b8)
a10   a9 = 1
4
(b1 + b2 + b3 + b4   b5   b6   b7   b8)
a12   a11 = 1
4
(b1   b2 + b3   b4   b5 + b6   b7 + b8)
a14   a13 = 1
4
(b1 + b2   b3   b4   b5   b6 + b7 + b8)
a16   a15 = 1
4
(b1   b2   b3 + b4   b5 + b6 + b7   b8):
Remark 4.16. (a) We are only interested in solutions a 2 N2t+10 for Equation 4.2
because the ai represent the cardinalities of the sets I
t
i and cannot be negative.
(b) a1 is the number of all positions where the secret and all shares have the value
zero. These positions still contain only zeros when sums of shares are considered.
Hence a1 has no eect on the distances of these sums to the secret and on whether
a group of participants is authorized or not. That is why a1 does not appear in
the system of linear equations 4.2. a1 can be regarded as a free parameter which
can be used to adjust to a given code length n 
2tX
i=1
a2i| {z }
b1
+
2tP
i=2
a2i 1.
So far we expressed the structure of the shares in terms of the cardinalities a1; : : : ;
a2t+1 of sets determined by the supports of the shares and the secret. Furthermore
we found out that for a given secret s the distance vector b(s; k1; : : : ; kt) is possible if
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there is a solution (a1; : : : ; a2t+1) 2 N2t+10 of the system of linear equations in 4.2. This
solution determines the shares uniquely up to the order of their entries.
4.4 The Existence of an Universal Realization
In this section we show that any access structure can be realized using our construc-
tion. For the sake of simplicity we restrict ourselves to the case that there are only
two possible distances from the sums to the secret: one small distance k and one
large distance g. When a set of participants is authorized the distance of the related
sum to the secret shall be k. Otherwise we want the distance to be g. We develop
non-negative integer solutions of Equation 4.2 for such distance vectors.
Remark 4.17. Suppose that C is a binary code with length n and minimum distance
d. Let s 2 C be the secret to be shared with our construction.
(a) The secret s is a codeword in C. Therefore its weight b1 has to be at least as
large as the minimum weight of C.
(b) When the small distance k fullls the inequality d  2k + 1, then k does not
exceed the error-correction capacity of C. That guarantees that the secret is
the codeword lying next to the sum of the shares of each authorized set. Using
Hamming decoding the secret can be found and condition 1 from Section 4.2 is
fullled.
(c) The large distance g can be regarded as the security distance of our scheme.
It is the number of positions in which the sum of the shares of each unautho-
rized subset dier from the secret and has to be larger than the error-correction
capability. Hence we require g >

d 1
2

. This condition is necessary, but not
sucient, to guarantee that no unauthorized set is able to reconstruct the secret
using Hamming decoding. Depending on the structure of C, the secret may still
be the codeword next to the sum of the shares. Condition 2 from Section 4.2 is
denitely met when, for instance, g exceeds the covering radius of C.
In the following we show that for all access structures there are suitable codes and
distances b1; k; g 2 N depending only on the number t of the participants such that
for all codewords s with weight b1 there are shares k1; : : : ; kt 2 Zn2 with the following
properties:
 bj = d (s; Sj) = k if the jth set in P (T ) is authorized. Sj denotes the jth sum
of shares which belong to the jth set of participants.
 bj = d (s; Sj) = g > k if the jth set in P (T ) is unauthorized.
b = (b1; : : : ; b2t)
 is the distance vector b(s; k1; : : : ; kt). Using specic values for n,
b1, g and k we prove the existence of a solution a = (a1; : : : ; a2t+1) 2 N2t+10 for the
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linear system 4.2. Since ai = jI ti j for all i = 1; : : : ; 2t+1, these solutions determine
suitable shares k1; : : : ; kt uniquely up to permutations of the positions.
Unfortunately the price for this generality is a large word length n and a relatively
small security distance g. Later we will see that special classes of access structures
allow choices of b1, g and k which have signicantly more ecient and secure realiza-
tions.
4.4.1 First Denitions
The linear system 4.2 states requirements for the dierences a2i   a2i 1, i = 2; : : : ; 2t,
and not for the single ai. Thus, for the sake of simplicity, we can consider solutions
with a2i = 0 or a2i 1 = 0.
Denition 4.18. Let   be an arbitrary access structure on t participants and let
b1; g 2 N and k 2 N0 such that b1; g > k.
(a) The distance vector b = (b1; b2; : : : ; b2t)
 dened by
bj =
(
k if the jth subset of T is authorized
g if the jth subset of T is unauthorized for all j = 2; 3; : : : ; 2
t:
is called elementary distance vector for   with respect to (b1; g; k).
(b) Consider the system of linear equations 4.2:
2tX
i=1
a2i = b1
a2i   a2i 1 = 1
2t 1
Ei  b for all i = 2; 3; : : : ; 2t
For i = 2; 3; : : : ; 2t let
a2i =
1
2t 1
Ei  b and a2i 1 = 0 if 1
2t 1
Ei  b > 0
and
a2i = 0 and a2i 1 =   1
2t 1
Ei  b if 1
2t 1
Ei  b  0:
Then a3; : : : ; a2t+1 2 N0 solve all equations of 4.2 but the rst one. If additionally
the inequality
2tX
i=2
a2i  b1
holds, we dene a2 = b1  
2tP
i=2
a2i  0 and obtain a solution (a2; a3; : : : ; a2t+1) 2
N2t+1 10 for all equations of 4.2. In this case we say that (b1; g; k) realizes  
elementarily and call (a2; a3; : : : ; a2t+1) an elementary solution for ( ; b1; g; k).
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Now we have a look at the structure of E  b for an elementary distance vector
b with respect to arbitrary parameters b1; g; k. The following lemma gives us three
important properties.
Lemma 4.19. Let   be an access structure on t participants and let b = (b1; b2; : : : ; b2t)

be an elementary distance vector for   with respect to (b1; g; k). Suppose that there
are u non-empty unauthorized sets. Let Ei denote the ith row of the matrix E(t).
Dene ci to be the number of ones in Ei being multiplied with g while calculating Ei b
and di to be the number of minus ones being multiplied with g . Then
(a) Ei  b = b1  k+ (2ci u)(g  k) = b1  k+ (u  2di)(g  k) for all i = 2; 3; : : : ; 2t
(b)
2tP
i=2
Ei  b = (2t   1)(b1   k)  u(g   k)
(c) 2ci   u   2t 1 for all i = 2; 3; : : : ; 2t
Proof. (a) By construction each row Ei, i  2, consists of 2t 1 ones and 2t 1 minus
ones and starts with one. Therefore
Ei  b = b1 + ci  g   (u  ci)g + (2t 1   ci   1)k   (2t 1   (u  ci))k
= b1   k + (2ci   u)(g   k)
= b1   k + (u  2di)(g   k) since ci = u  di
(b) Lemma 4.12 (d) yields
2tX
i=2
Ei  b = (2t   1)b1   ug   (2t   u  1)k = (2t   1)(b1   k)  u(g   k):
(c) Let i  2. If u < 2t 1, the smallest possible value for ci is 0 since each row Ei
contains exactly 2t 1 ones and we have
2ci   u   u >  2t 1:
If u  2t 1, we write u = 2t 1 +u0 for a suitable 0  u0 < 2t 1. Since Ei contains
2t 1 ones and 2t 1 minus ones, ci is at least u0. This yields
2ci   u  2u0   u = u0   2t 1   2t 1:
Next we specify what we mean by a \suitable" code.
Denition 4.20. Let C be a binary code with length n. Suppose that (a2; : : : ; a2t+1)
is a (not necessary elementary) solution for the linear system 4.2 with respect to an
access structure   and a distance vector b = (b1; : : : ; b2t)
 . Then C is called suitable
for (s; ; b) i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(a) s is a codeword in C with weight b1.
(b) The inequality
n  b1 +
2tX
i=2
a2i 1
holds.
(c) There are shares k1; : : : ; kt dened by (a2; : : : ; a2t+1) and s with the following
properties: For all j = 2; 3; : : : ; 2t let Sj be the sum of the shares of the jth set
Aj in P(T ).
i. When Aj is authorized, then
d (s; Sj) = bj
and there is no other codeword c 2 C with d (c; S)  bj.
ii. When Aj is unauthorized, then
d (s; Sj) = bj
and there is at least one other codeword c 2 C with
d (c; Sj) < d (s; Sj) :
We dene a1 = n  b1 
2tP
i=2
a2i 1 and call (a1; a2; : : : ; a2t+1) 2 N2t+10 a solution for ( ; b)
with respect to C.
If additionally b is an elementary distance vector for   with respect to (b1; g; k) and
(a2; : : : ; a2t+1) is an elementary solution for ( ; b1; g; k), we say that C is suitable for
(s; ; b1; g; k) and call (a1; a2; : : : ; a2t+1) 2 N2t+10 an elementary solution for ( ; b1; g; k)
with respect to C.
Remark 4.21. (a) When C is suitable for (s; ; b), s can be shared with our con-
struction such that the conditions 1. and 2. of section 4.2 are fullled.
(b) Let u  2t   1 be the number of the non-empty unauthorized sets and g  b1.
When (a2; : : : ; a2t+1) is an elementary solution for ( ; b1; g; k), condition (b) in
Denition 4.20 is denitely fullled when n  2b1   a2 holds: The equation
2tX
i=2
a2i| {z }
b1 a2
 
2tX
i=2
a2i 1 =
2tX
i=2
(a2i   a2i 1)
=
1
2t 1
 
(2t   1)(b1   k)  u(g   k)

(see Lemma 4.19 (b))
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yields
2tX
i=2
a2i 1 = b1   a2   1
2t 1
 
(2t   1)(b1   k)  u|{z}
2t 1
(g   k)| {z }
(b1 k)
  b1   a2:
That means n  2b1   a2  b1 +
2tP
i=2
a2i 1.
(c) For all j = 2; 3; : : : ; 2t let Aj be the jth set in P(T ). Dene
k = max
Aj2 
fbjg and g = min
Aj2 
fbjg :
i. The rst requirement of condition (c) in Denition 4.20 is fullled when the
minimum distance d(C) satises 2k+ 1  d(C). In this case the maximum
error k does not exceed the error-correction capability of C.
ii. The second requirement of condition (c) in Denition 4.20 is fullled when
the minimum security distance g is larger than the covering radius (C).
4.4.2 The Universal Realization
Now we are ready to state our main theorem about the existence of an universal ele-
mentary realization (b1; g; k) depending only on the number t of the involved partici-
pants, which can be used for all access structures. Furthermore we prove the existence
of suitable binary codes for these realizations.
Theorem 4.22. Let t 2 N be arbitrary and   an arbitrary access structure on t
participants.
(a) Suppose that the parameters b1; g; k have the following properties.
 b1 2 N, b1  22t   2t such that 2t j b1
 k = b1
2
  2t 1
 g 2 N, b1
2
< g  b1
 
1
2
+ 1
2t
  2t 1 such that 2t 1 j g
Then (b1; g; k) realizes   elementarily.
(b) Let b1; g; k be dened as in part (a) and let C be an arbitrary binary (not nec-
essary linear) code with minimum distance d(C) = b1 which contains the zero
word. Then C is suitable for (s; ; b1; g; k) for all codewords s 2 C with weight
b1.
It will turn out that the conditions stated in part (a) are sucient, but generally
not necessary (see Example 5.23).
Proof. (a) With the results and notations from Lemma 4.19 (a) Equation 4.2 can
be written as
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E  b = E M odd  (aodd) + E M even  (aeven)
,
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
b1
b1   k + (2c2   u)(g   k)
...
b1   k + (2ci   u)(g   k)
...
b1   k + (2c2t   u)(g   k)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
2tP
i=1
a2i
2t 1 (a4   a3)
...
2t 1 (a2i   a2i 1)
...
2t 1 (a2t+1   a2t+1 1)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
.
Hence for all i  2 the following inequality holds
b1   k + (2ci   u)(g   k)  b1   k   2t 1(g   k) (Lemma 4.19 (c))
 b1   k   2t 1  b1
2t
since g   k  b1
2t
=
b1
2
  k
= 2t 1 > 0 as k =
b1
2
  2t 1:
That means a2i   a2i 1 = 12t 1 (b1   k + (2ci   u)(g   k)) > 0 for all i  2.
We obtain an elementary solution by choosing
a2i =
1
2t 1
(b1   k + (2ci   u)(g   k)) and a2i 1 = 0 for all i  2:
(Note that aj 2 N0 for all j = 3; 4; : : : ; 2t+1 since 2t 1 j (b1 k) and 2t 1 j (g k).)
Next we show that the inequality
2tP
i=1
a2i  b1 holds.
2tX
i=1
a2i = a2 +
1
2t 1
2tX
i=2
(b1   k + (2ci   u)(g   k))
= a2 +
1
2t 1
 
(2t   1)(b1   k)  u(g   k)

(Lemma 4.19 (b))
= a2 + 2b1   1
2t 1
 
b1 + ug +
 
2t   u  1 k
Since the sum
2tP
i=1
a2i has to be b1 and a2 cannot be negative the following in-
equality has to be satised.
1
2t 1
 
b1 + ug +
 
2t   u  1 k  b1| {z }
a2
 0
, u(g   k)  (2t 1   1) b1   (2t   1) k
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If this equation holds for u = 0 it holds for all u  0. For u = 0 we have
0   2t 1   1 b1    2t   1 k
=
 
2t 1   1 b1    2t   1b1
2
  2t 1

=  b1
2
+ 2t 1(2t   1)
which is true for b1  22t   2t. We dene a2 = b1  
2tP
i=2
a2i and obtain the
elementary solution (a2; a3; : : : ; a2t+1) for ( ; b1; g; k).
(b) According to part (a), the parameters b1; g; k provide an elementary solution
(a2; a3; : : : ; a2t+1) for ( ; b1; g; k) where all odd numbered components are zero.
Let C be a binary code with d(C) = b1 and let s 2 C be a codeword with weight
b1. This fullls condition (a) of Denition 4.20. The code length n has to be at
least the minimum distance b1. This length is sucient since
n  b1 =
2tX
i=1
a2i| {z }
=b1
+
2tX
i=2
a2i 1|{z}
=0
:
Thus condition (b) of Denition 4.20 is fullled. Furthermore the rst part of
condition (c) is fullled since
d(C) = b1 > b1   2t = 2k + 1
(see Remark 4.21 (c)). Now let a1 = n  b1 and consider shares k1; : : : ; kt given
by (a1; a2; : : : ; a2t+1). Since all odd numbered components of the elementary
solution (a2; a3; : : : ; a2t+1) are zero there are no positions where s has the value
zero and one of the shares or a share sum has the value one. Let S be the share
sum of an arbitrary unauthorized set. Then there are exactly g > b1
2
positions
where s and S dier. In these positions s has the value one and S has the value
zero. Hence S has the weight b1  g < b12 and Hamming decoding yields the zero
word.
Example 4.23. The following parameters fulll the conditions of Theorem 4.22 (a):
b1 = 2
2t; k = 22t 1   2t 1 and g = 22t 1 + 2t 1:
A possible suitable code for the universal realization is the following.
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Corollary 4.24. Let a 2 N, a  2t. Choose
 b1 = 2a
 k = b1
2
  2t 1 = 2a 1   2t 1
 g = b1
 
1
2
+ 1
2t
  2t 1 = 2a 1 + 2a t   2t 1
 C = RM(1; a+ 1)
Then C is suitable for (s; ; b1; g; k) for all access structures   on t participants and all
codewords s 2 C n f(0; : : : ; 0); (1; : : : ; 1)g.
Proof. b1; g; k fulll the conditions of Theorem 4.22 (a). C has minimum distance
d = b1, contains the zero word and all codewords s 2 C n f(0; : : : ; 0); (1; : : : ; 1)g have
the weight b1 = 2
a. Hence condition (b) is also met.
Example 4.25. For t = 3 participants let
  = ffT1g ; fT3g ; fT1; T2g ; fT2; T3gg :
The non-empty unauthorized sets are
fT2g ; fT1; T3g ; fT1; T2; T3g :
These are the 3rd, the 6th, and the 8th element of P(T ). Dene the parameters b1; g; k
as in Example 4.23:
b1 = 2
2t = 64; k =
b1
2
  2t 1 = 28; g = b1
2
+
b1
2t
  2t 1 = 36:
The corresponding distance vector is given by
b =
 
64; 28; 36
"
3
; 28; 28; 36
"
6
; 28; 36
"
8

:
Since
1
4
 E  b = (71; 7; 7; 7; 7; 15; 7; 7)
we are looking for an elementary solution a = (a1; : : : ; a16) 2 N160 such that
a2 + a4 + : : :+ a16 = 64
a4   a3 = 7
a6   a5 = 7
a8   a7 = 7
a10   a9 = 7
a12   a11 = 15
a14   a13 = 7
a16   a15 = 7:
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We dene
a2 = a4 = a6 = a8 = a10 = a14 = a16 = 7
a3 = a5 = a7 = a9 = a11 = a13 = a15 = 0
a12 = 15:
As in Corollary 4.24 for a = 2t = 6 we choose the binary code
C = RM(1; a+ 1) = RM(1; 7):
The code length is n = 128 and we have to choose a1 = 64. Let
s = 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 2 C:
the secret to be shared. Next we construct the shares.

a1 = jI31 j =
supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) \ supp(k3) = 64
means that s, k1, k2 and k3 have all the value zero in exactly 64 positions.

I31 [ I33 [ I35 [ I37 [ I39 [ I311 [ I313 [ I315 = supp(s)
Therefore a3 = a5 = a7 = a9 = a11 = a13 = a15 = 0 means that there are no
positions with zeros in s and a one in one of the shares.

a2 = jI32 j =
supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) \ supp(k3) = 7
implies that there are exactly 7 positions with ones in s and zeros in k1, k2 and
k3. Choose the rst 7 positions.

a12 = jI312j =
supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) \ supp(k3) = 15
implies that there are exactly 15 positions with ones in s, k1 and k3 and zeros
in k2. Choose positions 8; : : : ; 22.
 The remaining positions are chosen in the same way by
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i ai I
3
i positions s k1 k2 k3
4 7 supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) \ supp(k3) 23  29 1 1 0 0
6 7 supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) \ supp(k3) 30  32; 1 0 1 0
65  68
8 7 supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) \ supp(k3) 69  75 1 1 1 0
10 7 supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) \ supp(k3) 76  82 1 0 0 1
14 7 supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) \ supp(k3) 83  89 1 0 1 1
16 7 supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) \ supp(k3) 90  96 1 1 1 1
We obtain the shares
k1 = 0000 0001 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1000
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
0000 1111 1110 0000 0000 0000 0111 1111
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
k2 = 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0111
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
1111 1111 1110 0000 0011 1111 1111 1111
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
k3 = 0000 0001 1111 1111 1111 1100 0000 0000
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
0000 0000 0001 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 1111 0000 0000
and the sums
k1 + k2 = 0000 0001 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
1111 0000 0000 0000 0011 1111 1000 0000
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
k1 + k3 = 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0011 1111 1000
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
0000 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1000 0000
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
k2 + k3 = 0000 0001 1111 1111 1111 1100 0000 0111
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
1111 1111 1111 1111 1100 0000 0000 0000
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
k1 + k2 + k3 = 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0011 1111 1111
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
1111 0000 0001 1111 1100 0000 0111 1111
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000:
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C = RM(1; 7) has minimum distance d = 26 and can correct up to
j
26 1
2
k
= 31 errors.
Since
d (s; k1) = d (s; k3) = d (s; k1 + k2) = d (s; k2 + k3) = 28  31;
Hamming decoding yields the secret s when the set is authorized. Furthermore
wt(k2) = wt(k1 + k3) = wt(k1 + k2 + k3) = 28
means
d (0; k2) = d (0; k1 + k3) = d (0; k1 + k2 + k3) = 28  31:
Hence Hamming decoding yields the zero word when the set is unauthorized.
In general   is non-monotone and the use of a combiner is necessary in any case.
But there is another reason why the participants must not have their shares in plain
text. It is public knowledge that the zero word cannot be the secret since b1 > 0. So
the members of an unauthorized set may look for the codeword lying next to their
sum which is not the zero word. Since g is rather small it is very likely that they nd s.
Example 4.26. For s; k1; k2; k3 and C from Example 4.25 the following table shows
the results of Hamming decoding of the share sums of the unauthorized sets. We see
that the closest code word, which is not the zero word, is already the secret s.
unauthorized c 2 C with c 2 C with next c 2 C with
sum S d (S; c) < 36 d (S; c) = 36 d (S; c) > 36
k2 c  0 c = s  1 + x6 c  x7, c  x6 + x7; d= 42
k1 + k2 c  0 c = s c  x7, c  x6 + x7; d= 50
k1 + k2 + k3 c  0 c = s c  x4, c  x4 + x6,
c  x3 + x4 + x7,
c  x3 + x4 + x6 + x7; d= 52
This problem can be overcome by the use of a combiner. The following management
model may be used.
1. For a given secret the dealer chooses a codeword s in a suitable binary code of
length n which represents it. Then he constructs suitable shares k1; : : : ; kt in
Zn2 such that conditions 1. and 2. from Section 4.2 are satised. In addition
to that he chooses random vectors r1; : : : ; rt 2 Zn2 and distributes the vectors
k1 +r1; : : : ; kt+rt as shares to the participants. Since the ri are chosen randomly
the shares are also random vectors and provide no information about s to the
participants. The dealer gives (r1; : : : ; rt) to the combiner.
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Dealer Combiner
T1 Tt
r1; : : : ; rt
r1 + k1 rt + kt: : :
2. When a group fTj1 ; : : : ; Tj`g of participants wants to reconstruct the secret they
calculate the sum
P`
m=1(kjm + rjm) of their shares and send it together with
their numbers j1; : : : ; j` to the combiner.
Dealer Combiner
Tj1 Tj`
 P`
m=1
(kjm + rjm); j1; : : : ; j`

3. The combiner adds
P`
m=1 rjm to the received sum and obtains
P`
m=1 kjm . Then
he applies a Hamming decoding algorithm on
P`
m=1 kjm . If the participants
are authorized the algorithm outputs the secret since condition 1 is satised.
Otherwise the output is another codeword since condition 2 is satised.
4. The dealer sends the output of the decoding algorithm to the device which carries
out the desired action if it receives the secret.
However, if an unauthorized group gets to know their random vectors rj, they have
their shares in plain text. Then it is very likely that they gain the secret by looking for
the nearest codeword with weight b1 (see Example 4.26). Furthermore, the problem
of the large code length n, which has a negative impact on the eectiveness of the
scheme, remains.
In the following chapters we identify access structures which allow smaller code
lengths and larger security distances. We start with the classication of access struc-
tures on the same number of participants, such that the access structures lying in the
same class allow the same parameters b1; g; k and also have the same suitable codes
when some additional conditions are met.

Chapter 5
Classication of Access Structures
As in the previous section we consider the case that the sums of the subsets have either
distance k or distance g to the secret, depending on whether the subset is authorized
or not. This chapter identies an invariant which enables us to classify all access
structures on the same number of participants such that each class allows the same
valid parameters b1, g and k. Furthermore we present a renement of this classication
such that all access structures lying in the same rened class have the same suitable
codes and are able to share the same secrets.
Throughout this section we consider access structures on t participants. We start
with an important denition.
Denition 5.1. Consider an access structure   6= P(T ) n f?g. The set
  = P(T ) n (  [ f?g)
of all non-empty unauthorized sets is called dual access structure of  .
Now we have a closer look at the matrix " dened in 4.11. The rst row of " is
the zero vector. Hence the rst entry of each column is zero. For all j = 1; : : : ; 2t we
denote the jth column with the rst entry deleted by "j.
Denition 5.2. Consider an access structure   6= P(T ) n f?g with the dual access
structure   = P(T ) n (  [ f?g) = fA1; : : : ; Aug. Assume that Aj is the `jth element
in P (fT1; : : : ; Ttg) with respect to 4 for all j = 1; : : : ; u and that Aj 4 Aj+1 for all
j = 1; : : : ; u  1. Dene "  to be the following binary (2t   1 u)-matrix:
"  =
 
"`1 ; : : : ; "`u

:
Suppose that b is an elementary weight vector with respect to the parameters
b1; g; k. Since   = fA1; : : : ; Aug, b`j = g for all j = 1; : : : ; u. The rst component of b
is b1 and all other components have the value k. Hence a column "`j occurs in "  i
the `jth column of E is multiplied with g while calculating
1
2t 1E  b.
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Example 5.3. Let   = ffT1g ; fT2g ; fT1; T3g ; fT1; T2; T3gg be an access structure on
3 participants. Then
  =
 fT1; T2g| {z }
=A1
; fT3g|{z}
=A2
; fT2; T3g| {z }
=A3
	
:
A1 is the 4th element, A2 the 5th element and A3 the 7th element of (P(T );4). Hence
"  consists of the 4th, the 5th and the 7th column of " without the rst entry.
" =
0BBBBBBBBBBBB@
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCA
and "  =
0BBBBBBBBB@
1 0 0
1 0 1
0 0 1
0 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 0
0 1 0
1CCCCCCCCCA
:
For all i = 2; 3; : : : ; 2t the number of ones in the (i  1)th row of "  is exactly the
number of summands  g in the equation a2i   a2i 1 = 12t 1Ei  b in the linear system
4.2. The number of zeros in the ith row of "  says how many summands of the form
+g occur in that equation. Each row of ", except for the rst row, consists of 2t 1
ones and 2t 1 zeros and starts with a one. Therefore the number of summands k,  k
in the equation a2i  a2i 1 = 12t 1Ei  b is also determined by the weight of the ith row
of " . That means the weight distribution of the rows characterize equations 2 up to
2t of the linear system 4.2 uniquely.
In the next step we identify a class of permutations on the indices of the rows of " 
such that the rst t rows of the resulting matrix represent the non-empty unauthorized
sets A1; : : : ; Au. For all j = 1; : : : ; u the jth column of this (t  u)-submatrix should
represent the unauthorized set Aj. That means a vector in Zt2 has to characterize a
subset of fT1; : : : ; Ttg. This can be done as follows.
Denition 5.4. LetA be an arbitrary subset of fT1; : : : ; Ttg. Dene v = (v1; : : : ; vt) 2
Zt2 by
vi =
(
1 if Ti 2 A
0 if Ti =2 A
for all i = 1; : : : ; t:
v is called the characteristic vector of A.
Example 5.5. The characteristic vectors of the non-empty unauthorized sets A1 =
fT1; T2g, A2 = fT3g, A3 = fT2; T3g in Example 5.3 are0@11
0
1A ;
0@00
1
1A ;
0@01
1
1A :
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For a permutation P on the indices of the rows of "  we denote the resulting matrix
with the permuted rows by P (" ). That means we have to nd a class of permutations
P such that the columns of the submatrix consisting of the rst t rows of P (" ) are
the characteristic vectors of the non-empty unauthorized sets. The following lemma
provides such a class of permutations.
Lemma 5.6. Let   = fA1; : : : ; Aug and let P : f1; 2; : : : ; 2t   1g ! f1; 2; : : : ; 2t   1g
be an arbitrary permutation such that
P (2l 1) = l for all l = 1; : : : ; t:
For each subset Aj, j = 1; : : : ; u, let vj be the characteristic vector. Then P (" ) has
the form
P (" ) =
0BBB@
v1 : : : vu
 : : : 
...
...
 : : : 
1CCCA
g t9=; 2t   t  1
where the rst t rows are given by the column vectors v1; : : : ; vu and the remaining
2t t 1 rows consist of the remaining 2t t 1 non-trivial linear combinations modulo
2 of the rst t rows.
Proof. 1. At rst we have a look at the structure of the rows of the matrices " and
" . Let pj denotes the Boolean polynomial corresponding to the jth codeword in
RM0(1; t). According to Lemma 4.12 (a), the jth column of " is the evaluation
vector of pj for all j = 1; : : : ; 2
t. Therefore each row of " consists of all possible
evaluations  
p1
 
tX
i=1
aiei
!
; : : : ; p2t
 
tX
i=1
aiei
!!
on one specic element
tP
i=1
aiei 2 Zt2 (e1; : : : ; et denote the canonical basis vectors
of Zt2). The order of the vectors
tP
i=1
aiei which characterize the rows of " corre-
sponds to the order  on Zt2 mentioned in Remark 4.4. Hence the (2l 1 + 1)th
row belongs to the canonical basis vector el for all l = 1; : : : ; t and has the form
(p1(el); : : : ; p2t(el)). Due to the linearity 
p1
 
tX
i=1
aiei
!
; : : : ; p2t
 
tX
i=1
aiei
!!
=
tX
i=1
ai (p1(ei); : : : ; p2t(ei))
the remaining rows are the remaining linear combinations of the rows belonging
to the canonical basis vectors e1; : : : ; et.
Suppose that A1; : : : ; Au are the l1th, : : :, luth element of P(T ) with l1 < : : : < lu.
When we delete the rst row and all columns of " which do not belong to the
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non-empty unauthorized sets we obtain the matrix "  with the rows 
pl1
 
tX
i=1
aiei
!
; : : : ; plu
 
tX
i=1
aiei
!!
for all sums
tP
i=1
aiei 6= 0. For all l = 1; : : : ; t the 2l 1th row has the form 
p1(e1); : : : ; p2t(el)

as the rst row is missing.
2. In this step we identify the positions in the columns of "  which belong to
the characteristic vectors v1; : : : ; vu. Since all plj , j = 1; : : : ; u, are Boolean
polynomials of degree one without the constant summand 1, plj(ei) = 1 i the
monomial xi is a summand of plj . According to Remark 4.4, this happens exactly
if Ti 2 Aj. Hence (plj(e1); : : : ; plj(et)) = vj for all j = 1; : : : ; u.
Now we apply the permutation P on " . Because of the observations in 1. and 2. the
rst t rows of the resulting matrix are0BBB@
pl1(e1) : : : plu(e1)
pl1(e2) : : : plu(e2)
...
...
pl1(et) : : : plu(et)
1CCCA =  v1; : : : ; vu
and the remaining 2t t 1 rows of "  are the remaining non-trivial linear combinations
of the rst t rows.
Example 5.7.   =
 fT1; T2g| {z }
=A1
; fT3g|{z}
=A2
; fT2; T3g| {z }
=A3
	
from Example 5.3 corresponds to the
Boolean polynomials p4 = x1 + x2, p5 = x3, p7 = x2 + x3 2 Z2[x1; : : : ; xt]. Therefore
"  =
0BBBBBBBBB@
1 0 0
1 0 1
0 0 1
0 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 0
0 1 0
1CCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBB@
p4(100) p5(100) p7(100)
p4(010) p5(010) p7(010)
p4(110) p5(110) p7(110)
p4(001) p5(001) p7(001)
p4(101) p5(101) p7(101)
p4(011) p5(011) p7(011)
p4(111) p5(111) p7(111)
1CCCCCCCCCA
 x1
 x2
 x3:
We apply the candidate P =

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 4 3 5 6 7

for a permutation described in
Lemma 5.6 on "  and receive the matrix
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P (" ) =
0BBBBBBBBB@
1 0 0
1 0 1
0 1 1
0 0 1
1 1 1
1 1 0
0 1 0
1CCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBB@
v1 v2 v3
row 1 + row 2
row 1 + row 3
row 2 + row 3
row 1 + row 2 + row 3
1CCCCCCCCCA
:
As already mentioned we are interested in the weight distribution of the rows of
"  because these weights characterize the equations in the linear system 4.2. These
weights can be written in a vector, the so called weight vector of " , which is dened
as follows.
Denition 5.8. Let A be an arbitrary (x  y)-matrix over Z2. For j = 0; : : : ; y let
wj be the number of rows with exactly j ones. The weight vector of A is the vector
wA := (wj)
y
j=0 :
For A = "  the weight vector w"  =: w  is called weight vector of the access structure
 .
Obviously the order of the rows (and columns) of a matrix has no eect on its
weight vector. Hence the permutation P , which brings the characteristic vectors of
the unauthorized sets in the rst t rows, does not change the weight vector.
Example 5.9. The weight vector of the access structure   from Example 5.3 is
w  = (0; 3; 3; 1):
For abbreviation we denote the matrix consisting of the rst t rows of P (" ) with
"1
 
. According to our construction, the columns of this matrix are the characteristic
vectors of the unauthorized sets in   ordered by 4.
Using the weight vector w  we can specify how "  determines the equations of the
linear system 4.2.
Remark 5.10. The weight vector w  describes the equations of the linear system 4.2
up to the order. Let w  = (w0; w1; : : : ; wu). Then there are exactly wj equations with
exactly j minus ones being multiplied with g. According to Lemma 4.19 (a) these
equations have the form
a2i   a2i 1 = 1
2t 1
(b1   k + (u  2j)(g   k)):
Example 5.11. The weight vector w  = (0; 3; 3; 1) of the access structure in Example
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5.3 yields the following system of linear equations:
8P
i=1
a2i = b1
a2i   a2i 1 = 14(b1   k + (3  2  1)(g   k)) = 14(b1 + g   2k) 3 times
(i = 2; 4; 8)
a2i   a2i 1 = 14(b1   k + (3  2  2)(g   k)) = 14(b1   g) 3 times
(i = 3; 5; 7)
a2i   a2i 1 = 14(b1   k + (3  2  3)(g   k)) = 14(b1   3g + 2k) once (i = 6)
When two access structures  ; 0 have the same weight vectors, the right hand
sides of the related equations 2 to 2t of the linear system 4.2 are the same. Only their
orders may be dierent. However, a change in the order of the right hand sides has no
impact on the validity of the parameters b1; g; k. Hence the same parameters (b1; g; k)
realize   and  0 elementarily. For this reason we classify the set of all access structures
in the following way.
Denition 5.12. Two access structures   and  0 on the same set of t participants
belong to the same class of access structures i
w  = w 0 :
Example 5.13. Let  0 = ffT1g ; fT2g ; fT1; T2gg,  00 = ffT1; T2g ; fT3g ; fT1; T2; T3gg
be access structures on the same participant set T = fT1; T2; T3g. Then
"1
 0 =
0@1 0 10 1 1
0 0 0
1A and "1
 00 =
0@1 0 11 0 1
0 1 1
1A :
The related weight vectors are
w 0 = w 00 = (1; 0; 6; 0):
Hence  0 and  00 belong to the same class. The access structure   from Example 5.3
belongs to another class since the weight vector w  = (0; 3; 3; 1) is dierent.
The following proposition summarizes our previous considerations. It says that we
have achieved our rst aim to classify the access structures such that each class allows
the same parameters b1; g; k.
Proposition 5.14. Let  ; 0 be two access structures in the same class. Suppose that
(b1; g; k) realizes   elementarily. Then (b1; g; k) realizes  
0 elementarily, too.
When we want to nd out, whether two access structures belong to the same class
or not, we can do this by determining the weight vectors of the related "-matrices. In
this context the following remark is very helpful for the following course of this work.
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Remark 5.15. Let A be an (x 2x  1)-matrix over Z2 which contains each non-zero
vector in Zx2 as column. Then A is a generator matrix of a binary simplex code I of
dimension x. I has the weight distribution
w(I) = (1; 0; : : : ; 0; 2x   1
"
2x 1
; 0; : : : ; 0):
Therefore the (2x 12x 1)-matrix B over Z2, whose rows are all possible non-trivial
linear combination of the rows of A (which are the non-zero codewords of I), has the
weight vector
wB = (0; : : : ; 0; 2
x   1
"
2x 1
; 0; : : : ; 0):
Our next aim is to nd a renement of the classication explained above, such
that all access structures in the same rened class allow not only the same parameters
b1; g; k, but also have the same suitable codes and possible secrets. To achieve this
we give another presentation of our classication in terms of linear algebra. For this
purpose we introduce an invariant of binary matrices of the same size, the so-called
linearity type of the matrix.
Denition 5.16. (a) Let A be an arbitrary (xy)-matrix over Z2. For i = 1; : : : ; y
let `i denote the number of all sets of i pairwise dierent columns Aj1 ; : : : ; Aji of
A such that Aj1 + : : : + Aji = 0. Dene `A := (`1; : : : ; `y). `A is called linearity
vector of A.
(b) We say that two binary (x  y)-matrices A, A0 have the same linearity type if
they have the same linearity vector `A = `A0 .
(c) Denote `"1
 
by ` . We say that two access structures  ,  
0 have the same linearity
type, if `  = ` 0 .
Example 5.17. Consider the access structure   from Example 5.3. The rst 3 rows
of P (" ) are
"1
 
=
0@1 0 01 0 1
0 1 1
1A :
`1 = 0, since there is no zero vector.
`2 = 0, since no column occurs twice.
`3 = 0, since the columns are linearly independent.
We obtain the linearity vector `  = (0; 0; 0).
In contrast to that the access structures  0,  00 from Example 5.13 with
 0 = ffT1g ; fT2g ; fT1; T2gg ;  00 = ffT1; T2g ; fT3g ; fT1; T2; T3gg
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and
"1
 0 =
0@1 0 10 1 1
0 0 0
1A ; "1
 00 =
0@1 0 11 0 1
0 1 1
1A
both have the linearity vector (0; 0; 1):
`1 = 0, since there is no zero vector.
`2 = 0, since no column occurs twice.
`3 = 1, since the sum of the three columns is the zero vector.
Since the columns of "1
 
are the characteristic vectors of the unauthorized sets, they
are pairwise dierent and non-zero. That means `1 = `2 = 0 for all "
1
 
.
In Example 5.17 it is noticeable, that the access structures  0 and  00, which belong
to the same class according to Example 5.13, have the same linearity vector. The access
structure   belongs to another class and also has another linearity type. This is not a
coincidence. In the next step we show that two access structures have the same weight
vector i they have the same linearity type.
To achieve this we have a look at the matrix "  from a dierent perspective: Sup-
pose that the (tu)-submatrix "1
 
has the rank r. Then "1
 
has r linearly independent
rows and can be considered as a general generator matrix of a binary linear [u; r]-code
D. The rows of "  and the zero word of length u are the codewords of D because they
are all possible linear combinations of the rows of "1
 
(see Lemma 5.6). Depending on
the rank r each codeword occurs several times.
Lemma 5.18. Consider an arbitrary (x  y)-matrix A over Z2 with rk(A) = r. Let
U be the r-dimensional linear subspace of Zy2 generated by the rows of A. Then each
vector in U can be written as linear combination of the rows of A in 2x r dierent
ways.
Proof. Let R1; : : : ; Rx denote the rows of A.
For r = x all rows are linearly independent and U = hR1; : : : ; Rxi is a r-dimensional
subspace of Zy2 with the basis fR1; : : : ; Rxg. Hence each vector in U has a unique
representation as linear combination of the rows R1; : : : ; Rx and can be represented in
1 = 2x r ways.
Let r < x. The rank is the maximal number of linearly independent rows and
we can assume w.l.o.g. that the rows R1; : : : ; Rr are linearly independent and that
the rows Rr+1; : : : ; Rx are linear combinations of the rst r rows. Let u 2 U and
br+1; : : : ; bx 2 Z2 be arbitrary. Then u +
xP
i=r+1
biRi is a vector in U and there are
uniquely determined coecients b1; : : : ; br such that
u+
xX
i=r+1
biRi =
rX
i=1
biRi:
Since there are 2x r possibilities to choose br+1; : : : ; bx the assertion holds.
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Lemma 5.18 yields
Lemma 5.19. Consider an arbitrary (xy)-matrix A over Z2 with rk(A) = r. Let B
be a (zy)-submatrix of A consisting of z  x rows of A which also has rank r. Dene
N to be the binary (2x  y)-matrix whose rows are all possible linear combinations
of the rows of A and M to be the (2z  y)-matrix consisting of all possible linear
combinations of the rows of B. Then
wN = 2
x zwM :
Proof. There must be r linearly independent rows which appear in the matrix A as
well as in B. Hence the linear subspace U generated by the rows of A is the same as
the subspace generated by the rows of B. Lemma 5.18 says that each vector in U can
be written as a linear combination of rows of A in exactly 2x r ways and as a linear
combination of rows of B in exactly 2z r ways. Let P be the binary (2r  y)-matrix
whose rows are the vectors of U . Then
wN = 2
x rwP and wM = 2z rwP :
This yields wN = 2
x zwM .
Going back to the code D generated by the rows of "1
 
Lemma 5.18 says that each
codeword, except for the zero word, occurs exactly 2t r times as a row of the matrix
" . The zero word occurs 2
t r   1 times since the rst row of ", which contains only
zeros, has been removed during the construction of " .
Lemma 5.19 gives the following relation between the weight distribution w(D) of
D and the weight vector w  of the matrix " :
w  = 2
t r  w(D)  (1; 0; : : : ; 0):
In other words, the weight vector w  of each access structure   and the weight
distribution of the binary code generated by "1
 
determine each other uniquely.
The following lemma explains the connection between the weight distribution of
the dual [u; u  r]-code D? and the linearity vector `  of "1 .
Lemma 5.20. Let A be an arbitrary (xy)-matrix over Z2 of rank r with the columns
C1; : : : ; Cy and the rows R1; : : : ; Rx. Let E be the binary [y; r]-code generated by A.
Then
(a) A is a check matrix of the dual code E? and
(b) `A = w(E?).
Proof. Part (a) is a well known fact, so we only prove part (b).
Let d = (d1; : : : ; dy) be a binary vector with weight w. Then there are positions
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i1; : : : ; iw where d has the value one. In all other position d has the value zero. Fur-
thermore
d 2 D? ,
yX
i=1
diCi = 0 ,
wX
j=1
dijCij = 0:
That means each codeword d 2 D? with weight w corresponds to a selection of w
pairwise dierent columns of A whose sum is the zero vector and vice versa.
We also know that, due to the MacWilliams identity stated in Theorem 3.21,
w(D?) determines w(D) uniquely and vice versa. With these preliminary thoughts we
can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 5.21. Let  ,  0 be arbitrary access structures on t participants. Then
w  = w 0 , `  = ` 0 :
Proof. Let D be the binary code generated by the rows of "1
 
and D0 be the binary
code generated by the rows of "1
 0 .
\)" Suppose that w  = (w0; : : : ; wu) = (w00; : : : ; w0u) = w 0 . For rk("1 ) = r we have
2t r   1 = w0 = w00. Hence rk("1 0) = r, too, and both codes have the same
dimension r and the same weight distributions
w(D) = 1
2t r
(w  + (1; 0; : : : ; 0)) =
1
2t r
(w 0 + (1; 0; : : : ; 0)) = w(D0):
Using the MacWilliams identity we see that the weight distributions `  and ` 0
of the dual codes D? and (D0)? are also the same.
\(" Suppose that the dual codes D? and (D0)? have the same weight distribution
`  = ` 0 . The sum of all entries in `  determines the dimension of D? and
therefore the dimension ofD. Hence the codesD andD0 have the same dimension
r. Furthermore w(D) = w(D0) due to the MacWilliams identity. This yields
w  = 2
t r  w(D)  (1; 0; : : : ; 0) = 2t r  w(D0)  (1; 0; : : : ; 0) = w 0 :
The equivalence stated in Proposition 5.21 provides a linear algebraic view on
the classication of the access structure. This yields one possible renement of the
classication such that all access structures of the same rened class have the same
suitable codes and allow the same secrets.
Proposition 5.22. Consider two access structures  ; 0. Suppose that there is an
invertible binary (t t)-matrix B with
B  "1
 
= "1
 0 :
(a) Then   and  0 lie in the same class.
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(b) Let (b1; g; k) be an elementary realization for   (and thus also for  
0) and C a
binary code which is suitable for (s; ; b1; g; k) for a codeword s 2 C with weight
b1. Then C is also suitable for (s; 0; b1; g; k).
Proof. Since B "1
 
= "1
 0 for an invertible matrix B, the rows of "
1
 0 are linear combina-
tions of the rows of "1
 
and vice versa. Therefore the matrices "  and " 0 have the same
rows. Only the orders of these rows may be dierent. Hence there is a permutation
 : f1; 2; : : : ; 2t   1g ! f1; 2; : : : ; 2t   1g such that the ith row of "  is the (i)th row
of " 0 for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; 2
t   1. This yields:
(a) w  = w 0 .
(b) The right hand sides of the related equations of the linear system 4.2 dier only in
their order. Hence an elementary solution a0 = (a02; a
0
3; : : : ; a
0
2t+1) for ( 
0; b1; g; k)
can be gained from an elementary solution (a2; a3; : : : ; a2t+1) for ( ; b1; g; k) by
permuting the even and the odd numbered components separately using the
permutation :
a2i = a
0
2((i 1)+1) and a2i 1 = a
0
2((i 1)+1) 1 for all i = 2; 3; : : : ; 2
t:
We check the requirements of Denition 4.20.
 By assumption requirement (a) is fullled.
 Requirement (b) is met since n  b1 +
2tP
i=1
a2i 1 = b1 +
2tP
i=1
a02i 1.
 Let a = (a1; : : : ; a2t+1) be an elementary solution for ( ; b1; g; k) with respect
to C. Consider shares k1; : : : ; kt dened by a and s which share the secret
s according to   and let K =
0B@k1...
kt
1CA be the matrix whose rows are these
shares. We dene
K 0 =
0B@k
0
1
...
k0t
1CA = (B 1) K
and give the rows k01; : : : ; k
0
t as shares to the participants T1; : : : ; Tt. These
shares have the following properties:
{ Let S1; : : : ; S2t be all possible sums of the shares k1; : : : ; kt and S
0
1; : : : ; S
0
2t
be all possible sums of the shares k01; : : : ; k
0
t. Since (B
 1) is invertible,
each sum of the shares k1; : : : ; kt can be by represented as a suitable
sum of the shares k01; : : : ; k
0
t and vice versa. That means (S1; : : : ; S2t)
and (S 01; : : : ; S
0
2t) dier only in the order of their components.
{ Let Si1 ; : : : ; Siu be the sums related to the unauthorized sets in   and
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S 0i01 ; : : : ; S
0
i0u be the sums related to the unauthorized sets in  
0. Then0B@S
0
i1
...
S 0iu
1CA =  "1 0 K 0
=
 
"1
 0
  (B 1) K
=
 
"1
 
 K
=
0B@Si1...
Siu
1CA :
Hence the sums of the shares k1; : : : ; kt of the (un)authorized sets in   are
the same as the sums of the shares k01; : : : ; k
0
t for the (un)authorized sets in
 0. Since k1; : : : ; kt fullls the requirements of Denition 4.20 (c) the same
is true for k01; : : : ; k
0
t.
Indeed, we receive a renement of our classication by saying that two access
structures  ,  0 belong to the same (rened) class, i there is an invertible binary
matrix B with B  "  = " 0 : Proposition 5.22 says that access structures with this
property have the same weight distributions. But the converse is not true. For example
consider the access structures  ; 0 with the "1-matrices
"1
 
=
0@1 0 1 0 00 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 1
1A and "1
 0 =
0@1 1 1 0 10 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 1
1A :
Both access structures have the same weight distribution (0; 0; 2; 4; 1; 0), but there is
no matrix B with the properties stated above.
However, when there is no such matrix B, the same code C and the same secret
s 2 C can be suitable for both access structures. This depends on the structure of C,
on k and on g.
Example 5.23. Consider the access structures  ,  0 with
  = ffT1; T2g ; fT3g ; fT2; T3gg ;  0 = ffT1g ; fT2g ; fT1; T2; T3gg :
Then there is an invertible (3 3)-matrix B such that0@0 1 00 0 1
1 1 0
1A
| {z }
B

0@1 0 01 0 1
0 1 1
1A
| {z }
"1
 
=
0@1 0 10 1 1
0 0 1
1A
| {z }
"1
 0
:
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The parameters b1 = g = 6 and k = 2 realize   elementarily since for these parameters
there is an elementary solution for the linear system in Example 5.11. According to
Proposition 5.14 b1 = g = 6 and k = 2 also realize  
0 elementarily. The related
"-matrices and elementary solutions (a2; : : : ; a16), (a
0
2; : : : ; a
0
16) are
a4 = 2; a3 = 0
a6 = 0; a5 = 0
a8 = 2; a7 = 0
a10 = 0; a9 = 0
a12 = 0; a11 = 2
a14 = 0; a13 = 0
a16 = 2; a15 = 0
0BBBBBBBBB@
1 0 0
1 0 1
0 0 1
0 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 0
0 1 0
1CCCCCCCCCA
| {z }
=" 
  !
0BBBBBBBBB@
1 0 1
0 1 1
1 1 0
0 0 1
1 0 0
0 1 0
1 1 1
1CCCCCCCCCA
| {z }
="
 0
a04 = 0; a
0
3 = 0
a06 = 0; a
0
5 = 0
a08 = 0; a
0
7 = 0
a010 = 2; a
0
9 = 0
a012 = 2; a
0
11 = 0
a014 = 2; a
0
13 = 0
a016 = 0; a
0
15 = 2
;
where  is the permutation  =

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5 1 4 2 7 3 6

of the rows of " .
For a1 = a
0
1 = a2 = a
0
2 = 0 we receive the word length
n =
8X
i=1
a2i +
8X
i=1
a2i 1 =
8X
i=1
a02i +
8X
i=1
a02i 1 = 8:
We choose the code C =  (1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 0; 0)| {z }
s
; (1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; 1)| {z }
c
	
and the secret s.
For all i 2 f4; 8; 11; 16g the components ai of the elementary solution a are nonzero.
We choose the following positions to be dened by the ai:
I4 = jsupp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) \ supp(k3)j : positions 1; 2
I8 = jsupp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) \ supp(k3)j : positions 5; 6
I11 = jsupp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) \ supp(k3)j : positions 7; 8
I16 = jsupp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) \ supp(k3)j : positions 3; 4
This yields the shares k1; : : : ; k8. The shares k
0
1; : : : ; k
0
8 are dened by
k0j = (B
 1)  kj for all j = 1; : : : ; 8:
We obtain the following sums:
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S1 = s = 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 = 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 = s = S
0
1
S2 = k1 = 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 = k
0
1 = S
0
2
S3 = k2 = 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 = k
0
2 = S
0
3
S5 = k3 = 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 = k
0
3 = S
0
5
S4 = k1 + k2 = 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 = k
0
1 + k
0
2 = S
0
4
S6 = k1 + k3 = 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 = k
0
1 + k
0
3 = S
0
6
S7 = k2 + k3 = 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 = k
0
2 + k
0
3 = S
0
7
S8 = k1 + k2 = 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 = k
0
1 + k
0
2 = S
0
8
+k3 +k
0
3
We see that the same sums occur for both access structures. Only their order is
dierent. Furthermore the matrices K, K 0 whose rows are the shares have the relation
0@1 1 00 0 1
1 0 0
1A
| {z }
(B 1)

0@1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
1A
| {z }
K
=
0@1 1 0 0 0 0 1 10 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1A
| {z }
K0
:
A look at the distances of the sums to the secret s and to the wrong codeword c shows
that C is suitable for both access structures.
d(Si; s) d(Si; c)
S2 = S
0
5 2 4
S3 = S
0
6 2 8
S4 = S
0
2 6 0
S5 = S
0
3 6 4
S6 = S
0
7 2 4
S7 = S
0
8 6 4
S8 = S
0
4 2 4
Remark 5.24. Let  ; 0 be two access structures in the same class realized elemen-
tarily by (b1; g; k) and let C be a binary code which is suitable for (s; ; b1; g; k) for a
codeword s 2 C with weight b1. Suppose that additionally
2k + 1  d(C) and g > (C)
holds. Then C is also suitable for (s; 0; b1; g; k) and the existence of a matrixB with the
properties stated above is not necessary. In this case w  = w 0 holds by assumption
and in the proof of Proposition 5.22 only part (c) of Denition 4.20 requires the
existence of the matrix B. But with the additional requirements on k and g part (c)
is already satised according to remark 4.21 (c).
Even when   and  0 belong to dierent classes, they can nevertheless have the
same elementary realization (b1; g; k). Under certain conditions the same code C and
the same secret s 2 C are suitable for both access structures.
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Lemma 5.25. Consider two access structures  ; 0 which allow the same parameters
(b1; g; k) with g  b1. Assume that there are u0  2t 1 unauthorized sets with regard
to  0 and let a0 = (a02; a
0
3; : : : ; a
0
2t+1) be an elementary solution for ( 
0; b1; g; k).
Consider a binary code C with length n, minimal distance d(C) and covering radius
(C), which is suitable for (s; ; b1; g; k) for a secret s 2 C with weight b1. Suppose
that
 n  2b1   a02
 2k + 1  d(C)
 g > (C).
Then C is also suitable for (s; 0; b1; g; k).
Proof. We check the conditions of Denition 4.20:
Condition (a) holds by denition of s.
Remark 4.21 (b) shows that the elementary solution a0 = (a02; : : : ; a
0
2t+1) for ( 
0; b1; g; k)
has the property
2tP
i=2
a02i 1  b1  a02. Hence b1 +
2tP
i=2
a02i 1  2b1  a02  n. This satises
condition (b).
Finally, condition (c) is met because of Remark 4.21 (c).
In this chapter we dealt with the question under which conditions two dierent
access structures  ,  0 on the same set of participants have the same elementary real-
izations or even the same suitable codes and secrets. The following graphic summarizes
our results.
 ; 0 lie in
the same class
`  = ` 0 w  = w 0
same suitable C,
s 2 C for  ; 0
 ; 0 have same el.
realization (b1; g; k)
Def. 5.12
Prop. 5.14
Prop. 5.21
Prop. 5.22,
if B  "  = " 0
Lem. 5.25, if n  2b1   a02,
2k + 1  d(C), g > (C)
u0  2t   1, g  b1
Rem. 5.24, if
2k + 1  d(C), g > (C)
Figure 5.1: Results of Chapter 5
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At the end of this chapter we present two kinds of especially favorable parameters.
Lemma 5.26. Let   be an arbitrary access structure with an elementary realiza-
tion (b1; g; k) and a (not necessarily elementary) solution a = (a2; a3; : : : ; a2t+1) for
( ; b1; g; k).
(a) Suppose that k = 0 < g. Let n 2 N be arbitrary with n  b1 +
2tP
i=2
a2i 1 and let
s 2 Zn2 be arbitrary with weight b1. Then C = Zn2 is suitable for (s; ; b1; g; k).
Especially for n  2b1 the code C = Zn2 is suitable for (s; ; b1; g; k) for all s 2 Zn2
with weight b1.
(b) Assume that there are u  2t   1 unauthorized sets. Suppose that b1 = 2e 
g > 2e   2 e 12 and k < b1
2
= 2e 1 for an arbitrary e 2 N. Then the rst order
Reed Muller code C = RM(1; e+1) is suitable for (s; ; b1; g; k) for all codewords
s 2 C n f(0: : : : ; 0); (1; : : : ; 1)g.
Proof. We check the requirements of Denition 4.20.
(a) Requirement (a) is obviously fullled. Requirement (b) holds because of Remark
4.21 (b).
(c) i. is fullled since k = 0 yields 1 = 2k+ 1  d(C) = 1 (see Remark 4.21 (c)).
(c) ii. holds since the sum of the shares of each unauthorized set is already a
codeword 6= s.
(b) Requirement (a) is fullled since all codewords in RM(1; e + 1) except for the
zero word and the word (1; : : : ; 1) have the weight 2e = b1.
The code length of C is n = 2e+1 = 2b1 and according to Remark 4.21 (b)
requirement (b) is fullled.
According to Remark 4.21 (c), requirement (c) holds since 2k + 1  2e = d(C)
and since g > 2e   2 e 12 exceeds the covering radius of C (see 3.27).
One advantage of variant (a) is that no decoding is necessary. The authorized sets
receive the secret s directly by adding their shares. Furthermore the knowledge of n
yields neither the weight of the secret b1 nor the number g of the incorrect positions.
Hence the members of the unauthorized sets learn only very little about the secret
from the sums of their shares.
Variant (b) has the advantage that g exceeds the covering radius of C. When a
set is unauthorized, Hamming decoding yields a wrong codeword. In contrast to the
general solution stated in Theorem 4.22 this codeword is generally not the zero word.
For both variants the additional properties 2k+1  d(C) and g > (C) are fullled.
That means, if one access structure of an arbitrary class allows the given parameters,
all other access structures of that class allow the same parameters and the given codes
are suitable for all access structures of that class (see Remark 5.24).
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In the next chapter we examine how specic operations on the access structures
inuence the elementary realizations. The classication of the access structures de-
scribed above will become a very useful tool for this task.

Chapter 6
Operations on the Access
Structures
For many access structures there are elementary realizations (b1; g; k) which are supe-
rior to the universal realization provided by Theorem 4.22. The security distance g
might be larger or the weight of the secret b1 smaller, such that smaller code lengths
are possible. For instance in Example 5.23 the parameters b1 = g = 6 and k = 2
and the code length n = 8 are possible for an access structure on t = 3 partici-
pants. In contrast to that Theorem 4.22 provides parameters b1  22t   2t = 56,
g  b1
 
1
2
+ 1
2t
   2t 1 = 5
8
b1   4 and k = b12   2t 1 = b12   4 and a code length
n  b1 = 56.
In this chapter we study how certain operations performed on the access structures
inuence the possible elementary realizations and solutions. Starting with an access
structure with favorable parameters this gives us the possibility to identify further
access structures which allow parameters that are superior to the parameters of the
universal solution.
Again we consider access structures on t participants and restrict ourselves to the
case that there are only two dierent distances g; k from the sums of the shares to the
secret.
6.1 The Dual Access Structure
At rst we have a look at access structures and their duals. In order to nd a relation
between their elementary realizations we start with some fundamental considerations.
Remark 6.1. Let   ( P(T ) n f?g be an arbitrary access structure and   = P(T ) n
(f?g [  ) the dual access structure.
(a)   [   = P(T ) n f?g
(b)   =  
84 Chapter 6. Operations on the Access Structures
(c) Let u = j j. Then u > 0 since   6= ?. We know that all rows of the matrix ",
except for the rst row, contains 2t 1 ones and 2t 1 zeros. Furthermore the rst
column of " is the zero vector. Hence the weight vector w  = (w0; : : : ; wu) of  
determines the weight vector w  = (w
0
0; : : : ; w
0
2t u 1) of the dual access structure
  uniquely by
w0j =
(
w2t 1 j for all j = 2t 1   u; : : : ; 2t 1
0 else
:
(d) Let  ; 0 ( P(T ) n f?g be access structures on the same set of t participants.
Then   and  0 belong to the same class of access structures i the matrices "1
 
and "1
 0 have the same linearity type, or equivalently i the access structures
have the same weight vector w  = w 0 (see Proposition 5.21). Using part (b)
we see that this is equivalent to the dual access structures   and  0 having the
same weight vector w  = w 0 . Equivalently the matrices "
1
  and "
1
 0 have the
same linearity type which means that   and  0 belong to the same class of access
structures.
We will see that in some cases the same parameters b1; g; k can be used for realizing
the access structure   and also its dual  . Furthermore the same codes can be suitable
for both access structures.
Proposition 6.2. Let   ( P(T ) n f?g be an arbitrary access structure realized
elementarily by (b1; g; k) such that 2b1   g   k  0 and 2t 1j(2b1   g   k). Let
a = (a2; : : : ; a2t+1) be an elementary solution for ( ; b1; g; k).
Dene x to be the number characterized by equation 2 up to 2t of the linear system
4.2 in the following way:
 a2i < 12t 1 (2b1   g   k) for x dierent indices i and
 a2i  12t 1 (2b1   g   k) for 2t   1  x dierent indices i
and dene
S :=
2tX
i=2
0a2i< 2b1 g k2t 1
a2i:
Suppose that
x  2b1   g   k
2t 1
  S  b1  
2tX
i=2
a2i 1
holds. Then (b1; g; k) realizes   elementarily, too.
Proof. All non-empty sets which are unauthorized with regard to   are authorized
with regard to   and vice versa. Hence the elementary weight vector b for ( ; b1; g; k)
can be gained from the elementary weight vector b for ( ; b1; g; k) by interchanging all
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g's and k's. For u = j j and u = j j = j j we have u = 2t   u  1. Furthermore there
are exactly ci = 2
t 1   ci   1 ones in the ith row of E being multiplied with g while
calculating E  b, where ci is the number of ones in the ith row of E being multiplied
with g in the calculation of E  b.
Hence an elementary solution a = (a2; : : : ; a2t+1) for ( ; b1; g; k) is related to a as
follows:
a2i   a2i 1 = 1
2t 1
Ei  b (see Lemma 4.19 (a))
=
1
2t 1
(b1   k + (2ci   u)(g   k))
#
a2i   a2i 1 = 1
2t 1
Ei  b
=
1
2t 1
 
b1   k +
 
2  (2t 1   1  ci| {z }
ci
) 2t + u+ 1| {z }
 u

(g   k)
=
1
2t 1
(b1   g   (2ci   u)(k   g))
=
1
2t 1
(2b1   g   k   (b1   k + (2ci   u)(g   k)))
=
2b1   g   k
2t 1
  a2i + a2i 1 for all i = 2; : : : ; 2t:
There are two cases to consider:
 Let 0  a2i < 12t 1 (2b1   g + k), a2i 1  0. Then a2i   a2i 1 > 0. We dene
a2i =
2b1 g k
2t 1   a2i + a2i 1 and a2i 1 = 0. This case occurs for x times.
 Let a2i  12t 1 (2b1   g + k) > 0. Then a2i 1 = 0. Hence a2i   a2i 1  0. We
dene a2i = 0 and a2i 1 = a2i   2b1 g k2t 1 .
(a3; a4; : : : ; a2t+1 2 N0 since 2t 1j(2b1   g   k).) With these results we calculate
2tX
i=2
a2i =
2tX
i=2
0a2i< 2b1 g k2t 1
a2i +
2tX
i=2
a2i 2b1 g k2t 1
a2i
| {z }
=0
= x  2b1   g   k
2t 1
 
2tX
i=2
0a2i< 2b1 g k2t 1
a2i
| {z }
= S
+
2tX
i=2
a2i 1
= x  2b1   g   k
2t 1
  S| {z }
b1 
2tP
i=2
a2i 1
+
2tX
i=2
a2i 1  b1:
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For a2 = b1  
2tP
i=2
a2i we obtain
2tP
i=1
a2i = b1. Hence (a2; a3; : : : ; a2t+1) is an elementary
solution for ( ; b1; g; k) and (b1; g; k) realizes   elementarily.
Remark 6.3. (a) Suppose that the conditions of Proposition 6.2 are satised and
additionally g  b1 holds. Let C be a binary code with the properties 2k + 1 
d(C), g > (C) and n  2b1   a2, which is suitable for (s; ; b1; g; k) for a secret
s 2 C. According to Lemma 5.25, C is also suitable for (s; ; b1; g; k).
(b) Suppose that   allows the security distance g = b1. Then all dierences a2i a2i 1
have to be multiples of g k
2t 1 . Hence the inequality a2i <
2b1 g k
2t 1 yields a2i <
g k
2t 1
which means a2i = 0. Therefore S = 0. In this case x counts the number of
equations with a2i = 0. That means the parameters b1; g = b1; k realize the dual
access structure elementarily if 2b1  g  k = g  k is divisible by 2t 1 and if the
inequality
x  2
t 1
g   k
 
b1  
2tX
i=2
a2i 1
!
holds.
Example 6.4. For t = 3 participants let
  = ffT1g; fT2g; fT3g; fT1; T2; T3gg:
The dual access structure is
  = ffT1; T2g; fT1; T3g; fT2; T3gg:
We show that any parameters (b1; g; k) with b1 = g and k < g realize the access
structure  . If additionally g  3k holds, (b1; g; k) is also an elementary realization
for  . Furthermore we show that any binary simplex code with length n = 2l   1 for
l  6 is suitable for both access structures. We have
u = 3; "1
 
=
0@1 1 01 0 1
0 1 1
1A and w  = (1; 0; 6; 0):
Therefore the equations given in 4.2 are the following: For exactly one i 2 f2; 3; : : : ; 8g
we have ci = 3 and therefore the equation
a2i   a2i 1 = 1
4
(b1   k + (2ci   u)(g   k))
=
1
4
((g   k) + (2  3  3)(g   k))
= g   k:
We dene a2i = g   k and a2i 1 = 0.
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In the remaining six equations ci = 1 and the equations have the form
a2i   a2i 1 = 1
4
(b1   k + (2ci   u)(g   k))
=
1
4
((g   k) + (2  1  3)(g   k)) = 0:
In this cases we dene a2i = a2i 1 = 0. This yields
8X
i=2
a2i = g   k  g = b1:
This shows that arbitrary parameters (g; g; k) with k  g realize   elementarily.
According to Remark 6.3 (b), the number of the components a2i for i = 2; : : : ; 8 in
the range from 0 to 1
2t 1 (2b1   g   k) is x = 6 and the sum of these a2i is S = 0. This
yields
x  2t 1
g k
 
b1  
2tP
i=2
a2i 1
!
, 6  4
g k  g
, g  3k:
Hence   is realized elementarily by any (g; g; k), too, provided that g  3k and 4jg k.
Now choose an arbitrary l 2 N, l  6, and consider a binary simplex code C with
length n = 2l 1. All codewords in C, except for the zero word, have weight 2l 1. The
minimal distance is d(C) = 2l 1 and the covering radius (C) = 2l 1   1.
We dene g = b1 = 2
l 1 and k = 2l 2   4. This yields g > (C) and 2k + 1  d(C).
Furthermore g  3k holds and 4j(g   k). Hence (2l 1; 2l 1; 2l 2   4) is an elementary
realization for both access structures. We have
a2 = b1  
2tX
i=1
a2i = g   (g   k) = k and a1 = n  b1  
2tX
i=1
a2i 1| {z }
0
= g   1:
According to Remark 4.21, C is suitable for (s; ; b1; g; k) for all nonzero codewords
s 2 C. It remains to show that n  2b1   a2 holds. In this case Remark 6.3 (a) says
that C is also suitable for (s; ; b1; g; k).
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2b1   a2 = 2b1  
 
b1  
2tX
i=2
a2i
!
= b1 +
2tX
i=2
a2i
= b1 +
 
x|{z}
6
2b1   g   k
2t 1
  S|{z}
0
+
2tX
i=2
a2i 1| {z }
0

= b1 +
3
2
(g   k)
= 2l 1 +
3
2
 (2l 2 + 4)
= 2l   1| {z }
n
 2l 3 + 7| {z }
0
 n:
6.2 Embedding of Access Structures
Let   be an access structure on a set T of participants. Consider an arbitrary superset
T 0 of T . Then   is also an element of the power set P(T 0) and therefore an access
structure on the superset T 0. We denote it  T 0 and call this access structure the
embedding of   in P(T 0).
In this section we show under which conditions an elementary realization (b1; g; k)
for   is also suitable for all its embeddings  T 0 .
Example 6.5. Consider the access structure   = ffT1; T2gg  P(fT1; T2g| {z }
=T
) with the
non-empty unauthorized sets fT1g and fT2g.
The embedding  T 0 of   in P(fT1; T2; T3; T4g| {z }
T 0
) consists also of the authorized set
fT1; T2g. The non-empty unauthorized sets are
fT1g ; fT2g ; fT3g ; fT1; T3g ; fT2; T3g ; fT1; T2; T3g ; fT4g ; fT1; T4g ;
fT2; T4g ; fT1; T2; T4g ; fT3; T4g ; fT1; T3; T4g ; fT2; T3; T4g ; fT1; T2; T3; T4g :
Proposition 6.6. Consider an access structure   on a set T of t participants and its
embedding  T 0 in the power set of a participants set T 0  T with t0  t participants.
Suppose that there are u non-empty unauthorized sets with regard to   and that
(b1; g; k) realizes   elementarily such that
b1   k  (2t   u)(g   k)
holds. Then (b1; g; k) is also an elementary realization for  T 0 .
6.2. Embedding of Access Structures 89
Proof. Consider the matrix "1  whose columns are the characteristic vectors of the
authorized sets with regard to  . Suppose that the matrix " , whose rows are the
non-trivial linear combinations of the rows of "1 , has the weight vector
w  = (w0; : : : ; w2t u 1):
For T 0 = fTt+1; : : : ; Tt0g the matrix "1 T 0 , which consists of the characteristic vectors
of the authorized sets in  T 0 , has the form.
"1 T 0 =
0BBB@
"1 
0 : : : 0
...
...
0 : : : 0
1CCCA
| {z }
2t u 1
g t9=; t0   t:
Hence the matrix " T 0 has the weight vector
w T 0 = (2
t0 t   1 + 2t0 tw0; 2t0 tw1; : : : ; 2t0 tw2t u 1)
(see Lemma 5.19). There are u0 = 2t
0   1   (2t   u   1) = 2t0   2t + u non-empty
unauthorized sets with regard to  T 0 and the matrix " T 0 has the following row weights:
2t
0 t   1 + 2t0 tw0 rows have the weight 2t0 1 and
2t
0 twj rows have the weight 2t
0 1   j for all j = 1; 2; : : : ; 2t   u  1.
Let (a2; a3; : : : ; a2t+1) be an elementary solution for ( ; b1; g; k). In the rst case there
are indices i such that
a02i   a02i 1 =
1
2t0 1

b1   k + (2t0   2t + u  2  2t0 1)(g   k)

=
1
2t0 1
 
b1   k + (u  2t)(g   k)
| {z }
0
=
1
2t0 t
(a2i   a2i 1)
and we dene a02i = 0 and a
0
2i 1 =   12t0 1 (b1   k + (u  2t)(g   k)).
In the second case there are indices i such that
a02i   a02i 1 =
1
2t0 1

b1   k + (2t0   2t + u  2  (2t0 1   j))(g   k)

=
1
2t0 1
 
b1   k + (u  2  (2t 1   j))(g   k)

=
1
2t0 t
(a2i   a2i 1)
and we dene a02i =
1
2t0 ta2i and a
0
2i 1 =
1
2t0 ta2i 1.
This yields
2t
0P
i=2
a02i = 2
t0 t 1
2t
0 t
2tP
i=2
a2i = b1   a2 and we dene a02 = a2 and obtain the
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elementary solution (a02; a
0
3; : : : ; a
0
2t0+1) for ( T 0 ; b1; g; k).
There is also another kind of embedding.   denes an access structure  0 on the
superset T 0 with the property that each subset A of T 0 is (un-)authorized i the
intersection A \ T is (un-)authorized. That means
 0 = fA [B : A 2  ; B 2 P(T 0 n T )g  P(T 0):
In this access structure the participants of T 0 n T have no inuence on whether a
subset is authorized or not.
Example 6.7. Consider the access structure
  = ffT1; T2gg  P(fT1; T2g| {z }
=T
):
Then  0 in P(fT1; T2; T3; T4g| {z }
T 0
) is just the access structure
 0 =
 fT1; T2g ; fT1; T2; T3g ; fT1; T2; T4g ; fT1; T2; T3; T4g	:
Suppose that there are shares for the participants in T = fT1; : : : ; Ttg, which can
be used to share a secret s in a suitable code C of length n according to  . By assigning
the participants of T 0nT the zero word of length n as shares, the secret s can be shared
among the participants of T 0 according to  0.
6.3 Symmetric Dierence
The next technique is to replace all authorized sets A of an access structure  1 by the
symmetric dierences A M B for a given unauthorized subset B 2  1. This leads to
an interesting access structure   with the same number of authorized sets. We will
see that the transition from "1
 1
to the matrix "1
 
related to the new access structure
is characterized by adding the characteristic vector of B to all columns of "1
 1
. Only
the column related to B remains unchanged. With that knowledge we identify pairs
( 1; B) such that both "1-matrices have the same linearity type. Where this is the
case the access structures  1 and   belong to the same class and can be realized using
the same parameters.
Denition 6.8. Consider an arbitrary set M and a set B  M and let U  P(M).
Dene the symmetric dierence of U and B to be the set
U M B := fA M B : A 2 Ug :
We consider the case that M is the set T of the participants T1; : : : ; Tt, U is an
access structure  1 and B is an unauthorized set in  1.
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Example 6.9. Let  1 = ffT2g ; fT3g ; fT1; T3g ; fT2; T3gg and B = fT1g 2  1. Then
  =  1 M B = ffT2g M fT1g ; fT3g M fT1g ; fT1; T3g M fT1g ; fT2; T3g M fT1gg
= ffT1; T2g ; fT1; T3g ; fT3g ; fT1; T2; T3gg :
Next we study the eect of the symmetric dierence on the dual access structure.
For this we need the following lemma.
Lemma 6.10. Let M be an arbitrary set and B M a subset. Then
P(M) = fA M B : A Mg = P(M) M B:
Proof. P(M)  P(M) M B is clear since B M . Additionally
P(M) = fA : A Mg
= f(A M B) M B : A Mg
 P(M) M B:
We use Lemma 6.10 to describe the dual access structure  1 M B.
Lemma 6.11. Let  1 ( P(T ) n f?g be an arbitrary access structure and B 2  1 an
unauthorized set. Dene   =  1 M B. Then   =

( 1 n fBg) M B)

[ fBg.
Proof.
  = (P(T ) n  ) n f?g
= ((P(T ) M B) n  ) n f?g (Lemma 6.10)
=
 
(P(T ) M B) n ( 1 M B) n f?g
=
 
(P(T ) n  1) M B n f?g
=
 
( 1 [ f?g) M B n f?g
=
 
(( 1 n fBg) M B) [ (fBg M B| {z }
f?g
) [ (f?g M B| {z }
fBg
)
 n f?g
=
 
( 1 n fBg) M B) [ fBg
Example 6.12. For  1, B as in Example 6.9 we have
( 1 n fBg) M B)

[ fBg
= (ffT1; T2g ; fT1; T2; T3gg M fT1g) [ ffT1gg
= ffT2g ; fT2; T3gg [ ffT1gg
= ffT1g ; fT2g ; fT2; T3gg
=  :
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Remark 6.13. Let A;B  T with the characteristic vectors x = (x1; : : : ; xt) , y =
(y1; : : : ; yt)
 2 Zt2 and let z = (z1; : : : ; zt) 2 Zt2 be the characteristic vector of A M B.
Then z = x+ y, since for all j = 1; : : : ; t
zj = 1 , Tj 2 A M B
, Tj 2 A XOR Tj 2 B
, xj = 1 XOR yj = 1
, xj + yj = 1:
In terms of the "1-matrices the transition from  1 to   =  1 M B means the
following.
Lemma 6.14. Let v1; : : : ; vu 2 Zt2 be the characteristic vectors of the unauthorized
sets in  1. W.l.o.g. assume that v1 = b is the characteristic vector of B. Let   =  
1 M
B. Then the columns of "1
 
are b; v2 + b; : : : ; vu + b.
Proof. According to Lemma 6.11, the columns of "1
 
have to be the characteristic
vectors of the set B and of all sets A M B with A 2  1, A 6= B. These vectors are
exactly b and v2 + b; : : : ; vu + b by Remark 6.13.
In general the access structures  1 and  1 M B have dierent linearity types.
Example 6.15. For t = 3 participants let  1 = ffT1g ; fT1; T2g ; fT3g ; fT1; T2; T3gg
and B = fT1g. Then
"1
 1
=
0@1 1 0 10 1 0 1
0 0 1 1
1A and "1
 
=
0@1 0 1 00 1 0 1
0 0 1 1
1A :
The linearity vectors are ` 1 = (0; 0; 1; 0) 6= `  = (0; 0; 0; 1).
However, there are cases where  1 and  1 M B belong to the same class. In these
cases the same parameters can be used for both access structures. The following
proposition describes pairs of access structures  1 and unauthorized sets B with this
property.
Proposition 6.16. Let  1 ( P(T ) n f?g be an access structure and B 2  1 an
unauthorized set with the characteristic vector b 2 Zt2. Let v1 = b; v2; : : : ; vu be the
columns of "1
 1
. Suppose that
nP
p=1
vjp = 0 implies
 b =2 fvj1 ; : : : ; vjng and n even or
 b 2 fvj1 ; : : : ; vjng and n odd.
Then  1 and   =  1 M B belong to the same class.
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Proof. According to Lemma 6.14, the columns of "1
 
are v01 = b, v
0
2 = v2 + b; : : : ; v
0
u =
vu + b. Since their order has no eect on the linearity type we assume w.l.o.g. that
"1
 
=
 
v01; : : : ; v
0
u

=
 
b; v2 + b; : : : ; vu + b

. We show that
nX
p=1
vjp = 0 ,
nX
p=1
v0jp = 0
holds for all n = 1; : : : ; u and all choices fj1; : : : ; jng  f1; : : : ; ug. Then both matrices
have the same linearity type and belong to the same class (see Proposition 5.21).
According to the restrictions in the proposition, there are two cases with
nP
p=1
vjp = 0:
1. Suppose that b =2 fvj1 ; : : : ; vjng and n is even. Then
nX
p=1
vjp = nb|{z}
=0
+
nX
p=1
vjp =
nX
p=1
(vjp + b) =
nX
p=1
v0jp :
2. Let b 2 fvj1 ; : : : ; vjng and n be odd. W.l.o.g assume that vj1 = b. Since b = v1
that means j1 = 1. Then
nX
p=1
vjp = b|{z}
vj1
+
nX
p=2
vjp = (n  1)b| {z }
=0
+b+
nX
p=2
vjp = b|{z}
v0j1
+
nX
p=2
(vjp + b| {z }
=v0jp
) =
nX
p=1
v0jp :
Now suppose that
nP
p=1
v0jp = 0.
1. Let b 62 v0j1 ; : : : ; v0jn	. Then
0 =
nX
p=1
v0jp = nb+
nX
p=1
vjp :
If n is even, this implies
nP
p=1
vjp = 0. Otherwise, when n is odd, we have 0 =
b+
nP
p=1
vjp . This is a contradiction since the summand b occurs and the number
of summands (including b) is even.
2. Let b 2 v0j1 ; : : : ; v0jn	. W.l.o.g assume that v0j1 = b. Then
0 =
nX
p=1
v0jp = nb+
nX
p=2
vjp :
If n is even,
nP
p=2
vjp = 0. This is a contradiction since the number of summands
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is odd and the summand b is not involved. When n is odd, we receive 0 =
b+
nP
p=2
vjp =
nP
p=1
vjp .
Remark 6.17. Let  1 be an access structure with an unauthorized set B such that
the requirements of Proposition 6.16 are met. Then  1 and   =  1 M B have the same
elementarily realizations (see Proposition 5.14).
Additionally, if there is an invertible binary matrix M such that "1
 1
= M  "1
 
holds,
the same codes are suitable for both access structures (see Proposition 5.22).
Example 6.18. The access structure  1 and the unauthorized set B from Example
6.9 yield
"1
 1
=
0@1 1 10 1 1
0 0 1
1A = (v1; v2; v3) = (b; v2; v3)
and
"1
 
=
0@1 0 00 1 1
0 0 1
1A = (v01; v02; v03) = (b; v2 + b; v3 + b):
Since v1; v2; v3 are linearly independent, there are no sums
nP
p=1
vjp = 0 and the require-
ments of Proposition 6.16 are fullled. Hence both access structures belong to the same
class. Furthermore there is an invertible (3 3)-matrix M such that "1
 1
= M  "1
 
:0@1 1 10 1 1
0 0 1
1A
| {z }
"1
 1
=
0@1 1 00 1 0
0 0 1
1A
| {z }
M

0@1 0 00 1 1
0 0 1
1A
| {z }
"1
 
and  1 and   have the same suitable codes.
Sometimes it is easier to determine the characteristic vectors of the authorized sets,
than the characteristic vectors of the unauthorized sets, and it is easier to nd the
matrix "1 1 than the matrix "
1
 1
. Furthermore, in some cases it is easier to nd out,
which sums of the columns of "1 1 yield the zero vector, than to check the sums of the
columns of "1
 1
. The following remark shows the connection between the columns of
"1 1 and "
1
 1
. Moreover, we give a criterion concerning the columns of "1 1 for  
1 and  
belonging to the same class.
Remark 6.19. (a) Let   =  1 M B, B 2  1. Suppose that "1 1 consists of the
columns vu+2; : : : ; v2t . Let v1 = b be the characteristic vector of B and let
v2; : : : ; vu denote the remaining nonzero vectors of Zt2. Using Lemma 6.10 the
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set Zt2 of all characteristic vectors of the subsets of T can be written as
Zt2 =
n
v1; : : : ; vu| {z }
columns of "1
 1
; 0; vu+2; : : : ; v2t| {z }
columns of "1
 1
o
=
n
0; v2 + b; : : : ; vu + b; b| {z }
columns of "1
 
; vu+2 + b; : : : ; v2t + b| {z }
columns of "1 
o
:
We know from Lemma 6.14 that the vectors v2 + b; : : : ; vu + b; b characterize the
elements of  . Hence the remaining nonzero vectors vu+2 + b; : : : ; v2t + b must
be the columns of "1 .
(b) Suppose that the columns vu+2; : : : ; v2t of the matrix "
1
 1 have the property that
a sum of pairwise distinct columns vj1 ; : : : ; vjn can only be the zero vector when
the number n of the summands is even. The columns of "1  have the form
vu+2 + b; : : : ; v2t + b and the equivalence
nX
p=1
(vjp + b) = 0 ,
nX
p=1
vjp = 0
holds. That means "1 1 and "
1
  have the same linearity type. Therefore  
1 and  
lie in the same class. According to Remark 6.1 (d), their duals  1 and   lie in
the same class, too.
6.4 The Intersection of Access Structures
Another technique to create new access structures is to intersect two initial access
structures  1 and  2 on the same set T of t participants. At rst we show how
solutions for the initial access structures provide a solution for their intersection if
the dual access structures  1 and  2 are disjoint. Then we generalize our results to
arbitrary dual access structures.
First we analyze the dual of the intersection  . It turns out that it is the union of
the dual access structures  1 and  2:
  = (P(T ) n f?g) n ( 1 \  2)
= ((P(T ) n f?g) n  1) [ ((P(T ) n f?g) n  2)
=  1 [  2:
In terms of the related "-matrices this means that the columns of "  are exactly
the columns which occur in " 1 or in " 2 . When  1 and  2 are disjoint then "  is the
concatenation of " 1 and " 2 , except for the order of the columns. We use this fact to
construct a solution for   from solutions for  1 and  2.
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Proposition 6.20. Let  1; 2 ( P(T ) n f?g be access structures on the same set of
t participants with disjoint dual access structures.
(a) Suppose that (b1; g; k) realizes  1 elementarily and that (b
0
1; g
0; k0) realizes  2
elementarily with g   k = g0   k0. Then
(b^1; g^; k^) = (b1 + b
0
1; g + k
0; k + k0)
realizes   elementarily.
(b) Additionally, let C  Zn2 be a suitable code for (s; 1; b1; g; k) for a codeword
s 2 C with weight b1 and C 0  Zn02 be suitable for (s0; 2; b01; g0; k0) for a codeword
s0 2 C 0 with weight b01. Then the concatenation C^ of C and C 0 is suitable for
(s^; ; b^1; g^; k^), where s^ is the concatenation of the codewords s and s
0.
Proof. (a) Let j 1j = u and j 2j = u0. Then   has u^ = u + u0 elements since
 1 \  2 = ?. The matrix "  consists of the columns of " 1 and of " 2 . Hence
the number c^i of zeros in the ith column of "  is the sum ci + c
0
i of zeros in the
ith columns of " 1 and " 2 .
We are looking for an elementary solution a^ = (a^2; : : : ; a^2t+1) for ( ; b^1; g^; k^) =
( 1 \  2; b1 + b2; g + k0; k + k0). Let a = (a2; : : : ; a2t+1) and a0 = (a02; : : : ; a02t+1)
be elementary solutions for ( 1; b1; g; k) and ( 2; b
0
1; g
0; k0), respectively. Then a^,
a and a0 have the following relations given by Equation 4.2:
a^2i   a^2i 1 = 1
2t 1

b^1   k^ + (2c^i   u^)(g^   k^)

=
1
2t 1

b1 + b
0
1   (k + k0) + (2(ci + c0i)  (u+ u0))(g + k0   (k + k0)| {z }
=g k=g0 k0
)

=
1
2t 1
(b1   k + (2ci   u)(g   k) + (b01   k0 + (2c0i   u0)(g0   k0))
= a2i   a2i 1 + a02i   a02i 1 for all i = 2; 3; : : : ; 2t:
We have to distinguish the following cases.
 If a2i > 0 and a02i > 0 then a2i 1 = a02i 1 = 0 and a^2i  a^2i 1 = a2i+a02i > 0.
Hence
a^2i = a2i + a
0
2i and a^2i 1 = 0 = a2i 1 + a
0
2i 1:
 If a2i = a02i = 0 then a2i 1; a02i 1  0 and a^2i   a^2i 1 =  a2i 1   a02i 1  0.
Hence
a^2i = 0 = a2i + a
0
2i and a^2i 1 = a2i 1 + a
0
2i 1  0:
 Let a2i > 0 and a02i = 0. Then a2i 1 = 0, a02i 1  0 and a^2i   a^2i 1 =
a2i   a02i 1.
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If a2i   a02i 1 > 0 then
a^2i = a2i   a02i 1  a2i + a02i and a^2i 1 = 0  a2i 1 + a02i 1:
If a2i   a02i 1  0 then
a^2i = 0  a2i + a02i and a^2i 1 = a02i 1   a2i  a2i 1 + a02i 1:
(a2i = 0 and a
0
2i > 0 analogously)
In all cases the following equations are satised
a^2i  a2i + a02i and a^2i 1  a2i 1 + a02i 1:
Therefore
2tX
i=2
a^2i 
2tX
i=2
(a2i + a
0
2i)
=
2tX
i=2
a2i +
2tX
i=2
a02i  b1 + b01 = b^1:
This shows that (b1 + b
0
1; g + k
0; k + k0) realizes   elementarily.
(b) Let C^ be the concatenation of the codes C and C 0 and s^ the concatenation of the
codewords s and s0. We check the requirements of Denition 4.20.
 Requirement (a) is met since s^ is a codeword in C^ with weight b1 + b01 = b^1.
 The code length of C^ is
n^ = n+ n0
 b1 +
2tX
i=2
a2i 1 + b01 +
2tX
i=2
a02i 1
(since C is suitable for (s; 1; b1; g; k) and
C 0 is suitable for (s0; 2; b01; g0; k0))
= b1 + b
0
1| {z }
b^1
+
2tX
i=2
(a2i 1 + a02i 1| {z }
a^2i 1
)
 b^1 +
2tX
i=2
a^2i 1 (see proof of part (a));
which satises requirement (b) of Denition 4.20.
 Let k1; : : : ; kt and k01; : : : ; k0t be shares which satisfy the conditions of De-
nition 4.20 (c) for s; 1; b1; g; k and s
0; 2; b01; g
0; k0, respectively. Dene the
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shares k^1; : : : ; k^t for  ; b^1; g^; k^ to be the concatenations k^i = (ki; k
0
i) for all
i = 1; : : : ; t. For all j = 1; : : : ; 2t let Sj; S
0
j; S^j be the sums of the shares of
the jth set Aj 2 P(T ) with respect to the shares ki, the k0i and k^i.
{ Suppose that Aj 2  . Then Aj 2  1 and Aj 2  2. Therefore d (Sj; s) =
k, d
 
S 0j; s
0 = k0 and there are no codewords c 2 C, c0 2 C 0 with
d (Sj; c)  k and d
 
S 0j; c
0  k0. That means
d

S^j; s^

= d (Sj; s) + d
 
S 0j; s
0 = k + k0 = k^
and there is no other codeword c^ 2 C^ with d

S^j; c^

 k^.
{ For Aj 2  , Aj 2  1 \  2 or Aj 2  1 \  2. W.l.o.g we assume that the
rst case occurs. Then d (Sj; s) = g and d
 
S 0j; s
0 = k0. We also know
that there must be a codeword c 2 C with d (Sj; c) < g. Hence
d

S^j; s^

= d (Sj; s) + d
 
S 0j; s
0 = g + k0 = g^:
Let c^ 2 C^ be the concatenation of c and s0. Then
d

S^j; c^

= d (Sj; c) + d
 
S 0j; s
0 < g + k0 = g^:
This satises condition (c) of Denition 4.20.
Example 6.21. Consider the access structures
 1 = ffT3g; fT1; T2g; fT2; T3g; fT1; T3g; fT1; T2; T3gg and
 2 = ffT1g; fT2g; fT3g; fT2; T3g; fT1; T2; T3gg
on the participants set T = fT1; T2; T3g. The dual access structures
 1 = ffT1g; fT2gg and
 2 = ffT1; T2g; fT1; T3gg
are disjoint. Dene
  =  1 \  2 = ffT3g; fT2; T3g; fT1; T2; T3gg :
Then
  = ffT1g; fT2g; fT1; T2g; fT1; T3gg =  1 [  2:
At rst we show that the parameters (b1; g; k) = (b
0
1; g
0; k0) = (64; 64; 28) realize  1
and  2 elementarily. Then we nd suitable codes for  1 and  2 and apply Proposition
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6.20 to nd an elementary realization and a suitable code for  .
"1
 1
=
0@1 00 1
0 0
1A and w 1 = (1; 4; 2)
The numbers di of the ones in the ith row of " 1 are
di =
8>><>>:
0 once
1 4 times
2 2 times
:
Hence the equations 2 to 8 in the linear system 4.2 equations are
 a2i  a2i 1 = 14(b1  k+ (u  2di)(g  k)) = 14(64  28 + (2  2  0)(64  28)) = 27
for one time. In this case we choose a2i = 27 and a2i 1 = 0.
 a2i  a2i 1 = 14(b1  k+ (u  2di)(g  k)) = 14(64  28 + (2  2  1)(64  28)) = 9
for four times. We choose a2i = 9 and a2i 1 = 0.
 a2i a2i 1 = 14(b1 k+ (u  2di)(g k)) = 14(64  28 + (2  2  2)(64  28)) =  9
for two times and we choose a2i = 0 and a2i 1 = 9.
This yields
8X
i=2
a2i = 27 + 4  9 = 63  64 = b1:
Hence (64; 64; 28) realizes  1 elementarily. In order to show that (64; 64; 28) is also an
elementary realization for  2 we have a look at the matrix
"1
 2
=
0@1 11 0
0 1
1A :
It also consists of two linearly independent columns. That means "1
 1
and "1
 2
have
the same linearity type and  1 and  2 belong to the same class of access structures.
Hence (64; 64; 28) realizes  2 elementarily, too.
Lemma 5.26 (b) tells us that the rst order Reed Muller code RM(1; 7) is suitable
for (s; 1; 64; 64; 28) and for (s
0; 1; 64; 64; 28) for all codewords s; s0 2 RM(1; 7) n
f(0; : : : ; 0); (1; : : : ; 1)g.
According to Proposition 6.20 (a),   is realized elementary by
(b^1; g^; k^) = (b1 + b
0
1; g + k
0; k + k0) = (128; 92; 56):
Finally Proposition 6.20 (b) says that the concatenation
C^ = f(c; c0) : c; c0 2 RM(1; 7)g
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is suitable for (s^; ; 128; 92; 56) for all codewords s^ 2 C^, s^ 6= (0; : : : ; 0| {z }
128
; 1; : : : ; 1| {z }
128
),
(1; : : : ; 1| {z }
128
; 0; : : : ; 0| {z }
128
), with weight 128.
Let us now consider the general case where  1 and  2 are not disjoint. Suppose
that  1; 2 ( P(T ) n f?g such that  1 *  2 and  2 *  1. Then  1 [  2 consists of
the three non-empty and pairwise disjoint sets  1 n  2,  2 n  1 and  1 \  2. In order
to nd a realization for  1 \  2 we apply Proposition 6.20 twice:
 on  1 n  2 =  1 [ 2 and  2 n  1 =  1 [ 2, this yields an elementary realization
for ( 1 [  2) \ ( 1 [  2) = ( 1 \  2) [ ( 1 \  2);
 on ( 1\ 2)[( 1\ 2) and  1 \  2 =  1[ 2, this yields an elementary realization
for (( 1 \  2) [ ( 1 \  2)) \ ( 1 [  2) =  1 \  2.
Corollary 6.22. Let  1; 2 ( P(T ) n f?g be access structures on the same set of t
participants such that  1 *  2 and  2 *  1. Suppose that the dual access structures
are not disjoint. Let  01 :=  1 [  2,  02 :=  1 [  2 and  3 =  1 [  2.
(a) Suppose that (b1; g; k), (b
0
1; g
0; k0) and (b001; g
00; k00) are elementary realizations for
 01,  
0
2 and  3, respectively, such that g   k = g0   k0 = g00   k00 holds. Then
(b^1; g^; k^) = (b1 + b
0
1 + b
00
1; g + k
0 + k00; k + k0 + k00)
realizes  1 \  2 elementarily.
(b) Additionally, let C  Zn2 be a suitable code for (s; 01; b1; g; k) for a codeword
s 2 C with weight b1, C 0  Zn02 be a suitable code for (s0; 02; b01; g0; k0) for a
codeword s0 2 C 0 with weight b01 and C 00  Zn002 be suitable for (s00; 3; b001; g00; k00)
for a codeword s00 2 C 00 with weight b001. Then the concatenation C^ of C, C 0 and C 00
is suitable for (s^; 1 \ 2; b^1; g^; k^), where s^ is the concatenation of the codewords
s, s0 and s00.
Remark 6.23. Let   6= P(T ) n f?g be an arbitrary access structure such that there
are u > 0 unauthorized sets. The dual access structure   can be partitioned into at
most u disjoint smaller sets, which can be regarded as the duals of some suitable access
structures. This yields another approach towards an universal solution for all access
structures on the same number of participants: We partition the dual access structure
into u pairwise dierent sets, each containing one unauthorized set. Then we apply
Proposition 6.20 for u   1 times. Unfortunately, access structures with dual access
structures of size one do not allow small code lengths and large security distances.
This has the consequence that the alternative approach based on Proposition 6.20
does not improve the universal solution given in Theorem 4.22 with regard to the code
length and the security distance.
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Let us take a detailed look at this construction. Let  1 be an arbitrary access
structure with one unauthorized set. Then u = 1 and w 1 = (2
t 1   1; 2t 1) yields
ci = 1 for 2
t 1   1 times and ci = 0 for 2t 1 times. We obtain the equations
a2i   a2i 1 =
(
1
2t 1 (b1   k + (g   k)) 2t 1   1 times
1
2t 1 (b1   k   (g   k)) 2t 1 times
:
We choose b1 = g and b1
 
1
2
  1
2t 2
  k < b1
2
such that 2t 2jb1   k. Then
2tP
i=2
a2i  b1
, 1
2t 1 ((2
t 1   1)  2  (b1   k))  b1
, b1  (2t 2   1)  k  (2t 1   1)
, b1 
 
1
2
  1
2t 2
  k:
Hence the parameters (b1; b1; k) with the properties described above realize  1 ele-
mentarily. In order to guarantee that 2t 2jb1   k we choose k = b12   2t 2 and b1
to be divisible by 2t 1. However, a consequence of this is that b1 has to be at least
22t 2   2t 1.
For b1 = 2
2t 2 the rst order Reed Muller code RM(1; 2t   1) is suitable for
(s; 1; b1; b1; k) for all codewords in s 2 RM(1; 2t   1) n f(0; : : : ; 0); (1; : : : ; 1)g (see
Lemma 5.26 (b)).
Now let   be an access structure with u > 0 unauthorized sets. We split the dual
access structure into u disjoint sets with one element and apply Proposition 6.20 (a)
for u   1 times. This yields the following elementary realizations depending on the
size u of  .
u = 1 : (b1; b1; k)
u = 2 : (2b1; b1 + k; 2k)
...
1  u  2t   1 : (ub1; b1 + (u  1)k; uk) = (b^1;u; g^u; k^u)
...
u = 2t   1 : ((2t   1)b1; b1 + (2t   2)k; (2t   1)k) = (b^1; g^; k^)
For all u = 1; : : : ; 2t   1 Proposition 6.20 (b) says that the u-fold concatenation C
of RM(1; 2t  1) is suitable for (s^; ; ub1; b1 + (u  1)k; uk) for all secrets s^ 2 C, which
are concatenations of codewords in RM(1; 2t  1) n f(0; : : : ; 0); (1; : : : ; 1)g.
Let (~b1; ~g; ~k) be the parameters provided by theorem 4.22 for t participants. That
means especially
~b1  22t   2t and ~g  ~b1

1
2
+
1
2t

  2t 1:
In the worst case the alternative construction yields
b^1 = (2
t   1)b1  23t 2   3  22t 2 + 2t 1
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and fails to improve the eciency of the scheme. In order to make a statement about
the security provided by the two dierent realizations we study the \relative security
distances" g^
b^1
and ~g~b1
. We know from Remark 4.21 (b) that the code lengths 2b^1 and 2~b1,
respectively, are arithmetically possible. Hence the relative security distance measure
the proportions of digits in the share sums of the unauthorized sets which dier from
the secret. Unfortunately the new approach means no essential improvement with
regard to the security either since both relative security distances are below the (very
small) bound 1
2
+ 1
2t
:
The relative security distance provided by the universal solution is
~b1
~g
=
1
2
+
1
2t
  2
t 1
~b1
 1
2
+
1
2t
:
In the worst case u = 2t   1 we have g^ = b1 + (2t   2)k = 2t 1b1   22t 2 + 2t 1 and
therefore
g^
b^1
=
1
2
+
1
2t+1   2| {z }
 1
2t
  2
2t 2
(2t   1)b1 +
2t 1
(2t   1)b1| {z }
0
 1
2
+
1
2t
:
However, for smaller numbers u of unauthorized sets, the weights b^1;u are con-
siderably smaller than ~b1 and relative security distances above the bound
1
2
+ 1
2t
are
possible:
g^u
b^1;u
=
b1 + (u  1)k
ub1
=
b1
 
1 + u 1
2

ub1
  u  1
u
 2
t 2
b1
 u+ 1
2u
  u  1
u
 2
t 2
22t 2   2t 1
=
1
2
+
1
2u
  u  1
u

1
2t
+
1
22t 1   2t

| {z }
 1
2t 1
 1
2
+
1
2u
  u  1
2t 1u
which is larger than 1
2
+ 1
2t
for all u < 2
t 1+2
3
.
6.5 Removal of One Authorized Subset
This section deals with very small changes in the access structure. We study the eect
on the possible parameters when one single set of the access structure is removed.
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Let  0 be an access structure realized elementarily by (b1; g; k). It will turn out that
any authorized set, which is disjoint to all unauthorized sets, can be removed from  0
such that the resulting access structure   is also realized elementarily by (b1; g; k).
Proposition 6.24. Let  0 ( P(T ) n f?g be an arbitrary access structure on t par-
ticipants. Consider a set of participants V 2  0 which is disjoint to all unauthorized
sets in  0.
(a) Suppose that (a02; : : : ; a
0
2t+1) is an elementarily solution for ( ; b1; g; k) such that
there is no pair (a02i; a
0
2i 1) with
0  ja02i   a02i 1j <
g   k
2t 1
:
Then (b1; g; k) realizes the access structure
  :=  0 n fV g:
elementarily, too.
(b) Let C be suitable for (s; 0; b1; g; k) for a codeword s 2 C with weight b1. Suppose
that the minimum distance d(C) and the covering radius (C) satisfy d(C) 
2k + 1 and (C) < g. Then C is also suitable for (s; ; b1; g; k).
Proof. (a) Without loss of generality let V = fT1; : : : ; Tvg. Let j 0j = u0.   =
 0 [ fV g yields j j = u = u0 + 1 and
"1
 0 =
0BBB@
0 : : : 0
...
...
0 : : : 0

1CCCA
| {z }
u0
9=; v
g t  v
and "1
 
=
0BBBBBBBB@
1 0 : : : 0
...
...
...
1 0 : : : 0
0
... 
0
1CCCCCCCCA
| {z }
u=u0+1
9=; v9=; t  v
for a suitable (t vu0)-matrix (). The rows of the matrices " 0 and "  consist
of all possible sums of the rows of the matrices "1
 0 and "
1
 
, respectively, with at
least one summand. Let c0i denote the number of zeros in the ith row of " 0 . The
number ci of zeros in the ith row of "  is characterized by the matrix () and
has the following relation to c0i:
 Suppose that the ith row of " 0 is the sum of at least one of the last t  v
rows of "1
 0 . Then this row is the sum of a sum R
0 of the last t  v rows and
a multiple m  (0; : : : ; 0), m = 0; : : : ; v, of the zero row. Since there are 2v
combinations of the rst v rows, there are 2v rows like the ith row.
Let R be the vector consisting of R0 with an additional leading zero. Then
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the ith row of "  is the sum R + m  (1; 0; : : : ; 0). If m is even (possibly
zero), then the ith row is just R. In this case ci = c
0
i + 1. This happens
2v 1 times. If m is odd, the ith row looks like R with the rst bit ipped.
In this case ci = c
0
i. This also happens 2
v 1 times.
Hence each c0i occurs for a multiple of 2
v times and there are 2v 1 rows of
"  with ci = c
0
i + 1 zeros and 2
v 1 rows with ci = c0i zeros.
2v 1 times ci = c0i + 1
2v times c0i
2v 1 times ci = c0i
 Let the ith row of " 0 be a sum of the rst v rows of "1 0 . Then the row is
a multiple m  (0; : : : ; 0), m = 1; : : : v. Since there are 2v   1 possibilities to
choose at least one of the rst v rows, there are 2v   1 rows in " 0 of that
form. The ith row of "  is m  (1; 0; : : : ; 0). When m is even, the row is also
the zero vector and ci = c
0
i + 1. This happens 2
v 1   1 times. Otherwise,
when m is odd, the ith row of "  is the vector (1; 0; : : : ; 0) and ci = c
0
i. This
happens 2v 1 times.
2v 1   1 times ci = c0i + 1 = u
2v   1 times c0i = u0
2v 1 times ci = c0i = u  1
These observations show that there are indices i1; : : : ; i2t v 1 such that for all
j 2 fi1; : : : ; i2t v 1g there are exactly 2v rows of " 0 with c0j zeros. In "  there
are exactly 2v 1 rows with cj = c0j zeros and 2
v 1 rows with cj = c0j + 1 zeros.
Furthermore there are 2v   1 rows of " 0 with u0 zeros, 2v 1   1 rows of "  with
u = u0+ 1 zeros and 2v 1 rows of "  with u 1 = u0 zeros. Let i2t v be the index
of such a row of " 0 .
Hence the elementary solution a0 for ( 0; b1; g; k) yields an elementary solution
a = (a2; : : : ; a2t+1) for ( ; b1; g; k):
Consider the case ci = c
0
i + 1:
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a2i   a2i 1 = 1
2t 1
(b1   k + (2ci   u)(g   k))
=
1
2t 1
(b1   k + (2c0i + 2  u0   1)(g   k))
= a02i   a02i 1 +
g   k
2t 1
:
In the other case ci = c
0
i and we have
a2i   a2i 1 = 1
2t 1
(b1   k + (2ci   u)(g   k))
=
1
2t 1
(b1   k + (2c0i   u0   1)(g   k))
= a02i   a02i 1  
g   k
2t 1
:
According to our hypothesis ja02i   a02i 1j  g k2t 1 for all i = 2; : : : ; 2t, we have to
distinguish two cases:
 Suppose that a02i > 0. Then a02i 1 = 0 and a02i  g k2t 1 . Furthermore
a2i   a2i 1 = a02i +
g   k
2t 1
> 0 yields a2i = a
0
2i +
g   k
2t 1
; a2i 1 = 0;
a2i   a2i 1 = a02i  
g   k
2t 1
 0 yields a2i = a02i  
g   k
2t 1
; a2i 1 = 0
 If a02i = 0 and a02i 1 > 0 then a02i 1  g k2t 1 and
a2i   a2i 1 =  a02i 1 +
g   k
2t 1
 0 yields a2i = 0; a2i 1 = a02i 1  
g   k
2t 1
;
a2i   a2i 1 =  a02i 1  
g   k
2t 1
< 0 yields a2i = 0; a2i 1 = a02i 1 +
g   k
2t 1
Using these results we calculate
2tX
i=2
a2i = 2
v 1
2t v 1X
l=1

a02il  
g   k
2t 1

+ 2v 1
2t v 1X
l=1

a02il +
g   k
2t 1

+2v 1

a02i2t v  
g   k
2t 1

+ (2v 1   1)

a02i2t v +
g   k
2t 1

= 2v
2t v 1X
l=1
a02il + (2
v   1)a02i2t v  
g   k
2t 1
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=
2tX
i=2
a02i| {z }
=b1 a02
 g   k
2t 1
 b1:
That means (b1; g; k) realizes   elementarily, too and (a2; : : : ; a2t+1) is an ele-
mentary solution for ( ; b1; g; k).
(b) We have to check the requirements of Denition 4.20. Condition (a) is obviously
met and condition (c) is fullled because of remark 4.21 (c). It remains to show
that the length n of C is sucient.
n  b1 +
2tX
i=2
a02il 1
= b1 + 2
v 1
2t v 1X
l=1

a02il 1  
g   k
2t 1

+ 2v 1
2t v 1X
l=1

a02il 1 +
g   k
2t 1

+(2v   1) a02i2t v 1| {z }
=0
= b1 +
2tX
i=2
a2il 1
Hence C is also suitable for (s; ; b1; g; k).
Example 6.25. Let
 0 = ffT1g ; fT3g ; fT1; T2g ; fT1; T3g ; fT1; T2; T3gg ;  0 = ffT2g ; fT2; T3gg :
V = fT1g is disjoint to all unauthorized sets in  0. Dene
  =  0 n fV g = ffT3g ; fT1; T2g ; fT1; T3g ; fT1; T2; T3gg :
Then
  =  0 [ fV g = ffT1g ; fT2g ; fT2; T3gg :
The "1-matrices and weight vectors are
"1
 0 =
0@0 01 1
0 1
1A ; w 0 = (1; 4; 2)
and
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"1
 
=
0@1 0 00 1 1
0 0 1
1A ; w  = (0; 3; 3; 1):
At rst we illustrate how the numbers c0i of zeros in the ith row of " 0 determine the
numbers ci of zeros in the ith row of "  using the same notations as in the proof of
Proposition 6.24.
The rows of the matrices " 0 and "  are the following linear combinations of the rows
of "1
 0 and "
1
 
:
i4 !
i1 !
i2 !
i3 !
i = 2
i = 3
i = 4
i = 5
i = 6
i = 7
i = 8
0BBBBBBBBB@
0 0
1 1
1 1
0 1
0 1
1 0
1 0
1CCCCCCCCCA
| {z }
="
 0
row 1
row 2
row 1 + row 2
row 3
row 1 + row 3
row 2 + row 3
row 1 + row 2 + row 3
0BBBBBBBBB@
1 0 0
0 1 1
1 1 1
0 0 1
1 0 1
0 1 0
1 1 0
1CCCCCCCCCA
| {z }
=" 
i = 2
i = 3
i = 4
i = 5
i = 6
i = 7
i = 8
Let i1 = 3, i2 = 5, i3 = 7 and i4 = 2. Then c
0
i1
= 0, c0i2 = 1, c
0
i3
= 1 and c0i4 = 2. For
all j 2 fi1; i2; i3g there are 2v = 2 rows in " 0 with c0j zeros:
j = i1: row 2 and row 3 have c
0
j = 0 zeros
j = i2: row 4 and row 5 have c
0
j = 1 zero
j = i3: row 6 and row 7 have c
0
j = 1 zero
"  has 2
v 1 = 1 row with c0j + 1 zeros and 2
v 1 = 1 row with c0j zeros:
j = i1: row 2 has 1 zero and row 3 has 0 zeros
j = i2: row 4 has 2 zero and row 5 has 1 zero
j = i3: row 6 has 2 zero and row 7 has 1 zeros
For j = i4 there is 2
v   1 = 1 row in " 0 with c0j = u0 = 2 zeros: row 1. "  has
2v 1   1 = 0 rows with u0 + 1 = 3 zeros and 2v 1 = 1 row with u0 = 2 zeros: row 1.
Next we have a look at the equations 2 to 8 in the linear system 4.2 for elementary
solutions (a02; : : : ; a
0
16) for ( 
0; b1; g; k) and (a2; : : : ; a16) for ( ; b1; g; k) dened by the
numbers c02; : : : ; c
0
8 and c2; : : : ; c8 of zeros in the rows of " 0 and " . Consider the case
b1 = g.
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a03 = 0; a3 = 0
a04 =
3
4
(g   k); a4 = 1
2
(g   k)
a05 =
1
4
(g   k); a5 = 0
a06 = 0; a6 = 0
a07 =
1
4
(g   k); a7 = 1
2
(g   k)
a08 = 0; a8 = 0
a09 = 0; a9 = 0
a010 =
1
4
(g   k); a10 = 1
2
(g   k)
a011 = 0; a11 = 0
a012 =
1
4
(g   k); a12 = 0
a013 = 0; a13 = 0
a014 =
1
4
(g   k); a14 = 1
2
(g   k)
a015 = 0; a15 = 0
a016 =
1
4
(g   k); a16 = 0
Just like in the proof we obtain
3
2
(g   k) =
8X
i=2
a2i
= a4|{z}
a04  14 (g k)
+ a6|{z}
a06=0
+ a8|{z}
a08=0
+ a10|{z}
a010+
1
4
(g k)
+ a12|{z}
a010  14 (g k)
+ a14|{z}
a014+
1
4
(g k)
+ a16|{z}
a014  14 (g k)
= 2(a06 + a
0
10 + a
0
14) + a
0
4  
1
4
(g   k)
= 2 
3X
l=1
a02il + a
0
2i4
  1
4
(g   k)
=
8X
i=2
a02i| {z }
7
4
(g k)
 1
4
(g   k)
and
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1
2
(g   k) =
8X
i=2
a2i 1
= a3|{z}
a03=0
+ a5|{z}
a05  14 (g k)
+ a7|{z}
a05+
1
4
(g k)
+ a9|{z}
a09=0
+ a11|{z}
a011=0
+ a13|{z}
a013=0
+ a15|{z}
a015=0
= 2(a05 + a
0
9 + a
0
13) + a
0
3
= 2 
3X
l=1
a02il 1
=
8X
i=2
a02i 1:
In the general case, when the participant set V 2  0 is not disjoint to all unau-
thorized sets in  0, the summands  g k
2t 1 may be distributed dierently. For an ele-
mentarily solution (a02; : : : ; a
0
2t+1) for ( 
0; b1; g; k) there may be an elementarily solution
(a2; : : : ; a2t+1) for ( 
0 n fV g; b1; g; k) such that
2tX
i=2
a2i >
2tX
i=2
a02i:
But one can say at least the following.
Proposition 6.26. Let  0 ( P(T ) n f?g be an arbitrary access structure on t par-
ticipants and V 2  0. Suppose that (a02; : : : ; a02t+1) is an elementarily solution for
( ; b1; g; k) such that
a02  (g   k)

1  1
2t 1

:
Then (b1; g; k) realizes the access structure   :=  
0 n fV g elementarily, too.
Proof. Without loss of generality let V = fT1; : : : ; Tvg. Let j 0j = u0.   =  0 [ fV g
yields j j = u = u0+1 and "1
 
consists of the columns of "1
 
with the additional column
(1; : : : ; 1; 0; : : : ; 0) which represents V . Up to the order of the columns "1
 
has the
form 0BBBBBBBB@
1
...
1 "1
 0
0
...
0
1CCCCCCCCA
| {z }
u=u0+1
9=; v9=; t  v
The rows of the matrix "  look like the rows of "  with an additional leading zero or
an additional leading one. 2t 1   1 rows are the sums of an even number of columns
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of "1
 
. In this case the row starts with a zero. The remaining 2t 1 rows of "  belong
to sums with an odd number of summands and start with one.
Suppose that a2; : : : ; a2t+1 solve equations 2 up to 2
t of the linear system 4.2 for
 ; b1; g; k. Then there are 2
t 1   1 indices i such that
a2i   a2i 1 = a02i   a02i 1 +
g   k
2t 1
and 2t 1 indices i such that
a2i   a2i 1 = a02i   a02i 1  
g   k
2t 1
:
Hence
2tX
i=2
a2i 
2tX
i=2
a02i| {z }
b1 a02
+(2t 1   1)  g   k
2t 1
= b1 a02 + (g   k)

1  1
2t 1

| {z }
0
 b1:
Therefore (a2; : : : ; a2t+1) is an elementary solution for ( ; b1; g; k).
Chapter 7
Special Access Structures
In this chapter we apply the results and techniques of the previous chapters on special
classes of access structures. This yields access structures which are far superior with
regard to eciency and security to the general realization provided by Theorem 4.22
We start with access structures whose elementary distance vectors come from the
evaluation vectors of special Boolean polynomials by replacing 0 by k and 1 by g.
Then we deal with access structures which are dened by so-called necessary sets
and veto sets of dierent types.
7.1 Access Structures Related to Boolean Polyno-
mials
In this section we present an interesting connection between access structures on t
participants and Boolean polynomials with t variables. This connection comes from the
fact that any access structure   is completely characterized by the indices j  2 where
it's elementary weight vector has the value g (or k, respectively). Hence the distance
vector b corresponds to the vector (v2; : : : ; v2t) in Z2
t 1
2 with vj = 1 i bj = g. Adding
another bit v1 we receive one of the vectors (0; v2; : : : ; v2t) or (1; v2; : : : ; v2t) 2 Z2t2
which both characterize the access structure. We know that any vector in Z2t2 can
be considered as the evaluation vector of a Boolean polynomial. Hence there are two
Boolean polynomials which are related to (v1; v2; : : : ; v2t) and therefore related to b
and to  .
This approach enables us to identify classes of access structures with consider-
able better parameters than the parameters provided by Theorem 4.22. We will see
that access structures related to Boolean polynomials which belong to codewords in
RM1(1; t) allow the parameters g = b1 and arbitrary small code lengths n  b1. Fur-
thermore we study elementary realizations for access structures related to Boolean
monomials depending on the degree of the monomial.
Denition 7.1. Let   be an access structure on t participants and b = (b1; : : : ; b2t)

the elementary distance vector for   with respect to (b1; g; k). If there is a Boolean
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polynomial p : Zt2 ! Z2 with evaluation vector p = (p1; : : : ; p2t) such that
(b2; : : : ; b2t) = g  (p2; : : : ; p2t) + k 
 
(1; : : : ; 1)  (p
2
; : : : ; p
2t
)

we say that b and   are related to p, b  p and    p.
That means b is related to a Boolean polynomial p when
b =
(
g  p+ k  ((1; : : : ; 1)  p) + (b1   g)  e1 if p(0; : : : ; 0) = 1
g  p+ k  ((1; : : : ; 1)  p) + (b1   k)  e1 if p(0; : : : ; 0) = 0:
Example 7.2. Consider the access structure   = ffT1g ; fT1; T2g ; fT3g ; fT2; T3gg
from Example 4.25.   is related to the Boolean polynomial p : Z32 ! Z2 dened by
(x1; x2; x3) 7! 1 + x1 + x3 of degree one. The evaluation vector of p is calculated as
follows
x3 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
x2 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
x1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
p 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1.
Since the 2nd, the 4th, the 5th and the 7th element of (P(fT1; T2; T3g);4) are autho-
rized, any elementary distance vector of   has the form
b = (b1; k
"
2
; g; k
"
4
; k
"
5
; g; k
"
7
; g)
= g  (1; 0; 1; 0; 0; 1; 0; 1)| {z }
p
+k  (0; 1; 0; 1; 1; 0; 1; 0)| {z }
(1;:::;1) p
+(b1   g)  e1:
  is also related to the Boolean polynomial q : Zt2 ! Z2, dened by (x1; x2; x3) 7!
1 + x1 + x3 + (1 + x1)(1 + x2)(1 + x3) with the following evaluation vector
x3 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
x2 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
x1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
q 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
as
b = g  (0; 0; 1; 0; 0; 1; 0; 1)| {z }
q
+k  (1; 1; 0; 1; 1; 0; 1; 0)| {z }
(1;:::;1) q
+(b1   k)  e1:
The dual access structure is   = ffT2g ; fT1; T3g ; fT1; T2; T3gg and it is remarkable
that the vectors (x1; x2; x3)
 in the positions  2, where p or q have the value one, are
exactly the characteristic vectors the unauthorized sets. The other positions  2 of the
evaluation vectors belong to the characteristic vectors of the authorized sets. There
the evaluation vectors have the value zero. This is not a coincidence. The following
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lemma describes the connection between the authorized subsets and the zeros of the
related Boolean polynomials.
Lemma 7.3. Suppose that the access structure   is related to the Boolean polynomial
p : Zt2 ! Z2. Then the set A = fTi1 ; : : : ; Tilg is authorized i
p(y1; : : : ; yt) = 0 for yi =
(
1 if Ti 2 A
0 if Ti =2 A
:
Proof. Since   is related to p, the elementary weight vector b = (b1; : : : ; b2t)
 for  
with respect to (b1; g; k) has the property
(b2; b3; : : : ; b2t) = g  (p2; : : : ; p2t) + k 

(1; : : : ; 1)  (p
2
; : : : ; p
2t
)

:
Let fTi1 ; : : : ; Tilg be the jth element of P(T ). By construction of b
fTi1 ; : : : ; Tilg 2   , bj = k , pj = 0:
p
j
is the value of p when the argument is the jth vector of Zt2 with regard to the order
dened in Remark 4.4. This is exactly the desired vector y.
Remark 7.4. Lemma 7.3 yields the following connection between the Boolean poly-
nomials of an access structure and it's dual access structure:
   p ,    p+ 1:
Now we use the observations above to nd classes of access structures which allow
favorable parameters. We start with access structures related to Boolean polynomials
of degree  1 like the access structure in Example 7.2. Indeed, these access structures
turn out to have very good realizations.
Example 7.5. Again we consider the access structure
  = ffT1g ; fT3g ; fT1; T2g ; fT2; T3gg
on t = 3 participants with the elementary distance vector b = (b1; k; g; k; k; g; k; g)
 .
Let b1 be an arbitrary natural number, g = b1, and k 2 N0 arbitrary with k < b12 .
"  =
0BBBBBBBBB@
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 0
0 1 1
0 0 0
1 1 0
1 0 1
1CCCCCCCCCA
yields di =
(
2 6 times
0 once;
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where di is the number of ones in the ith row of "  for all i = 1; : : : ; 2
t  1. We obtain
the following equations for an elementary solution a = (a2; : : : ; a8):
a2i   a2i 1 =
(
1
4
(b1   k   (g   k)) = 0 6 times
1
4
(b1   k + 3(g   k)) = g   k once
Dene a2 = k. Then
8X
i=1
a2i = k + g   k = g = b1
shows that the chosen parameters realize   elementarily. Even the choice k = 0 is
possible. In this case Lemma 5.26 (a) implies that Zn2 , n  b1 +
2tP
i=2
a2i 1|{z}
=0
= b1, is
suitable for (s; ; b1; b1; 0) for all words s 2 Zn2 with weight b1.
The elementary solution a has the property that all its odd numbered components
are zero. Hence there are no positions where the secret has the value 0 and at least
one share has the value 1. Furthermore exactly one entry in fa4; a6; a8; : : : ; a16g is
non-zero and has the value g   k. This entry has to be
a12 = supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) \ supp(k3):
Otherwise fT1g and fT3g could not be authorized and fT2g unauthorized. Apart from
the order of the positions, the secret and the shares have the following structure.
1 . . .1 1 . . . . . . . . 1 0 . . . . . . . . 0 s
1. . .1 1 . . . . . . . . 1 0 . . . . . . . . 0 k1
1. . .1 0 . . . . . . . . 0 0 . . . . . . . . 0 k2
1. . .1 1 . . . . . . . . 1 0 . . . . . . . . 0 k3| {z }
a2=k0
| {z }
a12=g k
| {z }
a10
Hence T1 and T3 receive the secret s as shares and T2 receives the zero vector.
We will see that it is not a coincidence that the access structure in Example 7.2
has such a good realization. The following proposition states that all access structures
related to Boolean polynomials of degree  1, which have the constant summand 1,
have these realizations. Furthermore access structures related to Boolean polynomials
of degree  1 without the constant summand 1 allow signicantly better elementarily
solutions than the universal solution provided by Theorem 4.22.
Proposition 7.6. Let   be an access structure on t participants such that the ele-
mentary distance vectors are related to a Boolean polynomial p of degree  1. Then
the following parameters b1; g; k are possible.
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(a) Let p = (0; : : : ; 0). Then   = P(T ) n f?g and (b1; g; k) is an elementary realiza-
tion for   if
 2t 1j(b1   k)
 b1 > k  b1
 
1
2
  1
2t+1 2

.
(One possible elementary realization is (b1; g; k) with b1 = 2
e+t+1, k = 2e+t   2e
for e 2 N, e  t  1, g arbitrary.)
Furthermore the minimum code length of each suitable code is b1.
(b) Let p = (1; : : : ; 1). Then all subsets are unauthorized and the parameters b1 = g
are possible for all b1 2 N. For all n  b1 all subsets of Zn2 , which contain a
word s with weight b1 and a word c with weight < b1, are suitable codes for
(s; ; b1; g; k).
(c) Let p : Zt2 ! Z2 be a Boolean polynomial with p 2 RM0(1; t) n f(0; : : : ; 0)g.
Then (b1; g; k) realizes   elementarily if
 2t 1j(b1   k)
 b1 > k  b1
 
1
2
  1
2t 2

.
 b1  g  k + b1 k2t 1 .
(One possible elementary realization is (b1; g; k) with b1 = g = 2
h+t and k =
2h+t 1   2h+1 for all h 2 N, h  t  2.)
Furthermore the minimum code length of each suitable code is at least b1 + g  
k   b1 k
2t 1 .
(d) Let p : Zt2 ! Z2 be a Boolean polynomial with p 2 RM1(1; t) n f(1; : : : ; 1)g.
Then (b1; g; k) realizes   elementarily if
 2t 1j(b1   k)
 2t 1j(g   k)
 b1 > k  b1
 
1
2
  1
2t 2

.
 b1  g  b1   2t 12t 1 1k.
(One possible elementary realization is (b1; g; k) with b1 = g and k = 0.)
Furthermore the minimum code length of each suitable code is b1.
Proof. (a) Let p = (0; : : : ; 0). Choose parameters b1; k with the properties stated in
the proposition. Since all nonempty sets of participants are authorized, equations
2 up to 2t in the linear system 4.2 have the form
a2i   a2i 1 = 1
2t 1
(b1   k) > 0:
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Hence we dene a2i =
1
2t 1 (b1   k), which is a natural number since 2t 1jb1   k,
and a2i 1 = 0 for all i = 2; 3; : : : 2t. Then
2tX
i=2
a2i = (2
t   1) 1
2t 1
(b1   k)
 (2t   1) 1
2t 1

b1
2
+
b1
2t+1   2

= b1;
which shows that a = (a2; : : : ; a2t+1) is an elementary solution for ( ; b1; g; k) for
a2 = b1   (2t   1) 12t 1 (b1   k).
Furthermore the code length of each suitable code has to be at least
2tX
i=1
a2i| {z }
=b1
+
2tX
i=2
a2i 1|{z}
=0
= b1:
(b) When all sets of participants are unauthorized, we choose an arbitrary code
length n  b1 and consider an arbitrary subset C  Zn2 which contains a word
s with weight b1 and a word c with weight < b1. Then we give the zero word
of length n as share to all participants. The consequence is that all sums S of
shares are also the zero vector and fulll
d (s; S) > d (c; S) :
Hence Hamming decoding yields the wrong codeword.
(c) In this case b is related to a Boolean polynomial p of degree 1 without the
constant summand 1. W.l.o.g. let p(x1; : : : ; xt) = x1 + : : :+xv, v  t. According
to Lemma 7.3, a vector y = (y1; : : : ; yt)
 2 Zt2 is the characteristic vector of an
unauthorized set i p(y1; : : : ; yt) = y1 + : : : + yv = 1. That means the set V of
the characteristic vectors of the unauthorized sets is the preimage of 1 under the
linear transformation (y1; : : : ; yt)
 7! y1 + : : :+yv of rank 1. Hence V is an ane
subspace of Zt2 with dimension t   1 which does not contain the zero vector.
Because of Proposition 5.21 we can assume w.l.o.g. that V = et + he1; : : : ; et 1i.
This yields
"1
 
=
 
1 : : : 1

| {z }
u=2t 1
g t  1
where the submatrix () consists of all possible columns with t   1 entries.
According to Remark 5.15, the number di of ones in the ith row of "  is
di =
(
2t 2 2t   2 times
2t   1 once
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and we obtain the equations
a2i   a2i 1 = 1
2t 1
(b1   k) 2t   2 times
a2i   a2i 1 = 1
2t 1
(b1   k   2t 1(g   k)) once:
We choose parameters b1; g; k with the properties stated in the proposition. In
the rst case we dene a2i =
1
2t 1 (b1   k) which is > 0 since b1 > k, and integer
since 2t 1j(b1   k). In this case a2i 1 = 0. In the second case we dene a2i = 0
and a2i 1 =   12t 1 (b1   k   2t 1(g   k)) because b1   k   2t 1(g   k) < 0 for
g  k + b1 k
2t 1 . Hence
2tX
i=2
a2i = (2
t   2) 1
2t 1
(b1   k)
 (2t   2) 1
2t 1

b1
2
+
b1
2t   2

= b1:
Dene a2 = b1   (2t   2) 12t 1 (b1   k). Then (a2; : : : ; a2t+1) is an elementary
solution for ( ; b1; g; k).
Furthermore the code length of each suitable code has to be at least
2tX
i=1
a2i| {z }
=b1
+
2tX
i=2
a2i 1| {z }
=g k  b1 k
2t 1
= b1 + g   k   b1   k
2t 1
:
(d) b is related to a Boolean polynomial p of degree one with the constant sum-
mand 1. W.l.o.g. let p(x1; : : : ; xt) = x1 + : : : + xv + 1, v  t. Then a vector
y = (y1; : : : ; yt)
 2 Zt2 is the characteristic vector of an unauthorized set i
p(y1; : : : ; yt) = y1 + : : : + yv + 1 = 1, which is equivalent to y1 + : : : + yv = 0.
That means the set V of the characteristic vectors of the unauthorized sets is
a linear subspace of Zt2 of dimension t  1. Because of Proposition 5.21 we can
assume w.l.o.g. that V = he1; : : : ; et 1i. This yields
"1
 
=
 
0 : : : 0

| {z }
u=2t 1 1
g t  1
where the submatrix () consists of all possible columns with t 1 entries without
the zero column. According to Remark 5.15, the number di of ones in the ith
row of "  is
di =
(
2t 2 2t   2 times
0 once
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and we obtain the equations
a2i   a2i 1 = 1
2t 1
(b1   k   (g   k)) 2t   2 times
a2i   a2i 1 = 1
2t 1
(b1   k + (2t 1   1)(g   k)) once:
We choose parameters b1; g; k with the properties stated in the proposition. In
the rst case we dene a2i =
1
2t 1 (b1 k  (g k)) which is  0 and a2i 1 = 0. In
the second case we dene a2i =
1
2t 1 (b1 k+(2t 1 1)(g k))  0 and a2i 1 = 0.
This yields
2tX
i=2
a2i =
1
2t 1
 
(2t   1)(b1   k)  (2t   2)(g   k) + (2t 1   1)(g   k)

= b1

2  1
2t 1

  g

1  1
2t 1

  k
 b1

2  1
2t 1

 

b1   2
t 1
2t 1   1k

1  1
2t 1

  k
= b1:
Choose a2 =
2tP
i=2
a2i   b1. Then (a2; : : : ; a2t+1) is an elementary solution for
( ; b1; g; k).
Furthermore the code length of each suitable code has to be at least
2tX
i=1
a2i| {z }
=b1
+
2tX
i=2
a2i 1|{z}
=0
= b1:
Remark 7.7. (a) If p is a Boolean polynomial of degree  1 with constant sum-
mand 1, Proposition 7.6 says that (b1; g; k) = (b1; b1; 0) is an elementary realiza-
tion. According to Lemma 5.26 (a), C = Zn2 is suitable for (s; ; b1; g; k) for all
n  b1 and all s 2 Zn2 with weight b1.
(b) Suppose that p is a Boolean polynomial of degree 1 without the constant sum-
mand 1. Proposition 7.6 yields the following elementary realization (b1; g; k):
b1 = 2
h+t = g and k = 2h+t 1   2h+1 for an arbitrary h 2 N; h  t  2:
According to Lemma 5.26 (b), the rst order Reed Muller code RM(1; h +
t + 1) is suitable for (s; ; b1; g; k) for all codewords s 2 RM(1; h + t + 1),
s 6= (0; : : : ; 0); (1; : : : ; 1).
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In the general solution provided by Theorem 4.22 we have the restrictions
b1  22t   2t and g  b1

1
2
+
1
2t

  2t 1:
Hence the solutions provided by Proposition 7.6 mean an improvement concern-
ing the code length and therefore the eciency of the scheme. With regard to
the security of the scheme, the parameters provided by Proposition 7.6 are far
superior to the universal parameters, since g exceeds the covering radius.
At this point we want to mention another approach towards the elementary re-
alizations of access structures related to Boolean polynomials of degree one. This
approach uses the fact that the structure of the matrix E dened in 4.11 is also given
by Boolean polynomials of degree one (see Lemma 4.12).
Remark 7.8. Each Boolean polynomial p : Zt2 ! Z2 of degree one represents a
codeword in RM(1; t). If it has the summand 1, then p is contained in RM1(1; t).
Otherwise p lies in RM0(1; t).
Recall that the matrix E = E(t) is also related to codewords in RM(1; t). It's rows
are dened by the codewords of RM0(1; t) ordered by 4 in the way that all zeros in
the codewords are replaced by ones and all ones by minus ones.
These observations yield an alternative way to prove Proposition 7.6 (c) and (d):
Equation 2 up to equation 2t in the linear system 4.2 come from the equation
E  b =
0BBB@
a4   a3
a6   a5
...
a2t+1   a2t+1 1
1CCCA :
If b is related to a Boolean polynomial p with p = c 2 RM(1; t) we have
E  b = E  (g  c+ k  c+ (b1   k)e1)
= g  Ec + k  Ec + (b1   k)  Ee1
= (g   k)  Ec + (b1   k)  (1; : : : ; 1)
for c 2 RM0(1; t) and
E  b = E  (g  c+ k  c+ (b1   g)e1)
= g  Ec + k  Ec + (b1   g)  Ee1
= (g   k)  Ec + (b1   g)  (1; : : : ; 1)
for c 2 RM1(1; t).
Since the rows of E belong to the codewords in RM0(1; t) ordered by 4, it can be
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shown that
E  c =
8>>>><>>>>:
(0; : : : ; 0; 2t 1
"
l
#
; 0; : : : ; 0) if c is the lth codeword in RM0(1; t)
(0; : : : ; 0; 2t 1; 0; : : : ; 0) if c is the lth codeword in RM1(1; t).
These calculations yield the same elementary solutions (a2; : : : ; a2t+1) as the proof of
Proposition 7.6 (c) and (d):
For c 2 RM0(1; t) we have
a2i   a2i 1 =
(
1
2t 1 ( 2t 1(g   k) + b1   k) if i = l
1
2t 1 (b1   k) if i 6= l:
c 2 RM1(1; t) yields
a2i   a2i 1 =
8>>>><>>>>:
1
2t 1 (2
t 1(g   k) + b1   g)
= 1
2t 1 (b1   k + (2t 1   1)(g   k)) if i = l
1
2t 1 (b1   g)
= 1
2t 1 (b1   k   (g   k)) if i 6= l:
We have seen that access structures related to Boolean polynomials of degree  1
have very nice realizations. But how do these access structures look like? We have a
look at these access structures for t = 3 participants.
Example 7.9. For t = 3 we have the following access structures related to Boolean
polynomials p of degree  1:
p b  
0 (b1; k; k; k; k; k; k; k) P(T ) n f?g
x1 (b1; g; k; g; k; g; k; g) fA 6= ? : T1 =2 Ag
x2 (b1; k; g; g; k; k; g; g) fA 6= ? : T2 =2 Ag
x1 + x2 (b1; g; g; k; k; g; g; k) fA 6= ? : T1; T2 2 A or T1; T2 =2 Ag
x3 (b1; k; k; k; g; g; g; g) fA 6= ? : T3 =2 Ag
x1 + x3 (b1; g; k; g; g; k; g; k) fA 6= ? : T1; T3 2 A or T1; T3 =2 Ag
x2 + x3 (b1; k; g; g; g; g; k; k) fA 6= ? : T2; T3 2 A or T2; T3 =2 Ag
x1 + x2 + x3 (b1; g; g; k; g; k; k; g) fA 6= ? : jAj eveng
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p b  
1 (b1; g; g; g; g; g; g; g) ?
1 + x1 (b1; k; g; k; g; k; g; k) fA : T1 2 Ag
1 + x2 (b1; g; k; k; g; g; k; k) fA : T2 2 Ag
1 + x1 + x2 (b1; k; k; g; g; k; k; g) fA 6= ? : T1 2 A XOR T2 2 Ag
1 + x3 (b1; g; g; g; k; k; k; k) fA : T3 2 Ag
1 + x1 + x3 (b1; k; g; k; k; g; k; g) fA 6= ? : T1 2 A XOR T3 2 Ag
1 + x2 + x3 (b1; g; k; k; k; k; g; g) fA 6= ? : T2 2 A XOR T3 2 Ag
1 + x1 + x2 + x3 (b1; k; k; g; k; g; g; k) fA : jAj oddg
In Chapter 4 we considered the access structure   = fA : Tj 2 Ag for a xed j. We
now know that this access structure is related to the Boolean polynomial 1 + xj. The
special feature of this access structure is, that it can be realized using only the secret
s itself and the zero vector as shares. There are only a few access structures which
allow these shares and we are able to describe them in terms of Boolean polynomials.
Proposition 7.10. Let   be an access structure on the participant set T = fT1; : : : ; Ttg.
Then the following statements are equivalent:
(a)   is related to a Boolean polynomial p with p 2 RM1(1; t).
(b)   can be realized by assigning the following shares:
Tj receives
(
the secret s if fTjg 2  
the zero vector if fTjg 2  
for all j = 1; : : : ; t:
Proof. \)" Suppose that (a) holds. For p = 1 this is Proposition 7.6 (b).
W.l.o.g. let p(x1; : : : ; xt) = x1 + : : :+ xv + 1. Lemma 7.3 yields
A = fTi1 ; : : : ; Tilg 2  
, p(y1; : : : ; yt) = y1 + : : :+ yv + 1 = 0
for yi =
(
1 if Ti 2 A
0 if Ti =2 A
for all i = 1; : : : ; t
, A contains an odd number of participants of the set fT1; : : : ; Tvg :
When we give the secret s as share to each participant in fT1; : : : ; Tvg and the
zero vector to all other participants, this access structure is realized.
\(" Suppose that (b) holds. When there is no Tj 2  , all participants receive the
zero word and    1. Now assume that w.l.o.g. exactly for j = 1; : : : ; v the sets
fTjg are the authorized sets with one element. Let V = fT1; : : : ; Tvg. Consider
an arbitrary non-empty set A  T and the related sum S of the shares.
 If A \ V = ?, S = 0 and A is unauthorized.
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 If A \ V = fTi1 ; : : : ; Tilg, S =
(
s if l is odd
0 if l is even
and A 2
(
  if l is odd
  if l is even
.
Hence    1 + x1 + : : :+ xv.
Next we have a look at access structures related to Boolean monomials of higher
degree and their duals.
Proposition 7.11. Let   be an access structure on t participants related to a Boolean
monomial p : Zt2 ! Z2 of degree v, 1  v  t.
(a) (b1; g; k) is an elementary realization for   if
 b1  22t 1   2t and 2tjb1
 k = b1
2
  2t 1
 b1
 
1
2
+ 1
2t v+1
  2t 1(2t v   1)  g  b1  12 + 12t v+1  such that 2v 1jg   k.
Furthermore the minimum code length of each suitable code is n  b1 + g  k 
b1 k
2t v .
(b) The dual access structure   is related to the Boolean polynomial p + 1 and
(b1; g; k) is an elementary realization if
 k < b1
 b1  g  max

b1   k; k + b1 k2t v+1
	
.
 2t 1j(b1   k), 2t 1j(g   k).
The parameters b1 = g and k = 0 are possible for all b1 2 N with 2v 1jb1.
The minimum code length of each suitable code is
1
2t 1 ((2
t 1   2v 1 + 1)b1 + (2t 1 + 2v 1   2t v   1)g   (2t 1   2t v)k).
Proof. (a) W.l.o.g. we assume that p(x1; : : : ; xt) = x1  : : : xv. According to Lemma
7.3 the vector y = (y1; : : : ; yt)
 2 Zt2 is the characteristic vector of a subset in  
i p(y1; : : : ; yt) = 0. This is equivalent to y1  : : :  yv = 0 and happens i there is
at least one yj = 0 for 1  j  v. Only y1 = : : : = yv = 1 yields y1  : : :  yv = 1.
That is why we know that   = fA  T : fT1; : : : ; Tvg  Ag. "1  consists of all
possible columns in Zt2 which have the form (1; : : : ; 1| {z }
v
; ; : : : ; | {z }
t v
) . This means
that there are u = 2t v unauthorized sets and
"1
 
=
0BBB@
1 : : : 1
...
...
1 : : : 1

1CCCA
| {z }
2t v
9=; v
g t  v
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where the columns of the matrix () are all vectors in Zt v2 . The matrix " ,
which consists of all possible linear combinations of the rows of "1
 
, has the
weight vector
w  = (2
v 1   1
"
0
; 0; : : : ; 0; 2t   2v
"
2t v 1
; 0; : : : ; 0; 2v 1
"
2t v
)
(see Remark 5.15). The related equations of the linear system 4.2 are
a2i   a2i 1 =
8>><>>:
1
2t 1 (b1   k + 2t v(g   k)) 2v 1   1 times,
1
2t 1 (b1   k) 2t   2v times,
1
2t 1 (b1   k   2t v(g   k)) 2v 1 times.
Choose b1; g; k as stated in the proposition. Then b1   k   2t v(g   k)  0.
For all i = 2; : : : ; 2t dene a2i to be the right hand side of the equation and
a2i 1 = 0, if this side is positive. When the right hand side is negative we
choose a2i = 0 and dene a2i 1 to be the absolute value of the right hand side.
This yields an elementary solution (a2; : : : ; a2t+1) for ( ; b1; g; k) since
2tP
i=2
a2i  b1
holds:
2tX
i=2
a2i =
1
2t 1
 
(2t   2v 1   1) (b1   k)| {z }
=
b1
2
+2t 1
+(2v 1   1)2t v (g   k)| {z }
 b1
2t v+1 +2
t 1

 1
2t 1
 
b1(2
t 1   1) + 2t 1(2t   2)
= b1 + 2
t   2  b1
2t 1|{z}
2t 2
 b1:
Furthermore
2tX
i=2
a2i 1 =
1
2t 1
 2v 1  2t v(g   k)  (b1   k)
= g   k   b1   k
2t v
shows that the length of each suitable code has to be  b1 + g   k   b1 k2t v .
(b) In the proof of part (a) we determined the weight vector w  of the matrix " .
"
 
= "  contains the remaining columns of the matrix " with the rst row and
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rst column removed, and we deduce that the weight vector of "  has to be
w  = (0; : : : ; 0; 2
v 1
"
2t 1 2t v
; 0; : : : ; 0; 2t   2v
"
2t 1 2t v 1
; 0; : : : ; 0; 2v 1   1
"
2t 1
; 0; : : : ; 0):
  contains 2t   2t v   1 sets and the related equations of the linear system 4.2
are
a2i   a2i 1 =
8>><>>:
1
2t 1 (b1   k + (2t v   1)(g   k)) 2v 1 times,
1
2t 1 (b1   k   (g   k)) 2t   2v times,
1
2t 1 (b1   k   (2t v + 1)(g   k)) 2v 1   1 times.
Choose b1; g; k as stated in the proposition. Then b1   k   (2t v + 1)(g   k)
is negative as g  k + b1 k
2t v+1 . For all i = 2; : : : ; 2
t we dene a2i and a2i 1
as described in part (a). This yields an elementary solution (a2; : : : ; a2t+1) for
( ; b1; g; k) since
2tX
i=2
a2i =
1
2t 1
 
(2t   2v 1)(b1   k) + (2v 1(2t v   1)  (2t   2v))(g   k)

= b1   k + 1
2t 1
(2t 1   2v 1) (b1   g)| {z }
k
 b1   1
2t v
k  b1:
The parameters b1 = g, k = 0 have the property that k <
b1
2
and g  maxfb1  
k; k + b1 k
2t v+1g. In this case the requirements 2t 1j(b1   k = g   k = b1) can
be weakened: For all i = 2; : : : ; 2t we have a2i   a2i 1 2

0; b1
2v 1
	
and the
requirement 2v 1jb1 is sucient.
Furthermore
2tX
i=2
a2i 1 =
1
2t 1
(2v 1   1)  (2t v + 1)(g   k)  (b1   k)
=
1
2t 1
 
(2t 1 + 2v 1   2t v   1)g   (2t 1   2t v)k   (2v 1   1)b1

shows that the length of each suitable code has to be
n  b1 + 1
2t 1
 
(2t 1 + 2v 1   2t v   1)g   (2t 1 + 2t v)k   (2v 1   1)b1

=
1
2t 1
 
(2t 1   2v 1 + 1)b1 + (2t 1 + 2v 1   2t v   1)g   (2t 1 + 2t v)k

:
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Example 7.12. Let   be an access structure on t = 4 participants which is related
to the Boolean polynomial p(x1; x2; x3; x4) = 1 + x1x2x3. Then
  = ffT1:T2; T3g ; fT1; T2; T3; T4gg
and
"  =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
| {z }
u=13
6
6
8
6
8
8
6
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
:
The additional row contains the weights of the rows. Choose b1 = g = 8 and k = 0.
The related equations of the linear system 4.2 are
a2i   a2i 1 = 1
8
(b1 + (13  2  6)b1)
=
b1
4
for i = 2; 3; 5; 8
a2i   a2i 1 = 1
8
(b1 + (13  2  7)b1)
= 0 for i = 9; 10; : : : ; 16
a2i   a2i 1 = 1
8
(b1 + (13  2  8)b1)
=  b1
4
for i = 4; 6; 7:
We choose a4 = a6 = a10 = a16 = a7 = a11 = a13 =
b1
4
= 2 and the remaining aj = 0.
Then
16P
i=2
a2i = b1 and
16P
i=2
a2i 1 = 34b1 and we choose a2 = 0 and a1 =
1
4
b1 = 2.
Let s = (1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0) be the secret to be shared. That means
supp(s) = f1; 2; : : : ; 8g.
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I41 = supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) \ supp(k3) \ supp(k4)
I44 = supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) \ supp(k3) \ supp(k4)
I46 = supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) \ supp(k3) \ supp(k4)
I47 = supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) \ supp(k3) \ supp(k4)
I410 = supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) \ supp(k3) \ supp(k4)
I411 = supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) \ supp(k3) \ supp(k4)
I413 = supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) \ supp(k3) \ supp(k4)
I416 = supp(s) \ supp(k1) \ supp(k2) \ supp(k3) \ supp(k4)
Let a4; a6; a10; a16 determine the positions f1; 2g, f3; 4g, f5; 6g, f7; 8g and a1; a9; a11; a13
the positions f9; 10g, f11; 12g, f13; 14g, f15; 16g, respectively- This yields the follow-
ing shares:
k1 = (1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; 1; 0; 0; 1; 1; 1; 1; 0; 0)
k2 = (0; 0; 1; 1; 0; 0; 1; 1; 0; 0; 1; 1; 0; 0; 1; 1)
k3 = (0; 0; 0; 0; 1; 1; 1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; 1; 1; 1)
k4 = (0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0)
Remark 7.13. (a) For    xi1  : : :  xiv the parameters provided by Proposition
7.11 (a) represent a slight improvement on the parameters provided by Theorem
4.22: b1 is improved from
b1  22t   2t to b1  22t 1   2t
and g is improved from
b1
2
< g  b1

1
2
+
1
2t

  2t 1
to
b1

1
2
+
1
2t v+1

  2t 1(2t v   1)  g  b1

1
2
+
1
2t v+1

:
k is subject to the same condition k = b1
2
  2t 1.
(b) For    xi1 : : :xiv+1 the parameters b1 = g and k = 0 are possible. Proposition
7.11 (b) and Lemma 5.26 (a) imply, that for all n  b1
 
2  1
2v 1

the code C = Zn2
is suitable for (s; ; b1; b1; 0) for all words s 2 Zn2 with weight b1.
When an access structure   is related to a Boolean polynomial of the form p =
xi1  : : :  xiv + 1, a set is authorized i it contains the set fTi1 ; : : : ; Tivg. That means
fTi1 ; : : : ; Tivg is a necessary subset of all authorized sets and   is dened by this nec-
essary set. The dual access structure   consists of all non-empty sets which do not
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contain the whole set fTi1 ; : : : ; Tivg. For this access structure one can say that the par-
ticipants Ti1 ; : : : ; Tiv have veto power. When they work together and collectively join
the reconstruction process, they prevent the recovery of the secret.   is characterized
uniquely by the veto set fTi1 ; : : : ; Tivg.
This motivates us to have a closer look at access structures dened by necessary
sets and veto sets and their realizations.
7.2 Access Structures Dened by Necessary Sets
and Veto Sets
In this section we deal with classes of access structures dened by so-called necessary
sets and veto sets. It will turn out that some of these classes match perfectly to our
approach using error-correcting codes and allow large security distances g and small
code lengths n.
By a necessary set we mean a subset N  T such that a set of participants can
only be authorized if it contains certain participants of N . A subset V  T is called
a veto set when all sets of participants, which contain certain participants of V , are
unauthorized. In other words these certain participants are able to compromise the
correct reconstruction of the secret: They have veto power.
In [8] Blundo et al. also consider access structures with veto capability, which can
be realized using error-correcting codes. However, the way in which the participants
use their vetoes is dierent and the resulting access structures cannot be described by
veto sets. Additionally the use of the error-correcting code is completely dierent from
our approach. Blundo et al. study threshold access structures with veto capability.
In such a (r;m; t)-access structure on a set of t participants a set is authorized i it
contains at least r participants from whom at most m   1 members want to prevent
the correct reconstruction of the secret. Each participant can decide whether he wants
to recover the secret or whether he wants to compromise the reconstruction. For this
purpose he has two dierent shares: one share to enable the reconstruction of the
secret and another share to prevent it. This means, strictly speaking, this is not an
access structure in the sense of Denition 2.1.
Blundo et al. show how these access structures can be realized using Reed Solomon
codes. They start with a realization for the case m = 1 where all sets with at least r
participant are authorized if no participant uses his veto. Their method is an expansion
of Shamir's scheme and works as follows.
Consider a secret s 2 GF (pm), p prime, and choose random elements s1; s2 2
GF (pm) such that s = s1 + s2 (componentwise addition modulo p). Choose two
polynomials f; g 2 GF (pm)[x] randomly with deg(f) = 2r   2 and deg(g) = r   1
such that f(0) = s1 and g(0) = s2. Let c be the codeword of a Reed Solomon code
over GF (pm) which belongs to the polynomial f . The shares of each participant
consist of some correct digits of the codeword c, some random elements of GF (pm),
which are not components of c, and one interpolation point of g. In the recreation
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process each participant provides his interpolation point. When he wants to recover
the secret, he also provides his correct parts of c. Otherwise, when he wants to
prevent the reconstruction, he uses his veto by giving his random elements. When
at least r participants join the reconstruction process, their interpolation points yield
the polynomial g and therefore g(0) = s2. Fewer than r interpolation points provide
no information about s2. This is Shamir's scheme. In addition to that, when no
participant uses his veto, there are enough correct digits to recover c with an errors-
and-erasures algorithm. The codeword c yields s1 = f(0) and therefore the secret
s = s1 + s2. When at least one participant refuses to give his correct digits, there are
too few digits to decode c and s1 cannot be found.
For m > 1 a (r;m; t)-access structures can be derived from (r; 1; t)-access structures
in the following way. Choose a random polynomial f 2 GF (pm)[x] of degree t   m
such that s = f(0) is the secret and choose t further interpolation points s1; : : : ; st of
f such that each participant Tj has the power to prevent the reconstruction of one
interpolation point sj by providing his random elements instead of the correct com-
ponents. In the reconstruction process the participants try to recreate as many as
possible of the interpolation points of f and use them to recover s just as in Shamir's
scheme. When less than r participants join the reconstruction, no interpolation point
can be found and s cannot be recovered. Suppose that at least r participants take
part. When m or more participants use their vetoes, at most t   m interpolation
points can be reconstructed- too few to recover f and s. Otherwise the secret can be
found, since at least r  m+ 1 interpolation points can be recovered.
Now we return to access structures dened by necessary sets and veto sets. At rst
we have a closer look on those dened by necessary sets. We consider two kinds:
Denition 7.14. Let T be a set of participants,   an access structure on T and
N  T , N 6= ?.
 N is called strongly necessary, when all authorized sets contain the whole set N .
That means the whole set N is necessary for reconstructing the secret.
 We call N weakly necessary, when each authorized set contains at least one par-
ticipant of N . Here at least one participant of N is necessary for reconstruction.
Note that there can be unauthorized sets containing N or participants from N .
Access structures with necessary sets are generally non-monotone.
Example 7.15. Let T = fT1; T2; T3; T4g and N = fT1; T2g. For
  = ffT1; T2g ; fT1; T2; T4gg
N is strongly necessary and for
  = ffT1; T2; T3g ; fT2; T4gg
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N is weakly necessary.
Note that a strongly necessary set N is also weakly necessary, since all authorized
sets have to contain N and therefore at least one element of N .
Denition and Remark 7.16. Let T be a set of participants and N  T . The
largest access structure (e.g. the access structure with the largest cardinality) on T
with N being strongly necessary is
 sn(T ; N) := fA  T : N  Ag :
The largest access structure on T with N being weakly necessary is
 wn(T ; N) := fA  T : N \ A 6= ?g :
When the participant set T is clear, we omit the parameter T .
Remark 7.17. We have the inclusion  sn(T ; N)   wn(T ; N) because
A 2  sn(T ; N) ) N  A
) A \N 6= ?
) A 2  wn(T ; N):
Example 7.18. For T = fT1; T2; T3; T4g and N = fT1; T2g
 sn(N) = ffT1; T2g ; fT1; T2; T3g ; fT1; T2; T4g ; fT1; T2; T3; T4gg
and
 wn(N) =
 fT1g ; fT1; T3g ; fT1; T4g ; fT1; T3; T4g ;
fT2g ; fT2; T3g ; fT2; T4g ; fT2; T3; T4g ;
fT1; T2g ; fT1; T2; T3g ; fT1; T2; T4g ; fT1; T2; T3; T4g
	
:
Now we will have a closer look at access structures dened by veto sets. Again we
consider two kinds:
Denition 7.19. Let T be a set of participants,   an access structure on T and
V  T , V 6= ?.
 We say that V is a strong veto set , when all sets of participants, which contain at
least one participant of V , are unauthorized. That means each single participant
of V has veto power.
 We say that V is a weak veto set , when all sets containing the whole set V
are unauthorized. Here the participants of V have veto power when all of them
collaborate.
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When a set V is a strong veto set, it is also a weak veto set: Suppose that all subsets
containing at least one element of V are unauthorized. Then all sets containing the
whole set V must be unauthorized, too.
Example 7.20. Let T = fT1; T2; T3; T4g and V = fT1; T2g. For
  = ffT3g ; fT3; T4gg
V is a strong veto set, since all sets containing T1 or T2 are unauthorized. For
  = ffT1; T3g ; fT2; T4gg
V is a weak veto set, since all sets , which contain T1 and T2, are unauthorized.
Denition and Remark 7.21. Let T be a set of participants and V  T . Then
 sv(T ; N) := fA  T : A 6= ?; V \ A = ?g
is the largest access structure on T with V being a strong veto set.
 wv(T ; N) := fA  T : A 6= ?; V * Ag :
is the largest access structure on T with V being a weak veto set. When the participant
set T is clear, we omit the parameter T .
Remark 7.22. We have the inclusion  sv(T ; V )   wv(T ; V ) because
A 2  sv(T ; V ) ) A \ V = ?
) V * A
) A 2  wv(T ; V ):
There is an interesting connection between the access structures dened by neces-
sary sets and those dene by veto sets.
Remark 7.23. Let T be an arbitrary set of participants and N  T . Then
  sn(T ; N) = fA : N  Ag is dual to  wv(T ; N) = fA 6= ? : N * Ag and
  wn(T ; N) = fA : N \ A 6= ?g is dual to  sv(T ; N) = fA 6= ? : N \ A = ?g.
Example 7.24. Let T = fT1; T2; T3; T4g and V = fT1; T2g. Then
 sv(V ) =  wn(V ) = ffT3g ; fT4g ; fT3; T4gg
and
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 wv(V ) =  sn(V )
=
 fT3g ; fT4g ; fT3; T4g ;
fT1g ; fT1; T3g ; fT1; T4g ; fT1; T3; T4g ;
fT2g ; fT2; T3g ; fT2; T4g ; fT2; T3; T4g
	
:
In the following we will study the access structures  sn(N),  wn(N),  sv(V ) and
 wv(V ) with regard to elementary realizations and suitable error-correcting codes.
7.2.1 Access Structures Dened by Necessary Sets
Elementary Realizations and Suitable Codes for  sn(N)
Let N ( T be a subset of participants, N 6= ?, and let
  =  sn(N) = fA  T : N  Ag :
Then a subset is authorized i it contains all members of N . We can assume without
loss of generality that N = fT1; : : : ; Tvg, 1  v  t. That means a vector y =
(y1; : : : ; yt)
 2 Zt2 is the characteristic vector of an unauthorized set i there is at
least one j, 1  j  v, with yj = 0. Hence   is related to the Boolean polynomial
p(x1; : : : ; xt) = 1 + x1  : : :  xv (see Lemma 7.3). According to Proposition 7.11, the
only restrictions on the parameters are the following.
Parameters for  sn(N)
 k < b1
 b1  g  max

b1   k; k + b1 k2t v+1
	
 2t 1j(b1   k), 2t 1j(g   k)
In particular, the parameters b1 = g divisible by 2
v 1 and k = 0 are possible. Further-
more the code C = Zn2 is suitable for (s; ; b1; b1; 0) for all words s 2 Zn2 with weight
b1 for all n 2 N, n  b1
 
2  1
2v 1

(see Remark 7.13 (b)) .
Elementary Realizations and Suitable Codes for  wn(N)
Let N ( T , N 6= ?, and dene
  =  wn(N) = fA  T : N \ A 6= ?g :
Here a set is authorized i it contains at least one member of N . For an arbitrary h 2 N
with h  v  1 the following calculations show that (b1; g; k) realizes   elementarily if
the following restrictions hold:
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Parameters for  wn(N)
 b1 = g
 k = g
2
  2h
 g  2v+h+1   2h+1
 2vjg
Again let w.l.o.g. N = fT1; : : : ; Tvg with v < t. Then the dual access structure is
  =  sv(N) = fB : B  fTv+1; : : : ; Ttgg n f?g (see Remark 7.23) and
"1
 
=
0BBB@
0 : : : 0
...
...
0 : : : 0

1CCCA
| {z }
u=2t v 1
9=; v
g t  v
:
The submatrix () consists of all columns in Zt v2 except for the zero vector. The
related weight vector is given by
w  = (2
v   1
"
0
; 0; : : : ; 0; 2t   2v
"
2t v 1
; 0; : : : ; 0)
(see Remark 5.15).
Hence we have the following types of equations
a2i   a2i 1 = 1
2t 1
(b1   k + (u  2  0)(g   k))
=
1
2t 1
 
b1   k + (2t v   1)(g   k)

2v   1 times,
a2i   a2i 1 = 1
2t 1
 
b1   k + (u  2  2t v 1)(g   k)

=
1
2t 1
(b1   k   (g   k)) 2t   2v times.
For an arbitrary h 2 N, h  v   1, let b1 = g  2v+h+1   2h+1 be divisible by 2v and
k = g
2
  2h. We dene
a2i =
1
2v 1 (g   k) = g2v + 2h v+1; a2i 1 = 0 2v   1 times and
a2i = a2i 1 = 0 2t   2v times.
Note that a2; a3; : : : ; a2t+1 2 N0 since 2v 1jg k = g2  2h. Let a2 = g2v  2h+1 + 2h v+1.
Then a2  0 since g  2h+v+1   2h+1 and we have
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2tX
i=1
a2i = a2 + (2
v   1)  1
2v 1
 (g   k)
=
g
2v
  2h+1 + 2h v+1 +

2  1
2v 1


g
2
+ 2h

| {z }
g  g
2v
+2h+1 2h v+1
= g = b1:
Hence (a2; : : : ; a2t+1) is an elementary solution for ( ; b1; b1; k). Additionally, the rst
order Reed-Muller code RM(1; v+h+2) is suitable for (s; ; 2v+h+1; 2v+h+1; 2v+h 2h)
for all secrets s 2 RM(1; v + h+ 2) n f(0; : : : ; 0); (1; : : : ; 1)g (see Lemma 5.26 (b)).
7.2.2 Access Structures Dened by Veto Sets
Elementary Realizations and Suitable Codes for  wv(V)
Let V be a subset of T with 0 < v < 2t elements. Consider the access structure
  =  wv(V ) = fA  T : A 6= ?; V * Ag :
Here a subset is unauthorized i it contains all participants of V . That means the
participants of the veto set V have a collective veto right.
As pointed out in Remark 7.23, this access structure is dual to the access structure
 sn(V ), where V acts as a strongly necessary set. We assume without loss of generality
that V = fT1; : : : ; Tvg. We have seen above that  sn(V ) is related to the Boolean
polynomial 1 +x1  : : : xv. Hence the dual access structure  wv(V ) must be related to
the Boolean monomial x1  : : : xv of degree v. Proposition 7.11 (a) yields the following
parameters:
Parameters for  wv(V )
 b1  22t 1   2t
 k = b1
2
  2t 1
 b1
 
1
2
+ 1
2t v+1
  2t 1(2t v   1)  g  b1  12 + 12t v+1 
 2t 1jg   k, 2tjb1
We also know from Proposition 7.11 (a) that the minimum length of a suitable code
is b1 + g   k   b1 k2t v .
Elementary Realizations and Suitable Codes for  sv(V)
Again let V  T be a subset with 0 < v < 2t elements. Dene
  =  sv(V ) = fA  T : A 6= ?; A \ V = ?g :
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Here all subsets are authorized i they do not contain any participant of V . That
means each member of the veto set V has the power to impede the reconstruction of
the secret.
According to Remark 7.23, this access structure is dual to the access structure
 wn(V ). Using Proposition 6.2 we can nd an elementary realization (b1; g; k) and an
elementary solution (a2; : : : ; a2t+1) for ( sv(V ); b1; g; k).
We have seen above that (b1; g; k) with b1 = g divisible by 2
v, k = g
2
  2h and
g  2v+h+1   2h+1 for an arbitrary h 2 N, h  v   1, realize  wn(V ) elementarily.
For applying Proposition 6.2 we need g   k to be divisible by 2t 1. Furthermore we
require b1  2t v+h+1   2h+1. This yields the following parameters.
Parameters for  sv(V )
 b1 = g
 k = g
2
  2h
 g  max2v+h+1   2h+1; 2t v+h+1   2h+1	
 2tjg
Suppose that (a2; : : : ; a2t+1) is an elementary solution for ( wn(V ); b1; b1; k). The linear
system 4.2 for  wn(V ) provides two types of equations for a3; : : : ; a2t+1 :
a2i =
1
2v 1 (g   k) = g2v + 2h v+1; a2i 1 = 0 2v   1 times and
a2i = a2i 1 = 0 2t   2v times.
Using the notations of Proposition 6.2 the number x of all pairs (a2i; a2i 1) with
a2i   a2i 1 < 12t 1 (2b1   g   k) is x = 2t   2v and S =
2tP
i=2
0a2i< 2b1 g k2t 1
a2i = 0. Furthermore we
know from the observations about  wn(V ) that
2tP
i=2
a2i 1|{z}
=0
= 0. Therefore
x  2b1   g   k
2t 1
  S|{z}
=0
= (2t   2v)  g   k
2t 1
= (2t   2v) 
g
2
+ 2h
2t 1
= g   g
2t v
+ 2h+1   2h t+v+1
 g   2
t v+h+1   2h+1
2t v
+ 2h+1   2h t+v+1
= g = b1  
2tX
i=2
a2i 1| {z }
=0
:
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This means that all requirements of Proposition 6.2 are met and (b1; b1; k) with the
stronger restrictions stated above is an elementary realization for both access struc-
tures,  wn(V ) and  sv(V ).
According Lemma 5.26 (b), the rst order Reed-Muller code RM(1; v + h+ 2) is also
suitable for (s; sv(V ); 2
v+h+1; 2v+h+1; 2v+h  2h) for all secrets s 2 RM(1; v+ h+ 2) n
f(0; : : : ; 0); (1; : : : ; 1)g.
It is also possible to dene access structures by necessary sets and veto sets at the
same time. Finally, we have a look at their realizations.
7.2.3 Access Structures Dened by Necessary Sets and Veto
Sets
Denition and Remark 7.25. Let T be a set of participants and N; V ( T disjoint
non-empty subsets. Then

 sn;sv(N; V ) := fA  T : N  A; A \ V = ?g
is the largest access structure on T with N being strongly necessary and V being
a strong veto set.

 sn;wv(N; V ) := fA  T : N  A; V 6 Ag
is the largest access structure on T with N being strongly necessary and V being
a weak veto set.

 wn;sv(N; V ) := fA  T : N \ A 6= ?; A \ V = ?g
is the largest access structure on T with N being weakly necessary and V being
a strong veto set.

 wn;wv(N; V ) := fA  T : N \ A 6= ?; V 6 Ag
is the largest access structure on T with N being weakly necessary and V being
a weak veto set.
Elementary Realizations and Suitable Codes for  sn;sv(N;V)
Let
  =  sn;sv(N; V ) = fA  T : N  A and V \ A = ?g :
That means a set of participants is authorized i it contains all members of the nec-
essary set N and no member of the veto set V . We will see that   allows the same
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favorable parameters as the access structure  sn(N [ V ). This comes from the fact
that  sn;sv(N; V ) =  sn(N [ V ) M V :
 Let A be arbitrary with (N [ V )  A. Then
A M V = (A [ V| {z }
=A
) n A \ V| {z }
=V
= A n V 2  sn;sv(N; V )
since N  A n V . This means  sn;sv(N; V )   sn(N [ V ) M V .
 Let A be arbitrary with N  A and A \ V = ?. Then
A = A n V = (A [ V ) [ V| {z }
=A[V
n (A [ V ) \ V| {z }
=V
= (A [ V )| {z }
N _[V
M V
Hence  sn;sv(N; V )   sn(N [ V ) M V .
 sn(N [ V ) consists of all sets of participants, which contain all members of N [ V .
Without loss of generality assume that V = fT1; : : : ; Tvg and N = fTv+1; : : : ; Tv+wg.
We obtain the matrices
"1 sn(N[V ) =
0BBBBBBBBBB@
1 : : : 1
...
...
1 : : : 1
1 : : : 1
...
...
1 : : : 1

1CCCCCCCCCCA
| {z }
2t v w
9=; v9=;w
g t  v   w
and "1 sn;sv(N;V ) =
0BBBBBBBBBB@
0 : : : 0
...
...
0 : : : 0
1 : : : 1
...
...
1 : : : 1

1CCCCCCCCCCA
| {z }
2t v w
9=; v9=;w
g t  v   w
;
where the submatrix () contains all vectors in Zt v w2 as columns.
According to Remark 6.19 (b) the access structures  sn(N [ V ) and  sn;sv(N; V )
have the same linearity type and we can use the same parameters for realizing both
of them. These are
Parameters for  sn;sv(N; V )
 k < b1
 b1  g  max

b1   k; k + b1 k2t v+1
	
 2t 1j(b1   k), 2t 1j(g   k).
For k = 0 and b1 = g divisible by 2
v 1 the code C = Zn2 is suitable for (s; ; b1; b1; 0)
for all words s 2 Zn2 with weight b1 for all n 2 N, n  b1 + b12v 1 . (see Remark 7.13)
(b).
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ElementaryRealizationsandSuitableCodesforΓsn,wv(N,V)
Let
Γ=Γsn,wv(N,V)={A⊆T :N⊆AandV⊆A}.
That meansasetofparticipantsisauthorizediﬀitcontainsal membersofthe
necessarysetN andnotal membersofthevetosetV. W.l.o.g. assumethat
N={T1,...,Tw}andV={Tw+1,...,Tw+v}.
Thecolumnsofthematrixε1Γare
N
V
T\(N∪V)


1 ...1.. ..
1 ...1
∗


2t−w

w

t−w
withoutthecolumns
N
V
T\(N∪V)


1 ...1.. ..
1 ...1
1 ...1.. ..
1 ...1
∗


2t−w−v

w

v
}t−w−v
wherethecolumnsofthesubmatrices(∗)and(∗)arealpossiblevectorsinZt−w2
andZt−v−w2 ,respectively. Thenumberoftheunauthorizedsetsisu=2t−2t−w+
2t−w−v−1.InordertoﬁndtheweightdistributionwΓoftherowsofεΓwedetermine
theweightsofalnon-triviallinearcombinationsoftherowsofε1Γ.Inthiscontext,
linearcombinationsareregardedasdiﬀerent,whentheircoeﬃcientsarediﬀerent,even
whentheresultingvectorsareequal. WeuseRemark5.15andhavetoconsiderthe
folowingcases:
linearcombinationsof
rowsbelongingto.. number weight
N 2w 1−1 0 #rowseven
2w 1 2t w−2t w v #rowsodd
V 2v 1−1 2t w 1 #rowseven
2v 1 2t w 1−2t w v #rowsodd
T\(N∪V) 2t w v−1 2t w 1−2t w v 1
N,V (2w 1−1)(2v 1−1) 2t w 1 #rowsofNeven,
#rowsofVeven
(2w 1−1)·2v 1 2t w 1−2t w v #rowsofNeven,
#rowsofVodd
2w 1·(2v 1−1) 2t w 1−2t w v #rowsofNodd,
#rowsofVeven
2w 1·2v 1 2t w 1 #rowsofNodd,
#rowsofVodd
N,T\(N∪V) (2w−1)(2t w v−1) 2t w 1−2t w v 1
V,T\(N∪V) (2v−1)(2t w v−1) 2t w 1−2t w v 1
N,V,T\(N∪V) (2w−1)(2v−1)(2t w v−1) 2t w 1−2t w v 1
(#meansthenumberoftherows.)
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Overall the row weight of "  are
0 2w 1   1 times,
2t w   2t w v 2w 1 times,
2t w 1 2w+v 1   2w 1 times,
2t w 1   2t w v 2w+v 1   2w 1 times,
2t w 1   2t w v 1 2t   2w+v times.
This yields the following row weights di of " :
2t 1 2w 1   1 times,
2t 1   2t w + 2t w v 2w 1 times,
2t 1   2t w 1 2w+v 1   2w 1 times,
2t 1   2t w 1 + 2t w v 2w+v 1   2w 1 times,
2t 1   2t w 1 + 2t w v 1 2t   2w+v times.
If there is an elementary solution (a2; a3; : : : ; a2t+1) for ( ; b1; g; k), the following equa-
tions provided by the linear system 4.2 have to be fullled:
a2i   a2i 1
= 1
2t 1 (b1   k + (2t   2t w + 2t w v   1| {z }
u
 2  2t 1|{z}
di
)(g   k))
= 1
2t 1 (b1   k + ( 2t w + 2t w v   1)(g   k)) 2w 1   1 times,
a2i   a2i 1
= 1
2t 1 (b1   k + (u  2  (2t 1   2t w + 2t w v))(g   k))
= 1
2t 1 (b1   k + (2t w   2t w v   1)(g   k)) 2w 1 times,
a2i   a2i 1
= 1
2t 1 (b1   k + (u  2  (2t 1   2t w 1))(g   k))
= 1
2t 1 (b1   k + (2t w v   1)(g   k)) 2w+v 1   2w 1 times,
a2i   a2i 1
= 1
2t 1 (b1   k + (u  2  (2t 1   2t w 1 + 2t w v))(g   k))
= 1
2t 1 (b1   k   (2t w v + 1)(g   k)) 2w+v 1   2w 1 times,
a2i   a2i 1
= 1
2t 1 (b1   k + (u  2  (2t 1   2t w 1 + 2t w v 1))(g   k))
= 1
2t 1 (b1   k   (g   k)) 2t   2w+v times.
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For b1 = g that means
2tX
i=2
a2i =
1
2t 1
 
2w 1  (2t w   2t w v) + (2w+v 1   2w 1)  2t w v (g   k)
=
1
2t 1
(2t   2t v)(g   k):
Let g
2
> k   1
2
  1
2v+1 2

g. Then
2tX
i=2
a2i  1
2t 1
(2t   2t v)

1
2
+
1
2v+1   2

g = g = b1:
Hence there is an elementary solution for ( sn;wv(N; V ); b1; g; k) for the following pa-
rameters.
Parameters for  sn;wv(N; V )
 b1 = g
 g
2
> k   1
2
  1
2v+1 2

g
 2w+v 1jg   k
For example (2e; 2e; 2e 1   2t 1) realize  sn;wv(N; V ) elementarily for all e 2 N, e 
t + v. According to Lemma 5.26 (b), the rst order Reed-Muller code RM(1; e + 1)
is suitable for (s; sn;wv(N; V ); 2
e; 2e; 2e   2t 1) for all codewords s 2 RM(1; e + 1) n
f(0; : : : ; 0); (1; : : : ; 1)g.
Elementary Realizations and Suitable Codes for  wn;sv(N;V)
We consider the access structure
  =  wn;sv(N; V ) = fA  T : N \ A 6= ? and V \ A = ?g :
Here a set of participants is authorized i it contains at least one member of the
necessary set N and no member of the veto set V . This access structure allows
the same parameters as the access structure  sn;wv(V;N) since  wn;sv(N; V ) is the
symmetric dierence  sn;wv(V;N) M (N [ V ):
 Let A 2  sn;wv(V;N) be arbitrary. Then V  A, N 6 A and
A M (N [ V ) = (A [ V| {z }
=A
[N) n (A \ (N [ V ))
= A [N n (A \N [ A \ V| {z }
=V
)
= (A M N) n V 2  wn;sv(N; V );
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since ((A M N) n V ) \ V = ? and ((A M N) n V ) \N 6= ?.
This means  wn;sv(N; V )   sn;wv(V;N) M (N [ V ).
 Let A 2  wn;sv(N; V ) be arbitrary. Then A \N 6= ?, A \ V = ? and
A = (A [ V ) n V
= (((A nN) [ V ) [ (N [ V ))| {z }
=A[V
n (((A nN) [ V ) \ (N [ V ))| {z }
=V
= ((A nN) [ V ) M (N [ V ) 2  sn;wv(V;N) M (N [ V );
since V  ((A n N) [ V ) and N 6 ((A n N) [ V ). Hence  wn;sv(N; V ) 
 sn;wv(V;N) M (N [ V ).
W.l.o.g. let V = fT1; : : : ; Tvg and N = fTv+1; : : : ; Tv+wg. The columns of the matrix
" sn;wv(V;N) are
V
N
T n(N[V )
0BBBBBBBB@
1 : : : 1
...
...
1 : : : 1

1CCCCCCCCA
| {z }
2t v
9=; v9=; t  v
without the columns
V
N
T n(N[V )
0BBBBBBBBBBB@
1 : : : 1
...
...
1 : : : 1
1 : : : 1
...
...
1 : : : 1
0
1CCCCCCCCCCCA
| {z }
2t w v
9=; v9=;w
g t  w   v
where the columns of the submatrices () and (0) are all possible vectors in Zt v2 and
Zt v w2 , respectively. That means a linear combination of the columns can only be the
zero vector, if the number of the summands is even. By Remark 6.19 (b) the access
structures  wn;sv(N; V ) and  sn;wv(V;N) have the same linearity type and we can use
the same parameters for realizing  wn;sv(N; V ) and  sn;wv(V;N). These are
Parameters for  wn;sv(N; V )
 b1 = g
 g
2
> k   1
2
  1
2w+1 2

g
 2w+v 1jg   k.
Also here (2e; 2e; 2e 1   2t 1) realize  wn;sv(N; V ) elementarily for all e 2 N, e 
t + w. According to Lemma 5.26 (b), the rst order Reed-Muller code RM(1; e + 1)
is suitable for (s; wn;sv(N; V ); 2
e; 2e; 2e   2t 1) for all codewords s 2 RM(1; e + 1) n
f(0; : : : ; 0); (1; : : : ; 1)g.
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Elementary Realizations and Suitable Codes for  wn;wv(N;V)
Let
  =  wn;wv(N; V ) = fA  T : N \ A 6= ? and V 6 Ag :
In this access structure a set of participants is authorized i it contains at least one
member of the necessary set N and not all members of the veto set V . The columns
of the matrix "1
 
are
N
V
T n(N[V )
0BBBBBBBBBB@
0 : : : 0
...
... 
0 : : : 0
1 : : : 1
...
...
0 1 : : : 1
00
1CCCCCCCCCCA
9=;w9=; v
g t  w   v| {z }
2t w 1
| {z }
2t v
without
0BBBBBBBBBBB@
0 : : : 0
...
...
0 : : : 0
1 : : : 1
...
...
1 : : : 1
000
1CCCCCCCCCCCA
| {z }
2t w v
9=;w9=; v
g t  w   v
:
The columns of the second matrix occur in both parts of the rst matrix. Hence
one set of these columns has to be omitted such that they do not occur twice. The
columns of the submatrices
 
00

and (000) are all possible vectors in Zt v2 and Zt w v2 ,
respectively. The columns of the submatrix (0) are all vectors in Zt w2 except for the
zero vector. We have to omit the zero vector because "  does not contain the zero
column. We have u = 2t w + 2t v   2t w v   1 unauthorized sets. Now we determine
the weight distribution w  of the rows of " . Again we use Remark 5.15.
linear combinations of
rows belonging to ... number weight
N 2w   1 2t v 1
V 2v 1   1 2t w 1
2v 1 2t w 1 + 2t v   2t w v
T n (N [ V ) 2t w v   1 2t w 1 + 2t v 1   2t w v 1
N , V (2w   1)(2v 1   1) 2t w 1 + 2t v 1
(2w   1)  2v 1 2t w 1 + 2t v 1   2t w v
N , T n (N [ V ) (2w   1)(2t w v   1) 2t w 1 + 2t v 1   2t w v 1
V , T n (N [ V ) (2v   1)(2t w v   1) 2t w 1 + 2t v 1   2t w v 1
N , V , T n (N [ V ) (2w   1)(2v   1)(2t w v   1) 2t w 1 + 2t v 1   2t w v 1
(As in the study of  sn;sv(N; V ) there are cases where we have to distinguish between
even and odd numbers of summands.)
This yields the following row weight of " :
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2t v 1 2w   1 times,
2t w 1 2v 1   1 times,
2t w 1 + 2t v   2t w v 2v 1 times,
2t w 1 + 2t v 1 2w+v 1   2w   2v 1 + 1 times,
2t w 1 + 2t v 1   2t w v 2w+v 1   2v 1 times,
2t w 1 + 2t v 1   2t w v 1 2t   2w+v times.
If there is an elementary solution (a2; a3; : : : ; a2t+1) for ( ; b1; g; k), it has to fulll the
following equations:
a2i   a2i 1
= 1
2t 1 (b1   k + (2t w + 2t v   2t w v   1| {z }
u
 2  2t v 1| {z }
di
)(g   k))
= 1
2t 1 (b1   k + (2t w   2t w v   1)(g   k)) 2w   1 times,
a2i   a2i 1
= 1
2t 1 (b1   k + (u  2  2t w 1)(g   k))
= 1
2t 1 (b1   k + (2t v   2t w v   1)(g   k)) 2v 1   1 times,
a2i   a2i 1
= 1
2t 1 (b1   k + (u  2  (2t w 1 + 2t v   2t w v))(g   k))
= 1
2t 1 (b1   k   (2t v   2t w v + 1)(g   k)) 2v 1 times,
a2i   a2i 1
= 1
2t 1 (b1   k + (u  2  (2t w 1 + 2t v 1))(g   k))
= 1
2t 1 (b1   k   (2t w v + 1)(g   k)) 2w+v 1   2w   2v 1 + 1
times,
a2i   a2i 1
= 1
2t 1 (b1   k + (u  2  (2t w 1 + 2t v 1   2t w v))(g   k))
= 1
2t 1 (b1   k + (2t w v   1)(g   k)) 2w+v 1   2v 1 times,
a2i   a2i 1
= 1
2t 1 (b1   k + (u  2  (2t w 1 + 2t v 1   2t w v 1))(g   k))
= 1
2t 1 (b1   k   (g   k)) 2t   2w+v times.
Unfortunately, an elementary realization with b1 = g is only possible for w = 1 or
v = 1. In this case we have
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2tX
i=2
a2i =
1
2t 1
 
(2w   1)(2t w   2t w v) + (2v 1   1)(2t v   2t w v)
+(2w+v 1   2v 1)  2t w v(g   k)
=
1
2t 1
(2t+1   2t w+1   2t v+1 + 2t w v+1)(g   k)
= 4 

1  1
2w

1  1
2v

(g   k)
=

2  1
2maxfw;vg 1

(g   k) as w = 1 or v = 1:
Let g
2
> k  g
2
  g
2maxfw;vg+1 2 . Then
2tX
i=2
a2i 

2  1
2maxfw;vg 1

g
2
+
g
2maxfw;vg+1   2

= g = b1:
That means there is actually an elementary solution (a2; a3; : : : ; a2t+1) for ( ; b1; b1; k)
with w = 1 or v = 1, if
Parameters for  wn;wv(N; V ) for w = 1 or v = 1
 b1 = g
 g
2
> k 

1
2
  1
2maxfw;vg+1 2

g
 2w+v 1jg   k
In this case Lemma 5.26 (b) says that for all e  t+max fw; vg the code RM(1; e+1)
is suitable for ( wn;wv(N; V ); 2
e; 2e; 2e 1   2t 1) for all codewords s 2 RM(1; e + 1) n
f(0; : : : ; 0); (1; : : : ; 1)g.
For larger necessary sets or veto sets there is no elementary realization with b1 = g,
since v; w  2 yields
2tX
i=2
a2i = 4 

1  1
2w

1  1
2v

(g   k)
 4 

3
4
2
(g   k) > 9
8
g > g = b1:
We show that in this case the following parameters are suitable:
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Parameters for  wn;wv(N; V ) for w; v  2
 b1  22t
 g = b1
 
1
2
+ 1
2t+2 v

 k = b1
2
  2t 1
 22t+1 vjb1
For those parameters all right hand sides of the equations 2 up to 2t of 4.2 are positive
since for all i = 2; : : : ; 2t
a2i   a2i 1  1
2t 1
 
b1   k| {z }
b1
2
+2t 1
 (2t v   2t w v + 1)(g   k)| {z }
b1
2t+2 v +2
t 1

=
1
2t 1
b1|{z}
22t
1
4
+
1
2w+2
  1
2t v+2| {z }
>0

  2t v + 2t w v
 2t 1   2t v| {z }
0
+2t w v  0:
Hence we can apply Lemma 4.12(d) and obtain
2tX
i=2
a2i =
1
2t 1
 
(2t   1)(b1   k)  u(g   k)

=
1
2t 1

(2t   1)

b1
2
+ 2t 1

  (2t w + 2t v   2t w v   1)

b1
2t+2 v
+ 2t 1

=
b1
2t 1

2t 1   3
4
  2v w 2 + 2 w 2 + 2v t 2

+ 2t

1  1
2w

1  1
2v

= b1  

3
4
+ 2v w 2   2 w 2   2v t 2

b1
2t 1|{z}
2t+1
+2t

1  1
2w

1  1
2v

 b1   2t
1
2
+ 2v w 1   2 w 1| {z }
0
 2v t 1 + 2 w| {z }
0
+ 2 v   2 w v| {z }
0

 b1:
This show that there is an elementary solution for ( wn;wv(N; V ); b1; g; k) with the
restrictions stated above. It has the property that all odd numbered components are
zero. This is also the case in Theorem 4.22 (a) and it can be shown as in the proof of
Theorem 4.22 (b), that each binary (not necessary linear) code C with minimum dis-
tance d(C) = b1, which contains the zero word, is suitable for (s; wn;wv(N; V ); b1; g; k)
for all codewords s 2 C with weight b1. For example RM(1; e + 1), e  2t + 1, is
suitable for (s; wn;wv(N; V ); 2
e; 2e 1 + 2e t 2+v; 2e 1  2t 1) for all s 2 RM(1; e+ 1) n
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f(0; : : : ; 0); (1; : : : ; 1)g (see Corollary 4.24).
We end this chapter with a detailed example for the realization of the access structure
 sn;wv(N; V ) on an arbitrary number t  5 of participants, where the disjoint subsets
N; V both contain two elements. Compared to the universal solution provided by
Theorem 4.22 this realization is far superior with regard to eciency and security.
Instead of a code length n  b1  22t   2t the code length n = 128 is sucient
for all t  5. Furthermore we have the security distance g = b1 instead of g 
b1
 
1
2
+ 1
2t
  2t 1.
Example 7.26. Let T = fT1; : : : ; Ttg, t  5, N = fT1; T2g and V = fT3; T4g.
Consider the access structure   =  sn;wv(N; V ) which consists of all subsets of T
which contain T1 and T2 and at most one of the participants T3 and T4. For t = 5
there are u = 2t   2t 2 + 2t 2 2   1 = 25 unauthorized subsets. The resulting matrix
"  can be seen at the the end of the example. The weights of the rows are written in
the additional column.
We choose the parameters b1 = g = 64, k = 24 and the binary code C = RM(1; 7).
Let s = (1; : : : ; 1| {z }
32
; 0; : : : ; 0| {z }
32
; 1; : : : ; 1| {z }
32
; 0; : : : ; 0| {z }
32
)  1 + x6 be the secret to be shared.
The row weights of "  yield the following system of linear equations:
a2i   a2i 1 = 116 (b1   k + (u  2  10)(g   k)) = 15 for i = 2; 3
a2i   a2i 1 = 116 (b1   k + (u  2  12)(g   k)) = 5 for i = 6; 7; 10; 11; 13; 16
a2i   a2i 1 = 116 (b1   k + (u  2  13)(g   k)) = 0 for i = 17; 18; 19; : : : ; 32
a2i   a2i 1 = 116 (b1   k + (u  2  14)(g   k)) =  5 for i = 5; 8; 9; 12; 14; 15
a2i   a2i 1 = 116 (b1   k + (u  2  16)(g   k)) =  15 for i = 4
In order to nd an elementary solution we choose
a2i = 15; a2i 1 = 0 for i = 2; 3
a2i = 5; a2i 1 = 0 for i = 6; 7; 10; 11; 13; 16
a2i = 0; a2i 1 = 0 for i = 17; 18; 19; : : : ; 32
a2i = 0; a2i 1 = 5 for i = 5; 8; 9; 12; 14; 15
a2i = 0; a2i 1 = 15 for i = 4:
Then we calculate
a2 = b1  
2tX
i=2
a2i = 64  2  15  6  5 = 4
and
a1 = n  b1  
2tX
i=2
a2i 1 = 128  64  6  5  15 = 19:
a2i = a2i 1 = 0 for all i  17 means that jsupp(k5)j = 0, hence k5 is the zero word
and we can exclude it from the further observations. We dene the other shares by
deciding which positions should be determined by the single aj, j = 1; 2; : : : ; 32:
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j s k1 k2 k3 k4 aj positions
1 0 0 0 0 0 19 33  51
2 1 0 0 0 0 4 1  4
4 1 1 0 0 0 16 67  81
6 1 0 1 0 0 16 10  24
7 0 1 1 0 0 16 104  119
9 0 0 0 1 0 5 57  61
12 1 1 0 1 0 5 87  91
14 1 0 1 1 0 5 30  32; 65; 66
15 0 1 1 1 0 5 124  128
17 0 0 0 0 1 5 52  56
20 1 1 0 0 1 5 82  86
22 1 0 1 0 1 5 25  29
23 0 1 1 0 1 5 119  123
26 1 0 0 1 1 5 5  9
27 0 1 0 1 1 5 99  103
29 0 0 1 1 1 5 62  64; 97; 98
32 1 1 1 1 1 6 92  96
This yields the shares
k1 = 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
0011 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111
0011 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111;
k2 = 0000 0000 0111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0111
1100 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0001 1111
1100 0001 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111;
k3 = 0000 1111 1000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0111
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 1111 1111
1100 0000 0000 0000 0000 0011 1111 1111
1111 1110 0000 0000 0000 0000 0001 1111
and
k4 = 0000 1111 1000 0000 0000 0000 1111 1000
0000 0000 0000 0000 0001 1111 0000 0111
0000 0000 0000 0000 0111 1100 0001 1111
1111 1110 0000 0000 0000 0011 1110 0000:
When a subset of participants is authorized, the sum of their shares diers from the se-
cret in 24 positions. Since 24 <
j
d(C) 1
2
k
=

63
2

, Hamming decoding yields the secret.
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Otherwise, when the subset is unauthorized, the following table shows that Hamming
decoding yields always the wrong codeword. Even the next non-zero codeword is not
the secret. Furthermore, there are various codewords which have the same distance
from the sum as the secret.
unauthorized nearest codeword(s) # codewords c with
sum S c 6= 0 d(S; c) = 64
k1 c  x7, d(S; c) = 4 192
k2 c  1 + x6 + x7, d(S; c) = 24 68
k3 c  1 + x4 + x5, d(S; c) = 30 80
k1 + k3 c  1 + x4 + x5 + x7, d(S; c) = 34 74
k2 + k3 c  1 + x6 + x7, d(S; c) = 24 138
k1 + k2 + k3 c  1 + x6, d(S; c) = 24 138
k4 c  1 + x5 + x6 + x7, d(S; c) = 44 64
k1 + k4 c  x7, d(S; c) = 40 64
k2 + k4 c  1 + x6 + x7, d(S; c) = 28 60
k1 + k2 + k4 c  1 + x6, d(S; c) = 24 70
k3 + k4 c  x5, d(S; c) = 28 70
k1 + k3 + k4 c  x5 + x7, d(S; c) = 28 70
k2 + k3 + k4 c  1 + x5 + x6 + x7, d(S; c) = 32 70
k1 + k2 + k3 + k4 c  x4 + x5 + x6, d(S; c) = 30 72
kj, j  5 all c 2 C n f(0; : : : ; 0)(1; : : : ; 1)g, 254
d(S; c) = 64
In the case t > 5 all participants kj with j  6 receive the zero word as share. The
shares of T1; : : : ; T5 remain the same.
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"  =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
10
10
16
14
12
12
14
14
12
12
14
12
14
14
12
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
In this thesis we introduced a new approach towards secret sharing using error-
correcting codes. We developed a method which enables us to realize arbitrary access
structures. It turned out that the price for this generality is a limitation regarding the
security and the eciency of the scheme.
The secret is a codeword in a binary error-correcting code and the shares are binary
words of the same length. They have the property that Hamming decoding applied to
the sum of the shares of a set of participants yields the secret i the set is authorized.
The following restrictions were made: We studied the case that there is only one
large distance g from the share sums of the unauthorized sets to the secret and only
one small distance k from the share sums of the authorized sets to the secret. This
enabled us to describe each set of suitable shares in terms of non-negative integer
solutions of the linear system 4.2:
2tX
i=1
a2i = b1
a4   a3 = 1
2t 1
E2  b
...
a2i   a2i 1 = 1
2t 1
Ei  b
...
a2t+1   a2t+1 1 = 1
2t 1
E2t  b;
where we considered only elementary solutions with a2i = 0 or a2i 1 for all i = 2; : : : ; 2t.
Based on these considerations Theorem 4.22 provides parameters b1; g; k depending
only on the number t of the involved participants, which can be used to realize all
access structures. b1 is the weight of the secret to be shared.
 b1 2 N, b1  22t   2t such that 2t j b1
 k = b1
2
  2t 1
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 g 2 N, b1
2
< g  b1
 
1
2
+ 1
2t
  2t 1 such that 2t 1 j g
Furthermore, Theorem 4.22 says that each binary (not necessarily linear) code C
with minimum distance d(C) = b1 which contains the zero word is suitable for sharing
all codewords in C with weight b1.
Using the parameters provided by Theorem 4.22, the security distance g is rather
small and large code length n  b1  22t   2t are required. The problem of the small
distances g can be overcome by the use of a combiner, but the large code lengths remain
problematic. So, it must be said that our realization for arbitrary access structures is
unsuitable in practice.
In order to nd special access structures which allow better parameters, we classi-
ed all access structures, such that all access structures lying in the same class allow
the same parameters. Furthermore we studied the impact of changes in the access
structure on the elementary realizations. As a result, we have been able to identify
special classes which are far superior with regard to eciency and security.
On the one hand these are access structures related to Boolean polynomials of
degree one with the constant summand 1. In these access structures a set is autho-
rized i it contains an odd number of participants of an arbitrary xed subset of the
participant set. Here the security distance g = b1 is possible and the weight b1 of the
secret can be chosen arbitrarily with 2t 1jb1. Furthermore Zn2 is a suitable code for
all n  b1 and all words with weight b1. On the other hand, some access structures
dened by necessary sets and veto sets allow larger security distances and smaller code
lengths:

 sn(N) = fA : N  Ag
dened by a strongly necessary set N allow the parameters b1 = g, k = 0 where
b1 has to be divisible by 2
t 1. C = Zn2 is suitable for all n  b1
 
2  1
2jV j 1

.

 wn(N) = fA : N \ A 6= ?g
dened by a weakly necessary set N allows g = b1 and C = RM(1; jN j+ 2 + h)
for all h  jN j   1.

 sv(V ) = fA 6= ? : V \ A = ?g
dened by a strong veto set V allows g = b1 and C = RM(1; jV j+ 2 + h) for all
h  jV j   1.

 sn;sv(N; V ) = fA : N  A and V \ A = ?g
dened by a strongly necessary set N and a strong veto set V , allow g = b1 with
2jV j 1jb1, k = 0 and C = Zn2 for all n  b1 + b12jV j 1 .
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
 wn;sv(N; V ) = fA : N \ A 6= ? and V \ A = ?g
dened by a weakly necessary set N and a strong veto set V , allow g = b1 and
C = RM(1; e+ 1) for all e  t+ jN j.

 sn;wv(N; V ) = fA : N  A and V 6 Ag
dened by a strongly necessary set N and a weak veto set V , allow g = b1 and
C = RM(1; e+ 1) for all e  t+ jV j.

 wn;wv(N; V ) = fA : N \ A 6= ? and V 6 Ag
dened by a weakly necessary set N and a weak veto set V , allow g = b1 and
C = RM(1; e+ 1) for all e  t+ maxfjN j; jV jg.
Besides the results of this thesis, there are still many open questions and ideas for
further research, which are not followed yet.
Firstly the question arise, whether there are further classes of access structures,
which have ecient and secure realizations using our approach. For this purpose it
might be helpful to develop more techniques for changing access structures and to
study their inuence on the realizations.
Another question is, what kinds of realizations can be found when dierent large
and dierent small distances are allowed, or when we do not consider elementary
solutions.
Furthermore a change in the methods for nding integer solutions for the linear
system 4.1 might bring interesting results. For example, methods from linear opti-
mization could be used .
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